



# BEYOND DEVELOPMENT AID

EU-AFRICA POLITICAL DIALOGUE  
ON GLOBAL ISSUES OF COMMON CONCERN



Europe Africa  
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The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors only and do not necessarily represent the views of the institutes and organisations members of EARN.

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## Introduction

*Beyond Development Aid* is a publication of the Europe-Africa Policy Research Network (EARN) that intends to address the EU-Africa political dialogue on global issues of common concern. It is published at the initiative of the three institutes in charge of the EARN Working Group on Global Issues: the Institute for Strategic and International Studies (IEEI), the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) and the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM).

EARN was created in 2007 by a group of diverse African and European institutions, namely development institutes and think tanks, with the purpose of promoting knowledge, encouraging co-operation and partnerships between policy research institutes in Europe and Africa, and enhancing interaction between the world of policy research and policy making on issues of common interest to Africa and Europe.

African and European Heads of State and Government have, in December 2007, supported and committed to *new approaches* ("...to build a new strategic political partnership for the future, overcoming the traditional donor-recipient relationship and building on common values...", Lisbon Declaration) and added *new objectives* for their partnership ("...to reinforce and elevate the Africa-EU political partnership to address issues of common concern...", Joint Africa-EU Strategy - JAES). The JAES was indeed formulated in order to strengthen the political relationship and the EU-Africa cooperation as an answer to geopolitical changes, globalisation and the growing integration processes taking place in both continents. By setting an innovative and ambitious vision, the JAES is, undeniably, a test of political will, capacities and common interests of European and African institutions and its Member States.

Notwithstanding the proclamations, common positions and actions *beyond development* and *beyond Africa* have been rare and some of the proclaimed intentions are yet to be fulfilled. On the other hand, the European and African civil society actors, namely the research communities, very rarely – if at all – interact and discuss issues outside the scope of Africa, in a rather biased approach, as if poverty, security, good governance or economic crisis were only African.

This publication is precisely the result of a networking exercise, promoting exchange and dialogue through a series of debates organised by EARN members, in partnership with other European and African institutes. It brought together European and African policy-makers and experts from different thematic areas with the aim of fostering dialogue between public and policy spheres in Europe and Africa, and across perspectives, beyond the "traditional" areas of EU-Africa relations. In the process, EARN also organised public conferences to bring information and debate on EU-Africa relations, and namely on the JAES, into the wider public and beyond the 'usual' big political capitals of Europe and Africa.

With this publication, EARN intends to stress and bring the attention to the political dimensions – not always acknowledged – of EU-Africa relations and shift the focus from Africa and African problems into global issues of common concern. Although timely targeted to promote such a discussion around the 3rd EU-Africa Summit, the publication aims to deal with issues that go beyond the framework and time range of the Summits.

*Beyond Development Aid* analyses the main constraints and opportunities for engaging in a more strategic dialogue and partnership between the two continents. It focuses on what have been the outcomes of the political dialogue between the two continents in the period between Summits (2008–2010) and discusses relevant issues that impact upon both regions and on their partnership, namely on the areas of peace and security, global governance, trade and regional integration, and climate change. Finally, the last text, “An Agenda for Action” explores which upcoming opportunities and common agenda can be envisaged for the near future, in light of the written contributions hereby published and the debates held all along this process.



## Between the Summits

Andrew Sherriff with Patrícia Magalhães Ferreira

# Background Paper

### Introduction

**“... Our common future requires an audacious approach, one that allows us to face with confidence the demands of our globalising world ... We are resolved to build a new strategic political partnership for the future ... We are determined to give this new strategic partnership the necessary means and instruments that will enable it to fulfil the Joint Strategy... ” (Excerpts from the Lisbon Declaration – 2<sup>nd</sup> EU Africa Summit, Lisbon, 8–9 December 2007).**

