

Report

## **European Defence and the Mediterranean**

**Roberto Aliboni**

European defence concerns in the Mediterranean region reflect both objective realities and European perceptions of the challenges they face. Any analysis of future European defence must, therefore assess both considerations in order to describe what future defence configurations in the region will be but the most important concern is to establish what the challenges might really be.

### Assessing challenges and risks

A broad objective assessment of the challenges and risks emanating from the European Union's southern approaches is therefore essential. The first dimension that needs to be considered is related to South-South relations and developments, for Southern instability, stemming from domestic and inter-state conflict is at the roots of European and Western perceptions. Identifying which intra-state and inter-state factors cause instability is definitely relevant to any assessment of the risks coming from Western Europe's southern approaches

The second dimension concerns North-South relations. Challenges in this dimension come from essentially four factors: (a) spill-over effects from conflicts that may involve Western and NATO allies or their interests and security, a case explicitly contemplated by NATO's New Strategic Concept (NSC); (b) the use against and impact on European and Western countries of asymmetric strategies, as is the case with state-supported terrorism and other kinds of attacks such as sabotage, supply or transit disruptions; (c) the political and military impacts of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the associated delivery means; and (d) so-called "rogue states", now that the term has come back in vogue in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001 and the advent of the George W. Bush administration to power in the United States.

The third dimension is concerned with the impact on European Union societies from trans-national risks and the entanglement of external and domestic factors which

generates such risk. The list here includes varying forms of organised crime including trafficking of drugs, arms, human beings and organs, migrants; smuggling; and money laundry. Immigration must also be considered as part of this dimension, although it is not, in itself, a risk, but EU perceptions of immigration and its possible entanglement with forms of crime and illegality makes it a risk whose objective weight must be assessed.

*At the roots of risk: political instability and conflict in the South-South dimension*

A number of principal factors are regarded by the West as causes - either structural or proximate - of instability in the Southern Mediterranean area. Inadequate economic structure and performances in regional economies, along with their social implications, form one such factor, although it will not be considered in detail here. This report, in contrast, dwells on three basic political factors: (a) the uncertain legitimacy of political regimes; (b) the relevance of systemic opposition to the authority of the secular state and international order; and (c) unsolved and fresh conflict in the area. These factors concern mostly the Arab states, though some of them involve Israel and Turkey as well.

*Uncertain legitimacy of political regimes*

Arab states cannot be regarded as weak states, in the sense of states undermined by serious structural flaws, though the states in the Levant may be closer to such weakness because of the peculiar legacy of both colonisation and decolonisation[1]. In fact, the end of the Cold War, while exposing such weakness in the former Soviet Union and in the Western Balkans, has witnessed a remarkable stability on the part of the Middle Eastern and North African states. In contrast, however, these states enjoy weak legitimacy for their political regimes. This weak legitimacy of Arab states arises from the continued importance of their need for authenticity - be it pan-Arab or Islamic - with respect to other political discourses.

It has been noted[2] that legitimacy, in the form of an “implicit social contract, forged by the elites in the 1950s,” had been predicated on “a ‘trade-off’ between genuine political participation and palpable improvement in the quality of life of the citizens as well as the heady excitement of Arab nationalism. In other words, political freedom was sacrificed on the high altar of Arab nationalism”. Having failed to establish a powerful pan-Arab state, Arab regimes themselves have subsequently become discredited. After the end of the Cold War, they attempted to manage transitions towards democracy in order to re-

establish the foundations of their legitimacy but these attempts have proved to be broadly unsuccessful.

In fact, incumbent regimes face objective domestic situations that do not encourage a transition to democracy. The problem is not one of compromise with relevant liberal oppositions in order to shift the mainspring of legitimacy towards some form of democracy. Real and relevant opposition does not come from those who ask for the establishment of democracy because the social contract mentioned above has not been carried out but from those, nowadays in an Islamic rather than a nationalist garb, who insist on the contract being fulfilled. In these circumstances, governments ready to abandon authenticity for more democratic institutions would encounter serious opposition and would hardly be able to survive. Thus, these regimes are themselves hostages to their early legitimacy. As they are unable or unwilling to deliver in terms of this legitimacy and have no alternative basis for consensus, all they retain is a weak power-base that does not allow for political reform, bold foreign policies and rapid economic innovation. From the standpoint of the Union, therefore, weak incumbent governments are a primary and important source of instability.

#### *The relevance of systemic domestic opposition*

Significant contemporary opposition to Arab governments, as well as related issues, stem from religious rather than nationalist concerns, however. In the 1990s, Western and European Union perceptions and policies with respect to Islamism have oscillated[3] over a range of positions. There was a wide debate about political Islam and what the responses to it should be where two main positions emerged.

On the one hand, after the 1990-91 Gulf War, Western perceptions of Islamism and its impact became acute as a result of domestic reactions to the war in most Arab countries, in particular in Egypt, in occupied Palestine and in Algeria. The expansion and apparent strength of political Islam emerged as a major concern for varying reasons: for one thing, political Islam was perceived as a threat to Arab governments currently engaged in the Middle East process; for another, it was easily linked to the Islamic presence in Europe in view of the large Algerian community in France and increasing immigration into Europe. These developments appeared to confer on Islamism a more palpable global dimension and make its significant impact beyond Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) borders more likely.

Perceptions of such international Islamist project combined with emerging ideas in Western countries about the enhanced role factors relating to culture and identity were expected to play in post-Cold War international relations and the tensions that might result. In this framework, NATO, a little hastily, went so far as to identify Islamism and Islam as the new global threat to the West after the end of Communism.

On the other hand, the rise of political Islam was regarded as a sign of the need for polities in the MENA area to introduce political reform and pluralism. In a sense, this view was in tune with the typical democratic triumphalism that prevailed in the West as a consequence of the end of Communism. The argument was made that, provided they renounced violence and accepted the rules of the democratic game (most importantly, to allow political alternatives to control government), Islamist parties and groupings had to be considered legitimate opposition movements and integrated into national political processes within the framework of democratic reforms. The inherent systemic nature of Islamist opposition to the kind of Westphalian secular states that have gradually developed in the MENA in the wake of the French Revolution and the colonial experience, was broadly trivialised by stressing the unacceptability of “culturalist” interpretations[4].

This point of view has been strongly supported by Western non-governmental organisations (such as the Sant’ Egidio Community in Italy) as well as by academic circles and has significantly influenced official Western policies. For example, developments in Algeria have been an important test of such views and policies, particularly in Europe. Islamist leaders, considered as terrorists by the Algerian government were given political asylum in European countries and in the United States. In general, the distrust towards the authoritarian and illegitimate nature of the Algerian military regime overweighed concerns about Islamist violence. The use of violence by the Algerian state was regarded as state-terrorism, to the extent it was exercised by a poorly legitimated incumbent power, so that Islamist violence (but not terrorism) was regarded as legitimate resistance. This state of affairs continued into to mid-1990s, when the expulsion of a number of Algerian leaders from the United States and Europe coincided with a change in Western policies.

Thus the significance of political Islam and the possible concomitant violence has been reconsidered by Western governments. There was an appreciation of the essentially domestic character of religious political opposition and its adverse impact on allied or

pro-Western regional governments. In fact, political Islam has taken up the struggle of pan-Arab nationalism for complete decolonisation. It is against the location of Israel in Palestine and resists perceived Western intrusion and oppression. Its most immediate enemies, however, are incumbent regimes, seen as responsible for failing to defeat Israel and counter Western domination. Regimes are considered to be accomplices of Israel and the West, so that the first task for political Islam is their overthrow. In this sense, political Islam is primarily a systemic domestic opposition and its integration into the political game can easily bring the game to an end, rather than fostering its democratisation. From the Western point of view, such movements contribute to the weakening of incumbent regimes, without providing an alternative to them. By weakening incumbent regimes, they help to increase instability in the MENA countries and thus feed Western concerns derived from such instability.

In Israel, political stability is assured by long-standing democratic institutions, Nonetheless, it is being undermined for reasons and in a context that differ from those in Arab countries, yet have similar effects. According to a recent analysis, the end of David Ben Gurion's "strategic periphery" policies after the 1967 war gave way to a search for political solutions. These policies had involved a recognition of strategic antagonism with neighbouring states which was neutralised by strategic friendship with their own neighbours. In essence, this meant that hostility from neighbouring Arab states was countered by alliances with their non-Arab neighbours in Africa and Asia. The policies that replaced them stimulated, in turn, the emergence of an Israeli ethno-nationalism which strenuously opposed such solutions themselves on the basis of ideological exclusivism and religious extremism that were alien to early Zionism. Ethno-nationalist trends have been compounded by social changes in Israeli society, stemming from modernisation, growing income inequalities and the immigration of Jewish communities, which are socially deprived in Israel, in comparison to the existing Israeli elite. The same analyst points out that, "...the most notable consequence of these social changes was the emergence of a coalition between the forces of Land Israel-focused ethno-nationalists, stimulated by a sense of national deprivation, and sub-group identities (especially among North-African voters), encouraged by a sense of relative communitarian deprivation"[5]. These trends have given way to political fragmentation, on one hand, and to Jewish domestic terrorism and violence on the other.

These trends are similar to those prevailing in the Arab world and produce similar consequences. In particular, beside the practice of terrorism and the use of violence for political ends, the most important political outcome is the emergence of weak governments based on fragmented coalitions. Successive Israeli governments, both from the ethno-nationalist and democratic sides of the political divide there, have been powerfully restricted and weakened by the smaller parties in their respective coalitions. Such restrictions, more often than not, are the prerogative of religious parties, to which the originally secular Israeli state is gradually yielding - as did its Arab counterparts - in order to mollify religious opposition. The weakening of the secular character of MENA secular states as well as that of governments and regimes is, in itself, a cause of instability, both domestically and internationally. It is also, incidentally, one of the most important causes for the inconclusive outcome of the Middle East Peace Process.

Developments in recent years have suggested that Islamist movements are declining in influence and effectiveness[6]. However, recent events, particularly since September 11, 2001, have emphasised that, although radical political Islam may not have become an international armed political movement, a dangerous trend has emerged that is more than trans-national in nature and has developed a global dimension.

#### *Unsolved and fresh violent conflict in the area*

Public opinion in Europe - and in the West in general - perceives the MENA region broadly as a conflict-ridden area. This perception does not, however, account for the changes in the nature of conflict there that have emerged since the end of the East-West confrontation. In essence, it is still assumed that instability in the region stems primarily from inter-state conflict involving conventional warfare. In reality, contemporary instability there is far more likely to come from intra-state conflict, where a lower order of violence prevails – in the form of terrorism, guerrilla action and insurgency movements – and from threats stemming from non-conventional factors in the form of the proliferation of WMD.

In fact, the end of the Cold War has powerfully reduced the military capabilities of a number of Southern Mediterranean countries and changed their strategic and political perspectives. One consequence of such curtailment, coupled by worsening economic conditions in the region, has been the trend towards acquiring WMD, as weapons perceived to have the most effective expenditure-to-impact ratio. Another important

consequence of these changes in political and strategic perspectives has been that the most relevant conflicts in the area - in particular, the Western Sahara and Arab-Israeli conflicts - have declined in terms of military confrontation, being redirected towards negotiation instead. Even the violent crisis that erupted in the wake of the failure of the Camp David negotiations in September 2000 is most unlikely to be translated into inter-state warfare. The situation that prevails today in the area is one where major conflicts are not completely resolved but are terminated, in the sense that political and military conditions will prevent them from erupting again in the form of inter-state armed conflict. The terminated but politically unresolved character of major Southern Mediterranean conflicts[7] has, to a considerable extent, meant that violence has shifted from the international to the domestic arena. In fact, as we have already seen, the peace processes governments have been compelled to undertake as a result of changes in the international context have raised strong domestic opposition from nationalist as well as religious quarters and have helped to weaken the legitimacy of the governments concerned. As a result, while inter-state conflict has been suppressed, violent domestic conflict has increased – in the form of political turmoil, terrorism, guerrilla activity or insurgency.