This paper seeks to explore how EU–Africa relations have evolved between the Summits involving the Heads of State and whether they have lived up to the high expectations and commitments included in the Joint Africa–EU Strategy signed in Lisbon in 2007.<sup>1</sup> As such, the paper builds on and updates work undertaken by Patrícia Magalhães Ferreira in her paper entitled *“The Joint Africa–EU Strategy – Assessment and Implementation Challenges”*<sup>2</sup> and a paper completed by Jean Bossuyt and Andrew Sherriff entitled *“What next for the Joint Africa–EU Strategy? Perspectives on revitalising an innovative framework”*.<sup>3</sup> It also adds original research related to the political dialogue undertaken in the context of the EU–Africa Troika meetings held before and after the advent of the JAES as well as other recent developments before the 3<sup>rd</sup> Summit.

The paper is designed both to give a general analysis of what has occurred “between the Summits” and also some perspectives on why certain expectations may not have been met, as well as offering “food for thought” for policy makers in Africa and Europe. The paper does not encompass an “Agenda for Action” or detailed thematic analysis of the issues (Peace and Security, Governance, Trade, Climate Change) at play as these are looked at in a more detailed analysis elsewhere in the *EARN Political Dialogue Report*.

### 1. The way to the Joint Africa–EU Strategy

Over the decades, the relationship between Europe and Africa has been characterised by the underlying global dynamics and the political context of each continent. In the post-colonial period, the Lomé Agreements – renamed Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) since 2000<sup>4</sup> – have been the main legal framework of cooperation between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP).<sup>5</sup> The first EU–Africa Heads of State Summit in 2000, in Cairo, recognised the need for a new high-level political relationship

<sup>1</sup> For an overview and analysis of the EU policy frameworks for Africa see, BOND and ECDPM, *EU and Africa: the Policy Framework for Development*, October 2010.

<sup>2</sup> This paper was completed for the Portuguese NDGO Platform in June 2010.

<sup>3</sup> Available at: <http://www.ecdpm.org/dp94>, in French and Portuguese also.

<sup>4</sup> More information on the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and its last revision at: [http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/cotonuintro\\_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/cotonuintro_en.cfm)

<sup>5</sup> The ACP group does not include North African states.

between the two continents and professed a new standard of multilateral cooperation that would not be based on the usual post-colonial perspectives and donor-recipient philosophy.

However, beyond the symbolic value and the political meaning, the context of the two continents led to slow progress in implementing the commitments and there was a long hiatus before the 2<sup>nd</sup> EU-Africa Summit was held, in 2007 in Lisbon. On the one hand, the differences in opinion became clear in international cooperation: the European side giving priority to peace and security issues, while the African side emphasised mainly economic and trade issues, including those regarding external debt. At a later stage, issues concerning Zimbabwe threatened to dominate talks and even “contaminate” the political dialogue between European and African institutions which initially led to the postponement of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Summit.

Nevertheless, in the period between the first two Summits in 2000 and 2007, important evolutions occurred in the two continents and globally, setting conditions for a new stage in the EU-Africa relationship. There was a resurgence of Africa’s geostrategic importance (largely lost in the post-Cold War period), either due to security matters – including the prominence of terrorism, piracy and drug trafficking as a fundamental element of international security since 2001 – or due to economic reasons, since Sub-Saharan Africa became one of the chief sources of oil supply, due to the instability of Middle East energy sources as well as other primary products. New African leadership and the launch of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)<sup>6</sup>, in 2001, and, above all, of the African Union (AU)<sup>7</sup>, in 2002, created a stronger, better organised and more pragmatic institutional interlocutor at a continental level. It also clearly demonstrated Africa’s new collective ambitions on a range of issues. On the European side, the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) bore out the ambition for greater political projection of the European project on the international scene. This was closer to the EU’s importance in terms of trade and public development aid (the EU as a whole – Member States and European Commission (EC) – finances about 60% of international aid). To this we can add the emergence of new actors in the international political system – such as China, determining a reformulation in the global strategic balances, where Africa plays a relevant role. Most of these trends have only accelerated since 2007 in the intervening period between the Summits.

After some tough negotiating on both sides, the EU-Africa Heads of State Summit in Lisbon in 2007 signed a new Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) that articulated a bold new vision for EU-Africa relations.<sup>8</sup> The JAES was accompanied by a comprehensive Action Plan in eight thematic partnership areas of common interest with priority actions (see table 1). It is this Joint Africa-EU Strategy and its Action Plan which were to form a new basis for a renewed continent to continent relationship, with the ambition to take EU-Africa relations to a new strategic and political level.

<sup>6</sup> [www.nepad.org](http://www.nepad.org)

<sup>7</sup> [www.africa-union.org](http://www.africa-union.org)

<sup>8</sup> This is sometimes referred to as the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership.

Table 1: Partnerships and priority actions of Action Plan 2008–2010

Partnership	Priority actions of Action Plan 2008–2010
<b>1. Peace and security</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security</li> <li>• Full operationalisation of African peace and security architecture</li> <li>• Predictable funding for African-led peace support operations</li> </ul>
<b>2. Democratic governance and human rights</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enhance dialogue at global level and in the international arena</li> <li>• Promote the APRM and support the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance</li> <li>• Strengthen cooperation in cultural goods</li> </ul>
<b>3. Trade, regional integration and infrastructure</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support the African integration agenda</li> <li>• Strengthen African capacities in the areas of rules, standards and quality control</li> <li>• Implement the EU–Africa Infrastructure Partnership</li> </ul>
<b>4. MDGs</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Secure the finance and policy base for achieving the MDGs</li> <li>• Speed up progress towards the MDG food security targets</li> <li>• Speed up progress in meeting the MDG health targets</li> <li>• Speed up progress in meeting the MDG education targets</li> </ul>
<b>5. Energy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intensify cooperation on energy security and access</li> </ul>
<b>6. Climate change</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Build a common agenda on climate change policies and cooperation</li> <li>• Address land degradation and increasing aridity, including the ‘Green Wall for the Sahara’ initiative</li> </ul>
<b>7. Migration, mobility and employment</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implement the declaration of the Tripoli Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development</li> <li>• Implement the EU–Africa Plan of Action on people trafficking</li> <li>• Implement and follow-up the 2004 Ouagadougou Declaration and Action Plan on employment and poverty alleviation in Africa</li> </ul>
<b>8. Science, information, society and space</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support the development of an inclusive information society in Africa</li> <li>• Support S&amp;T capacity-building in Africa and implement Africa’s science and technology consolidated plan of action</li> </ul>

## 2. A short reminder of the ambitions of the JAES

It makes little sense to review the progress achieved so far and to discuss potential changes without revisiting the key objectives of the JAES to which the parties committed themselves during the 2007 Lisbon Summit. The high number of actors involved on both sides – each with varying levels of knowledge about the JAES – makes this brief reminder even more imperative. As does the fact that the visibility and awareness of these commitments in the EU and Africa still tends to be low outside the sphere of those who deal with the JAES on a day-to-day basis.

The JAES reflects both continuity and a major break from the past. It reconfirms existing principles of cooperation such as ownership and joint responsibility, respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, and the need for a people-centred partnership involving non-state actors (that can also be found in the ACP–EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement). Several of the JAES’s thematic partnerships (see table 1) also focus on topics that have been on the Africa–EU agenda for quite some time, or at least since the first Summit of 2000 (e.g. peace and security and governance) and even dating back to the first Lomé accords (e.g. economic development, trade). These components, albeit important, are not new.

Yet the JAES foundation documents also include major innovations aimed at “overcoming the traditional donor–recipient relationship” and fundamentally changing Africa–EU relations. This transformative reform agenda can be summarised in four major points, as shown in Box 1 below. It is this agenda that marks the JAES out from past agreements and is fundamental to understand what has been achieved between the Summits.