It should be noted that the increase in domestic conflict in the MENA region does not compare with the developments that have taken place in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet empire as a consequence of the end of the Cold War. Whilst domestic conflict there, particularly in the Caucasus and the Western Balkans, has been triggered by the collapse of state structures, in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East these structures have not collapsed, so that conflict there has not assumed the same disruptive character as in Eastern Europe. Even in the most serious cases of domestic conflict in the Southern Mediterranean - Islamist violence against the Algerian state - the state itself was able to retain a relatively high degree of “sustainable security”[8] and proved able to survive by repressing its Islamist opposition. The issue of sustainable security emerged even more clearly in the confrontation between the Turkish state and the extremist Kurdish movement, the PKK. One important implication of such state solidity is the relatively low significance of domestic turmoil for international security as far as secessionist or irredentist tendencies are concerned – unlike the situation in Eastern Europe.

In short, the current character of conflict in the MENA area is more intra-state than inter-state and the object of contestation is more government than territory, in the sense in

which these terms are used by SIPRI. Though it differs from the more traditional situation ordinarily perceived by public opinion in Europe, such a configuration of conflict is perceived in the West and in the European Union, in particular, as an additional source of instability. First, instability derived from domestic conflict compounds those factors that currently weaken government and regime – in particular, the ability to undertake gradual political reform and to contribute to international order and stability. Second, the fact that major conflicts have ended and that violence has shifted towards domestic arenas does not mean that the Mediterranean as a whole is free of international tension, crisis or latent conflict[9]. It may well be that existing geopolitical configurations will continue to prevent inter-state conflict. At the same time, however, domestic conflict weakens the ability of governments to come to terms with unsolved inter-state conflict and such inability fatally translates into more domestic conflict, low-level violence in international relations and hostile relations between regional states. All-in-all, both terminated but unresolved conflict and domestic conflict give the area a character of accentuated instability.

#### Risks in the North-South dimension

Having analysed the roots of instability in EU southern approaches, there remains the question of whether and to what extent such instability affects European security or stability by generating risks, threats or spill-overs.

#### *Spill-overs from conflict related to Euro-Atlantic coalitions*

At the beginning of the 1990s the collapse of the communist regimes in the Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern European countries, on one hand, and the Gulf crisis, on the other, suggested a significant potential for conflict to spill over and for the international scene to become involved in national and ethnic conflict as well as social, environmental and economic disruption. Two kinds of risks were perceived: involvement in conflict relating to minorities or territorial disputes in political arenas close to or directly involved in Euro-Atlantic alliance structures, as was the case with Eastern Europe and the Kurds respectively; and sudden, large increases in migrants and refugees, particularly in the form of “uncontrolled movement of peoples” highlighted in the 1999 Strategic Concept.

In fact, uncontrolled movements did take place, from Northern Iraq to Turkey as a consequence of the Gulf War and from Albania to Italy as a consequence of the collapse of the Albanian state. They were more consciously triggered by the central government

of the Yugoslav Federation from the Kosovo region towards adjoining countries during the Kosovo crisis. At the height of the Algerian crisis, there was also speculation about the likelihood of huge displacements of people towards Southern Europe, particularly France, which, however, never took place. Quite apart from such large and sudden movements of people, ordinary flows of migrants and refugees have considerably increased in recent years, thereby offering Europe a different kind of challenge.

As far as involvement in conflict was concerned, the successful and rapid inclusion of Central European countries in Euro-Atlantic coalition structures has avoided minority conflicts between local countries in the area. On the other hand, however, conflict in the western Balkans has fully involved NATO and the European Union. In the MENA region, violent inter-state conflict has subsided as a consequence of the end of the East-West confrontation and the peace negotiation processes in the Middle East and Western Sahara. Risks from the MENA region have not disappeared, however; NATO and an European Union enlarged to include Turkey may become directly involved in conflict at the fringes of Anatolia. Furthermore, they would be involved indirectly, whenever crises today under control were revived, whether in the Arab-Israeli arena, the Gulf or the Western Sahara.

To assess future risks a distinction must first be made between "spill-overs" and involvement. Spill-overs, understood more specifically as the ancillary effects of sudden conflict, such as day-to-day flows of migrants and refugees triggered by external crises, are by now part of the ordinary European landscape and are not a risk in any sense similar to that of the involvement in violent conflict. A second distinction must be made between risks of indirect involvement in distant crises, as with those which could affect the MENA areas, and risks of direct involvement in adjoining crises at the Euro-Atlantic periphery. In fact, while direct involvement is passively suffered by Euro-Atlantic coalitions and entails a defensive response, involvement in distant crises stems from a proactive reaction and a forward defensive or offensive response.

While the European Union's risks of direct involvement in MENA crises now seem remote, to what extent can the Union be involved indirectly by distant crises from MENA areas? As a matter of fact, threats to overall international stability are perceived today by Euro-Atlantic coalitions as an important public good with strong impacts on their internal stability, cohesion and prosperity. In this sense, risks stem less from the need to protect or defend allied territories than from the need to intervene abroad to manage crises in a "forward defence" perspective. In such a perspective, the European Union's indirect

involvement, as a member of a Euro-Atlantic coalition, may increase in the MENA region as well as other areas.

*Asymmetric strategies: terrorism and other attacks*

In the Euro-Atlantic vision, an important set of perceived risks involve damage that can be inflicted by low-intensity violence - such as sabotage, disruptions in supply and logistical control of vital resources and, more broadly speaking, any kind of terrorism. What brings these risks together is that they are all expressions of asymmetric strategies - in a sense, the same is true for WMD proliferation - and constitute paradigms[10] whereby war and coercive diplomacy are carried out by actors weaker than their perceived enemies. There is no doubt that the Mediterranean and the MENA region are among those areas in the world where the West is largely perceived by state and non-state actors alike as an intrusive oppressor. These actors confront Western countries, in particular the United States, as enemies or hostile entities and, being much weaker, use asymmetric strategies.

In implementing such strategies, terrorism, for example, can give way to direct attack or to spill-over effects. Traditional terrorism aims primarily at domestic targets, although it may also be directed against domestic targets owned by or otherwise linked to European and Western countries or even conduct attacks within these countries themselves. Conceptually, these kinds of direct attacks must be distinguished from the concept of spill-overs. Spill-overs consist, more properly, of terrorist activities taking place on European or Western territories for logistical reasons - the murder of adversaries located in Europe; recruitment, the organisation of bases, for example. In these cases, European and Western countries are not an object of attack but merely an environment in which such attack occurs.

Direct attacks on Europe and Western countries can also come from what has come to be called “new terrorism”[11] as well. The difference between this and traditional terrorism (broadly conducted by sub-state actors in a nationalist, ethnic or religious perspective) relates to the fact that new terrorism attacks are carried out by sub or super-state actors either for non-traditional reasons or as a service to effectively covert (“rogue”) state or even non-state entities. The similarity is that both new and old terrorism use asymmetric techniques to strike at stronger actors and call upon similar motives for their activities,

such as perceived interference, injustice or oppression. In principle, therefore, the new terrorism can also generate spill-overs as well.

It must be noted that the distinction between attacks and spill-overs may be difficult to maintain in specific cases, but is still very important in terms of the response to be provided. If a European or Western country suffered what would be regarded as a direct attack internally or externally, it would be entitled to a defensive response by using coercive and military instruments, whereas spill-overs would legitimate no more than police responses or other non-military security measures. If common Western “vital” interests were attacked, NATO could feel it legitimate to respond in military terms. This is not the case with the European Union, which would only be prepared to respond to spill-overs instead and, to that end, has initiated a set of internal and external policies of cooperation and prevention.

Thus European Union risks with respect to asymmetric strategies can only be effectively analysed on the basis of the distinction made between direct attacks and spill-overs. Is Europe exposed to direct attacks as well as spill-overs, or is it more exposed to the latter or the former? The quantitative evidence set forth in this Report as well as current information available from published sources suggest that European risk is less affected by direct attack than by spill-over effects. This is due to two main reasons: geography and Europe’s - in particular the European Union’s - inability to operate globally as an international Westphalian-style actor.

Europe has always been important logistically for nationalist and Islamist terrorists and their covert activities. The contemporary Union, with its Schengen area for free population movement, is even more useful for terrorist logistics because it constitutes an environment in which terrorists can move more easily.

On the other hand, actors in both the old and new terrorist paradigms believe that the source of their perceived oppression and the predominant supporter of their immediate enemies (Israel and corrupt Arab regimes) is the United States as a global power, for Europe is only a second-level actor. In consequence, targeting Europe is, in general, ineffective in political and utilitarian terms. Direct attacks on specific European interests do occur, but their number and importance is not significant. In recent years, these attacks were very few and specifically targeted - for instance, Algerian attacks in France in 1994-

1996, which reflected Algerian perceptions of French political involvement in their ongoing civil war.

It certainly should not be forgotten that attacks directed at non-European countries such as the United States or Israel, or against Allied interests and facilities such as NATO bases, may take place against targets located on European territory. It may also be the case that these attacks involve Europe's direct political interests as well and, for this reason, could be regarded as direct attacks. Otherwise, they would be regarded as forms of spill-overs and, in any case, these possible developments do not change the basic fact that Europe, as a non-global power, is more likely to be affected by spill-overs than by direct terrorist attack. This situation stems not only from the objective facts but also from Europe's self-perception as a non-global power. An increasing number of Union members do not conceive of the Union as a global actor with power attributes or are plainly against such a concept. This vision may easily be strengthened by the Union's enlargement policy towards countries in Eastern Europe.

“The United States,” as an American analyst points out[12], “will move into the 21st century as a pre-eminent, global power in a period of tremendous flux within societies, among nations, and across states and regions... To the extent that the United States continues to be engaged as a global power, terrorism will have the potential to affect American interests, directly and indirectly”. This objective will be achieved by limiting America's freedom-of-action; threatening long-standing American diplomatic and political objectives such as the Middle East Peace Process; destabilising allies, such as Egypt, Israel and Turkey; and hindering the struggle against trans-national risks, such as trafficking and crime. This is not the case with the Union, which may, for example, be afraid of spill-over effects into its territory eventually triggered by terrorism in Egypt and Israel/Palestine but feels much less affected by their destabilisation as regimes. Individual European Union members may be concerned, but not the politically undeveloped Union of which they are members.

In current circumstances, it must be concluded that, in general, the European Union and, more generally speaking, Europe are exposed to non-negligible risks of spill-overs from new-style and - more likely – old-style terrorist activities in countries around the Mediterranean basin, but the risk or threat of direct terrorist attack seems less important. This conclusion can be confirmed to the extent that political Islam can be regarded as a domestic factor contributing to instability in Southern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern

countries. It may, however, be less certain if the emergence of trans-national and international terrorism is considered instead!