#### Box 1: Key joint commitments and innovations included in the JAES

- “To reinforce and elevate the Africa–EU partnership to address **issues of common concern**”

This objective illustrates the ambition to take the Africa–EU relationship to a new, strategic level with a strengthened political partnership and enhanced cooperation at all levels, including in the joint promotion of a system of effective multilateralism.

- “To this end both sides will **treat Africa as one and upgrade the Africa–EU political dialogue** to enable a strong and sustainable **continent-to-continent partnership**, with the AU and the EU at the centre”

This commitment stresses the need to deal with Africa as one (as opposed to the current fragmentation of policy frameworks ‘slicing’ up EU relations with Africa). It considers an upgraded political dialogue as the linchpin of the new partnership. It clearly states that the continental level is the key focus and added value of the JAES, with the two Unions at the core of the process and institutional architecture. In order to make this work, parties agreed on the need to have “strong institutions [on the African side] that invest particularly in their capacity to act effectively together and interact with each other”. To this end, the EU commits itself to further supporting the “ongoing institutional transformation process of the AU”<sup>9</sup>.

- “To strengthen regional and **continental integration** in Africa”

Through the Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, Europe has provided long-standing support to regional integration processes. Yet the JAES is the first political framework which also fully recognises the need to promote *continental* integration. This reflects the creation of the AU and the need to support its pan African integration agenda. The “unity of Africa” is therefore considered to be one of the fundamental principles underlying the JAES<sup>10</sup>.

- “To provide an **overarching long-term framework** for Africa–EU relations”

The adoption of such an “overarching” new framework entails an obligation to “enhance the coherence and effectiveness of existing agreements, policies and instruments”<sup>11</sup> such as the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). To this end, parties committed themselves “to work together towards gradually adapting relevant policies and legal and financial frameworks... to the needs and objectives of the partnership”<sup>12</sup>.

Implementing such an ambitious agenda that is so political in nature requires a transition period, based on experimentation, collective learning and adjustments to well-established ways of organising Africa–EU relations. The transition should allow the JAES to gradually find its place alongside existing, legally binding policy frameworks and to demonstrate its added value. By definition, it is to be expected that the JAES objectives may overlap to some extent, and compete or conflict with

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. See under Institutional Architecture and Implementation, par. 98

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. See under “Principles”, par. 6

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. See under “Principles”, par. 6

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. See under “New Approaches”, par. 9 (f)

other policy objectives (such as the ENP)<sup>13</sup>. Progress on all these complex points is likely to largely depend on the capacity of all parties to strategically use the JAES effectively as a trigger to push forward their respective priority agendas. In many ways, the JAES can therefore be equated to a 'building under construction'.

### 3. The track record so far

#### 3.1 Assessing progress: a challenging job

Three years between the Summits is a short period of time to assess the functioning of a complex, ambitious and innovative framework such as the JAES. Experience suggests that it tends to take years before innovative multilateral initiatives gain full awareness, ownership and momentum so as to deliver results to the stakeholders. This was evidenced for example by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement which has a much longer heritage, and was less ambitious in topics, yet even now is not necessarily well known at every level in Europe and Africa. In assessing progress it is possible to look at the trajectory the JAES has followed since the 2007 Lisbon Summit, to identify emerging trends as well as directions of change in the implementation process so far, and to compare these to the specific political objectives it set out to achieve (as described in the previous section).

In the first two years (2008–2009), the JAES sought to push forward the various thematic partnerships. It did this through related action plans and political dialogue (primarily in the form of six-monthly Troika meetings, see box 2). Another strategy was policy dialogue on thematic issues in the (informal) Joint Expert Groups (JEGs) for each of the 8 thematic partnerships of the JAES that were settled as the main implementation mechanism. In the process, a variety of EU–Africa institutional actors, experts and non-state actors were mobilised on both sides.