Another important example of asymmetric strategy is provided by the risks of attack on the flow of vital resources through sabotage and other disruptions, in particular, on energy resources. In this respect, earlier discussions in this study have shown that, as far as oil is concerned, structural economic conditions exist which prevent disruptions from translating into significant damage to Western and non-Western countries. On the other hand, gas supplies, because of the rigidity of their distribution infrastructure, in theory create more dependence. Yet, this dependence cuts both ways and is, in fact, a good example of interdependence whereby any attempts designed to damage importers would backfire on exporters. The same interdependence can be detected with respect to infrastructure which is more exposed to damage and disruption. Yet the joint interests of exporters and importers and the actual resilience of the technologies used tend to minimise the effectiveness of possible attacks. The historical record of such incidents shows that they are very limited in number and that damage has been repaired very quickly. Thus, even with respect to such an important factor as energy resources, risks appear very limited for Europe – and, in the event, for the United States as well.

#### *Military challenges: WMD and missile proliferation*

The reasons why both WMD and associated means of delivery are being increasingly developed by Third World countries are complex[13]. Proliferation stems from issues of political status and legitimacy as well as from actual security dilemmas. In any case, the dominant causes of WMD and missiles development in the MENA countries arises from regional South-South factors. In short, it is in the South-South context that Third World states face real military threat and, more often than not, are willing and able to resort to such military instruments to resolve their disputes, as they have demonstrated in the past.

As a result, in the average European perception, southern WMD and missiles are essentially targeted on southern neighbours, so that Western and European countries are not expected to be their military targets. For these reasons, MENA WMD and missiles are regarded by European countries as less a military than a political risk. In fact, from a European point of view, these weapons and missiles help to intensify the level of instability in the areas concerned and they thus also contribute to European and Western perceptions of the various kinds of risks coming from these areas.

In the United States, perceptions of risk from proliferation have been intensified because of the success of intermediate-range missile tests by North Korea, Pakistan and Iran[14]. According to American evaluations, in the not-too-distant future these countries will be able to develop inter-continental ballistic missiles. American perceptions have thus assumed a more global dimension, a trend emphasised first by the Clinton administration and now by the George W. Bush administration to support the National Missile Defence (NMD) initiative, the implications of which may go well beyond proliferation and North-South security relations[15].

While the development of a Southern inter-continental capability is debatable, it is feared that it would be more likely that at least Southern Europe will be in the range of Southern payloads in ten-to-twenty years time - according to various estimates[16]. However, current evaluations suggest that this development would increase current risk levels, not translate them into real threat. Even so, the overall military threat posed to Southern Europe by countries on the other side of the Mediterranean in these circumstances would amount to their ability to inflict damage rather than conduct full military attack. It must be pointed out, however, that this significant ability to create damage will definitely have an interdiction effect, primarily on Southern European countries and eventually on the European Union, thus limiting the Alliance's cohesion and its freedom of manoeuvre and intervention. Besides having undesirable political effects, such a trend would have a military relevance as well.

In fact, even though proliferation does not emerge as a mechanism for carrying out calculated aggression towards Europe and Western alliance interests in Europe, there are military risks associated with proliferation that cannot be overlooked[17]. From a military point of view, WMD and missiles can put Western and European interests at risk in a number of contingencies, such as the involvement of military forces on mission in the MENA area; involvement of allies, on a formal Alliance basis – for example, with Turkey – as well as on an informal basis – with, for example, Israel, Kuwait or Egypt; involvement of Western strategic interests such as those identified by the New Strategic Concept; or terrorist use of such weapons and methods.

These risks were already a matter of concern to European combat troops alongside American forces in the Gulf War. As pointed out above, in future contingencies they may well also be of concern to both American and European troops again. After all, the European Union is currently developing a rapid intervention force to manage crises

abroad and, in its interventions, whether in the MENA area or elsewhere, this force could well be targeted by WMD and missiles.

Thus, from the European perspective, proliferation is a predominantly political risk which essentially requires political, diplomatic and socio-economic responses if it is to be contained and possibly reversed. The effects of interdiction arising from the escalating trend of proliferation, however, magnify military risk and anticipate threats, particularly if the European Union agenda to set up a force for external intervention is to succeed.

### *Trans-national risk and immigration*

The term “trans-national risk” refers to international non-state factors that affect internal security, in particular domestic order and prosperity. They do not affect national security directly but, by affecting the stability of the domestic social and cultural fabric, they may undermine national security in a broader sense. Such risk essentially reflects organised crime, terrorism and migration and is usually referred to as “soft security”. The Barcelona Declaration refers to such risk in its third chapter and seeks to establish international policies of co-operation to deal with it in a Euro-Mediterranean framework.

The multifarious activities of international organised crime involve the smuggling of drugs and people, money-laundering and, more recently, cybercrime[18]. Terrorism is usually included in this rubric as well, although “new terrorism” seems more consistent than traditional terrorism with the kind of trans-national activities discussed here. Whereas traditional terrorism is mostly limited to the domestic arena, only rarely extending its reach abroad, and is motivated by clearly political objectives, new terrorism is by definition trans-national, conducted by non-national, often super-state, groups, and mostly directed to ends that are politically undefined. Yet, whatever the kind of terrorism included in the notion of trans-national risk, terrorism overall is the most important kind of asymmetric strategy generically involved in strategic risk for Europe. Organised crime is also a significant risk because of its size and ramifications. Its impact on European societies is devastating but, in Europe, the debate on soft security and associated risks to European society is much less concerned with terrorism and organised crime than with migration, both illegal and legal. Is immigration indeed a risk for European security?

The analysis here of the links between immigration and security notes that the presence of large immigrant communities may apparently support the logistical structure of terrorism, although, in reality, the process is far more complex and generally relies on

established communities, whether or not of migrant origin, rather than on transient migrants. Furthermore, social deprivation and poverty can facilitate recruitment and support, although this is far more typical of settled communities suffering social and political discrimination as the *banlieusard* phenomenon in France made clear in the mid-1990s. These risks are obviously higher with illegal than with legal immigrants, involving not only terrorism but also organised crime. It is clear, however, that in these cases the immigration process is not a risk in itself but constitutes a medium through which terrorism and organised crime operate so that they continue to be the real issues at stake. In any case, in terms of response, this means that receiving countries need less to constrain immigration than to increase police and intelligence efforts to counter terrorism and organised crime. In addition, as part of the general process of improving the social and political environment, they should reduce illegal immigration and attenuate social deprivation among immigrants and settled communities by appropriate measures of integration and inclusion.

Whilst this perspective of managing rather than opposing immigration is generally accepted by European governments and policy-makers, immigration itself has raised a sense of insecurity in European civil society which translates into neurotic concerns over identity and, as a result, into xenophobia and racism, designed to exclude immigrants and prevent immigration, whether legal or illegal[19]. In the 1990s, this trend has emerged within organised political entities, such as political parties, and in some cases it has begun to affect governmental policy. Insofar as security is conceived as a situation in which people are in actual control of their institutions[20], immigration has been regarded as a potential interference in this pattern of control and, thus, as a stimulus, particularly in view of Europe's weak demographic growth, to the growth of domestic xenophobia rather than a risk to European security. Indeed, the levels of immigration, even in intensive areas of settlement in, for example, France and Germany, are far from constituting risks of interference, even in the future, although they certainly promote xenophobia, which is, after all, ultimately intended to prevent change in the nature of European society.

In conclusion, migration in itself cannot be considered a risk in any meaningful sense, for risk arises, instead, from Europe's inadequate political and administrative capacities to manage effective migration policies. This is due to historical and cultural reasons but the task is also complicated by the European Union's transition to a common legal and human space and will be compounded by enlargement. While immigration is a Europe-wide

trend which operates at the trans-national level, so that member-states have only a limited grasp of the phenomenon, coordination at the European Union level is only beginning and cannot yet cope with the full implications of migration. It must be noted that this is also true for organised crime. Indeed, in general, trans-national risk is difficult to handle at the national level because of the asymmetry between its internal impact and its external origin. The sluggish European transition towards a super-state union magnifies this asymmetry. Thus, the real risk today is not migration but national European state and European Union inability to accommodate and regulate its flows.

To complete the picture, it must also be observed that trans-national risks have geopolitical patterns that overlap with the Mediterranean and the Middle East-North Africa regions, without necessarily coinciding with them. In the case of traditional terrorism, there is such a broad coincidence, although its Islamist components extend as far as Asia, but with “new terrorism” regional definitions are by definition inappropriate. Organised crime spills over from Europe, particularly from its southern, south-eastern and eastern areas, rather than from across the Mediterranean, though Morocco and Turkey are heavily involved in drug trafficking. On the other hand, migration comes from the Maghrib rather than from the Mashriq as well as from farther afield in Asia and Africa, in addition to coming from within Europe itself. Consequently, insofar as there can be a meaningful discussion of trans-national risk as perceived by Europeans, it must be borne in mind that such risk can hardly be defined as “Mediterranean” – a consideration which is certainly relevant in terms of policy formulation.

Thus, while organised crime is definitely a risk to European Union and wider European security, the risk created by migration has a quite different and subtle character. In general, risks from migration arise from distorted European perceptions of the phenomenon. The inability of the Union and of member-states to accommodate and regulate immigration could transform such distorted perceptions into a self-fulfilling prophecy. The risk, in short, stems from poor European management of migration, not from migration itself.

### *"Rogue states"*

Several states in the developing world pursue national and ideological objectives that the West perceives as contrary to standards of international co-operation and to the international order established at the end of the Cold War. Examples of such perceptions

would include, for example, Iraq's attempt to annex Kuwait in 1990 and Iran's refusal to support the Middle East peace process. In addition to such objectives, these states also use instruments and policies which can threaten peace - such as the use of weapons of mass destruction - or breach international law - such as the sponsorship of terrorism, smuggling or international crime - quite apart from their abuses of human rights.

Over the past two decades, particularly during the 1990s after the end of the Cold War, such states have been described as "rogue states" and, during the Clinton era, this term was used interchangeably with the term "pariah states". In essence, the term was used to demonise states whose behaviour was considered to be beyond the pale, as far as the "community of nations" - states who did accept agreed international norms - were concerned. Towards the end of the Clinton administration, the phrase "states of concern" was introduced as a less ideologically-loaded description but the advent of the Bush administration at the start of 2001, has brought the earlier term back into favour. It now occupies the frontline of the international relations agenda and the existence of such states, together with the threat to international order that they are alleged to pose, has become the rationale for the development of the United States' missile defence system, despite the threat that this may pose to international agreements.

Rogue states now exist in many parts of the world, although the Middle East and the Mediterranean seem to have a preponderance of them. They are also so-defined for a multitude of reasons but Iraq occupies the scene as the one full-blooded "rogue state" - Serbia having just escaped such a description by its timely revolution, with the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic and his subsequent arrest and removal to the international court at The Hague. Serbia, as a result, avoided the kind of continuing pressure it might have faced from NATO until it mended its ways that Iraq continues to face from Britain and the United States - with the promise of further American action, once the issue of Afghanistan and terrorism associated with the al-Qa'ida movement has been tidied up.