The JAES' parties committed themselves to a result-oriented approach. However, measuring the performance of the JAES was bound to be a challenging exercise, considering its innovative nature, the diversity of stakeholders' expectations and attribution problems, not to mention the lack of a clear and jointly agreed methodology to measure performance. Since the launch of the JAES, regular progress reports have been prepared (primarily by the EC) and endorsed (by the Joint Task Force<sup>14</sup>). The most comprehensive one was the joint 'Assessment Report' of October 2009, which appraises the progress made and challenges faced in each of the thematic partnerships as well as in the institutional structures and working methods of the JAES.<sup>15</sup>

With regard to the progress achieved, this 2009 report presents a wide range of activities (e.g. high-level conferences, joint workshops, studies) and initiatives (that have been launched or are in the pipeline) as well as some qualified successes. For instance, the report explicitly mentions achievements such as:

- Reinforced cooperation between the two continents (e.g. Peace and Security);

<sup>13</sup> For instance, the privileged partnership relations sought with North African countries in the framework on the ENP is not necessarily compatible with the stated JAES objective to "treat Africa as one".

<sup>14</sup> [AU / EU] Joint Task Force, Assessment Report, 9 Oct. 2009 FINAL.

<sup>15</sup> Independent analysts may of course fundamentally disagree with the analysis given by the parties.

- Expanding the horizon of Africa–EU relations to new areas (e.g. in the partnership on Science, Information Society and Space, partnership on Energy);
- Enhanced political dialogue (e.g. in the field of migration, peace and security, climate change and governance);
- Stronger synergies between the priority actions of some partnerships and African defined and owned priorities (e.g. in the field of election observation; or with regard to the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme);
- Shared analysis of issues and coordination of policy responses (e.g. MDG partnership);
- Search for Joint Positions on a variety of themes and elaboration of Joint Declarations (e.g. on Climate Change, 2008);
- Mobilisation of funding for specific continental and regional programmes;
- On the institutional side, the establishment of the EU Delegation to the African Union has consolidated a collective EU approach to the African Union, provided greater insight from Africa to the challenges of making the JAES work for Europeans, and enhanced day-to-day dialogue.

This joint Assessment Report also recognises several challenges in each of the thematic partnerships. Among those frequently mentioned one finds: “insufficient communication”; “inadequate financial and human resources” (on the African side); “delays in the preparation of consolidated African positions”; “the lack of broad ownership by stakeholders”; the lack of a “dedicated implementation process”; and limited involvement of “Member States, civil society and the private sector”.

Furthermore, in the view of the Joint Task Force “mixed results” have been achieved with regard to the institutional architecture and working methods of the JAES. A big effort has been made to set up the necessary coordination and monitoring bodies within the two Commissions (mandated to be the motor of the JAES), at Council level (mainly on the EU side) and with other stakeholders (Parliaments, non-state actors). However, the report recognises important institutional bottlenecks such as the limitations of the EU–Africa Troika format (as the main body for political guidance); the less than optimal levels of ownership and involvement of key players such as both European and African Member States and the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs); and the insufficient link between the (technical) expert work of the JEGs with (political) decision-making processes.

From an independent perspective, an observant reader is likely to be struck by the primarily ‘technocratic’ nature of the reporting. The general focus in the 2009 Assessment Report is on describing activities, listing roadmaps, steps and support measures taken and presenting future expectations. Moreover, the sections on “challenges and opportunities” are rather technically conceived, focusing on downstream implementation problems (e.g. lack of capacity). In some partnerships, there is a timid probing into the ‘politics’ of the JAES processes, yet this is generally limited to observing a lack of ownership, without analysing why this happens.