There are also two "half-rogue states" in the Middle East and Mediterranean regions - Iran and Libya - although they may now be moving to a more acceptable international status. This is particularly the case for Libya, in the wake of the successful conclusion of the Lockerbie trial, although the United States has continued its hostility until the question of compensation has been settled. Iran, too, in the wake of its unexpectedly co-operative attitude over the Afghanistan crisis, may also see its status improve. In both cases, interestingly enough, Europe has little problem with their potential change of status; the

difficulties reside in Washington and may reflect more an atavistic attachment to a Republican past than any meaningful analysis of the present.

There are also some tricky cases where international scrutiny may well be maintained, despite apparent changes of heart in the states concerned. One such case is Syria, despite the change in regime there, and its role in the Middle East peace process will be crucial to its future status. Algeria, too, has managed to rehabilitate itself, despite its appalling human rights past, escaping condemnation for its "rogue" status, persuading the United States to treat it as a potential partner in the war against terrorism and even joining the NATO Mediterranean dialogue, even though, at first sight, it does not meet the required criteria. Most surprisingly, Algeria is now able to criticise European attitudes towards trans-national terrorism on the grounds of its own experience in trying to contain such a phenomenon and the lack of European support it had received in the past. Even Turkey faces being consigned to this halfway-house, despite its potential future as a European state, because of its continued treatment of its Kurdish population.

Rogue states of this kind do present a definite and definable risk to international security and, in particular, to Western security because they oppose an international order that they perceive as being imposed by the West, without legitimate reason, for its own interests and purposes. They are thus also a risk for Europe quite specifically, in the same way as the separate issues of terrorism and proliferation do, for they are based on the same perceptions of asymmetrical power that characterise the way in which those phenomena are perceived by their supporters. It is clear that such asymmetry in perception and practice exaggerates the risks for Europe but, in reality, it does not change its nature. Rogue state behaviour in this context creates only risks, not threats, to Europe - although such risks could turn into threats over time, as would be the case with the proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction.

There is, in short, little substance for Europe in the threat emanating from rogue states; there is, however, a need to address the risks in terms of policy formulation. Here, though, there lies a further danger, for the rhetoric implied by the term "rogue state" tends to imply an outcome because of its moral connotations; namely that of punishment. Indeed, as the inevitable rhetoric builds in the wake of the crisis created by the September 11, 2001 incidents, this may seem to be the only possible response, whereas true Western and international interests demand that inclusive policy alternatives should continue to be available. In short, positive options can partner or even replace punishment, so that the

West can use flexible and multi-dimensional approaches to such problems, as Alvaro Vasconcelos describes.

## **Conclusions**

The existence of risk to European Union security stems essentially from political instability in Europe's southern approaches as a result of the contested legitimacy of political regimes in the countries located there and the existence of systemic opposition to these regimes, as well as from unresolved and new conflict in the region. Whilst this background shapes the broad outlines of European Union policy towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East-North African areas, the more specific risks triggered by regional instability have different characters, magnitudes and effects and thus require differentiated assessment and specific responses. Yet the Union's risks of direct involvement in conflict along its periphery seem limited because these problems are essentially South-South in nature, although spill-over effects in terms of migrants and refugees exist. European involvement is inevitable, however, as a result of Northern perceptions of indirect and distant risk to overall international stability. Since international stability is now perceived by the Euro-Atlantic alliance as an important public good with powerful consequences on internal stability, cohesion and prosperity, even distant crises may require intervention.

Terrorism and the broader field of asymmetric conflict generate risks through spill-over effects rather than through direct attacks on European targets because of geography and Europe's - in particular the European Union's - political and diplomatic status as a non-global international actor. The fact that Europe is not a global factor and does not perceive itself as such greatly reduces its relevance as a target. In addition, it also reduces the relevance of direct attacks to non-European targets, in terms of European perceptions. On the other hand, proximity tends to involve Europe in the logistics of terrorism. Exposure to specific risks, such as Islamism or energy supply disruption also appears to be limited. Islamism, whilst a factor of instability and violence in Southern Mediterranean countries, only indirectly affects Europe stability. On the other hand, because of market volatility, oil supply disruptions are bound to have only transient effects on prices, whereas disruptions in gas supply are possible but seem to be a very remote possibility. International or trans-national terrorism derived from political Islam has different implications however, not least because its primary target appears to be the United States,

rather than Europe. Europe, however, must not overlook the fact that it is also a potential target simply because of its role as America's most important ally.

European analysts consider proliferation - normally an issue for hard security responses and essentially, in the Mediterranean, a South-South concern - as, essentially, a political risk which requires political, diplomatic and socio-economic responses, if it is to be contained and even reversed. Only if these approaches fail to contain the problem are hard security responses to be applied. The potential for interdiction of European freedom of diplomatic and political action as a result of the escalating trend in proliferation, however, magnifies military risks and gives rise to anticipation of threat, particularly in view of the Union's agenda to set up a military force capable of being projected abroad.

Trans-national risk is more complex an issue. Whilst the multifarious aspects of organised crime must be regarded as a serious risk to Europe's internal order and prosperity, partly because of criminal ability to exploit European regulation and constraint, the perceived risk created by migration, whether illegal or legal, is a very controversial and misconstrued issue that lies at the heart of Europe's perceptions of risk from the South as far as public opinion is concerned. The possibility that migration threatens political security and domestic identity, in the sense of popular control over basic political and cultural patterns, is a populist European political illusion and, even if it acquired substance, would continue to be a very remote concern. The quantification of this kind of risk then reflects the fact that it arises from distorted European perceptions of the implication of the phenomenon. More concretely, the inability of the Union and its member-states to accommodate and regulate migration properly could render some reality to the current distorted perceptions of the phenomenon. As mentioned above, in this sense, risk stems from a European management failure, rather than from immigration itself. In any case, all the risks linked to the trans-national phenomenon are not limited to the Mediterranean and Middle East-North African areas for they either have a global reach or are linked to geographical patterns that overlap with the areas concerned, but do not coincide with them.

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- [1] R. Aliboni, P. Miggiano, *Conflict and Its Sources in the Near East and North Africa. A Conflict Prevention Perspective*, Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Strategic Papers No. 81, 1999, Cairo.
- [2] Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Crises, Elites and Democratization in the Arab World", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 47, No. 2, Spring 1993, pp. 292-305; quotation at p. 293.
- [3] See G.E. Fuller, I.O. Lesser, *A Sense of Siege. The Geopolitics of Islam and the West*, Westview Press for RAND, Boulder (CO), 1995.
- [4] Shireen T. Hunter, "The Rise of Islamist Movements and Western Response: Clash of Civilization or Clash of Interests?", in L. Guazzone (ed.), *The Islamist Dilemma*, Ithaca Press, Reading, 1995, pp. 317-350.
- [5] *Continuity and Change in Israeli Security Policy*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers No. 335, London; p. 42.
- [6] See Gilles Kepel, *Jihad. Expansion et déclin de l'islamisme*, Gallimard, Paris, 2000; Olivier Roy, *L'échec de l'islam politique*, Deuil, Paris, 1992.
- [7] Aliboni, Miggiano, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-5.
- [8] I.e. the ability of the state to perform basic functions ( police and justice) effectively enough to prevent it from collapsing; see P. Baker, A. Weller, *An Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse: Manual for Pratictioners*, The Fund For Peace, Washington D.C. ,1998.
- [9] Laura Guazzone, "Who Needs Conflict Prevention in the Mediterranean ?", *The International Spectator*, Vol. 35, No. 1, January-March, pp. 83-102, 2000.
- [10] For these concepts see pp. 68-69 in J. Arquilla, D. Ronfeldt, M. Zanini, "Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism", in the collective momograph on *Countering the New Terrorism*, Rand, Santa Monica (CA), 1999, pp. 39-84.
- [11] The "new terrorism" is discussed by Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorism Trends and Prospects" in *Countering the New Terrorism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-38; see the article on Transnational risk in this Report.
- [12] Ian O. Lesser, "Countering the New Terrorism", in *Countering the New Terrorism*, *cit.*, pp. 85-144.

[13] In addition to the chapter by Delpech in this Report, see Ian O. Lesser, Ashley J. Tellis, *Strategic Exposure. Proliferation around the Mediterranean*, RAND, Santa Monica (CA), 1996; Thanos Dokos, "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean," *Mediterranean Politics* 5, 3 (Autmn 2000) pp 95-116; Anthony H. Cordesman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East; National Efforts, War Fighting Capabilities, Weapons Lethality, Terrorism and Control Implications*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., 1998; s.a., "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism", *Stability and Instability in the Middle East*, Volume III, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., on line: <http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html>.

[14] In this Report, Delpech recalls that "in 1998 ... three medium range missile tests (the Ghauri in Pakistan, the Shebab 3 in Iran and the Taepodong 1 in North Korea) took place between April and August, to everyone's surprise". The Shebab 3 has been successfully tested a second time in July 2000.

[15] Camille Grand, "Missile Defense: The View from the Other Side of the Atlantic", *Arms Control Today*, September 2000, pp. 12-21.

[16] See Delpech in this Report, and Lesser and Tellis , op. cit., p. 32.

[17] Joachim Krause, "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: the risks for Europe", in P. Cornish, P. van Ham, J. Krause (eds.), *Europe and the Challenge of Proliferation*, IIS/WEU, Chaillot Papers, No. 24, May 1996, pp. 5-21.

[18] See the references provided in the section; also: Thierry Cretin, "Les puissances criminelles. Une authentique question internationale", in T. de Montbrial, P. Jacquet (sous la direction de), *Ramses 2001*, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Dunod, Paris, 2000, pp. 135-154, with bibliography.

[19] The widespread debate on post-Cold War ethnic violence has stressed that one important reason for such violence is the sub-groups' acute sense of insecurity that emerges in situations where existing state structures collapse or fail. In many European Union members there is a feeling that the state is unable to respond to immigration. Beside more entrenched cultural perceptions, this feeling definitely contributes to insecurity and its consequences in terms of ideology and violence. See B.W. Jentleson, *Preventive*

*Diplomacy and Ethnic Conflict: Possible, Difficult, Necessary*, University of California, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Policy Paper No. 27, 1996.

[20] This definition is midway between an interesting Western definition, emphasising "governance", and an equally interesting Arab definition, emphasising "identity". The Western definition argues that, in seeking security, states seek "what they calculate would be a reasonable likelihood that they can design and operate their own institutions in their own territory" (L. Beaton as quoted by B. Wood in *Economic Security in North-South Perspective*, paper presented at the workshop on "Security Reconsidered: Principles and Problems", organised by the Istituto Affari Internazionali and the York University Centre for International & Strategic Studies in Rome, 21-23 November 1988, p. 2). The Arab definition is reported by A. Saaf, *Le discours stratégique arabe. Constantes et variations*, Cahiers du Lumiar, Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, Lisbonne, Septembre 1994, who, when coming to illustrate the foundations of the Arab notion of national security, quotes (pp. 16-7) T. Mossalim as saying such notion is linked to the "existence même des sociétés arabes, dont le lien commun est la langue arabe ... Divers facteurs définissent la nature de ces sociétés et contribuent à la défense de son existence. Lorsque tel n'est pas le cas, les sociétés qui forment le monde arabe vivent dans un état d'insécurité: ainsi lorsqu'il est investi par des forces étrangères dont les éléments ne parlent pas sa langue et ne partagent pas son système de valeurs global ..." . While Mossalim is clearly thinking of the different kinds of Crusaders that intruded and are still perceived as intruding into the Arab world, there is no doubt that the concept can apply to non-military alien forces such as immigrants as well.