The lack of a solid political analysis of the interests at stake in the JAES is particularly visible in sensitive partnerships. Thus, the Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure Partnership extensively reports on meetings, programmes and specific activities. However, no mention is made of the difficulties and tensions existing between both parties in relation to the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), which are not formally integrated and discussed in the JAES framework despite being the major strategic issue between Africa and the EU. The Partnership on Climate Change considers the 2008 Joint Declaration as a “major political achievement” but is silent on the political challenges involved in reconciling the diverging interests of both continents on this dossier with strong North-South connotations<sup>16</sup>. The subsequent Copenhagen United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP15) in late 2009 clearly illustrated the divisions and lack of agreement between, and to a certain extent within EU and Africa. That is, despite the Joint Declaration in 2008 this was not followed up by “joint action” on the issue in the key global forum (see chapter on the *Political Dialogue Report* on Climate Change).<sup>17</sup> A similar a-political tone prevails in the reporting on the partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment, a policy area still largely determined by national policies and interests, and where there has been little progress within the JAES framework on the substantive political issues between the two continents.<sup>18</sup> Generally there is much information on activities and potential funding opportunities yet no in-depth political analysis of the tensions and diverging interests at play in this critical and divisive policy issue. The list of challenges proposed in the report is also of a technical nature (i.e. the need to address the lack of an African co-chair; greater involvement of non-state actors; better visibility).

In order to assess if stakeholders have endorsed and utilised the JAES as a framework that adds value to existing cooperation, a key question to pose would be whether these Partnerships have generated new dynamics and initiatives (“*Would this have happened if the partnership or the JAES did not exist?*”). If we analyse the results of each thematic partnership, we can see that in many cases the reported achievements are limited to actions or projects that predate the JAES or were already planned<sup>19</sup>. These projects and initiatives are, in some cases, the main achievements, while there is no attempt to find better ways of reaching the goals expressed in each thematic partnership, using the specific advantages of the JAES as a multi-stakeholder process at continental level, facilitating the implementation of strategic joint decisions taken in Africa-EU political dialogue. On some themes it is obvious that the most sensitive issues that characterise the EU-Africa relationship are not dealt under the thematic partnerships’ framework but in other *fora*, and that means that the JAES does not see itself as an overarching and privileged framework for the relationship between the two continents.

16 This is reflected amongst others in an African Position on Climate Change, prepared at AU level for the United Nations Climate Change Conference in 2009 in Copenhagen.

17 Despite this, there may be some validity to Joint Declarations on issues such as Climate Change provided that both parties follow through on any commitments made in them (see chapter on Climate Change).

18 It also seems as if there has been a lowering of the political ambitions of the Second Action Plan on MME. For some commentary on general issues related to this as well as ideas on a way forward see ECDPM comments and questions during the drafting process of the 2nd Action Plan 2011 – 2013 of the Thematic Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment, 16<sup>th</sup> of September 2010.

19 As examples, we can point out the EU support for electoral processes in Africa (Partnership on Governance), the Trust Fund for Infrastructures (Partnership on Trade), the EC’s contribution to the Fast Track Initiative Fund “Education for all” (Partnership on MDGs).

## Box 2: Political Dialogue in the EU–Africa Ministerial Troikas – Addressing Issues of Common Concern?<sup>20</sup>

There have been 14 official Ministerial Troikas between EU and Africa since 2001. This is a format for political dialogue which arose after the first EU–Africa Heads of State Summit in Cairo in 2000 and which is now conducted every six months. To understand the evolution of the ability of Africa and EU to address issues of common concern, it is useful to reflect on the statements and outcomes of these meetings. While they do not paint the full picture of EU–Africa collaboration, they give some clear insight into the nature of the dialogue and the trajectory of action.

It should come as no surprise that the first EU–Africa Troika meeting held in October 2001 was dominated by the issue of terrorism, coming little over a month after the 11 September attacks. Indeed, here the EU and Africa made a commitment to work together to implement UN Security Council resolution 1373. This was supported by an EU–AU Joint Declaration on terrorism in 2001, and again another one after the 2<sup>nd</sup> Ministerial Troika in November 2002. It also referred to the importance of supporting existing initiatives to combat terrorism in Africa. In later EU–Africa Ministerial meetings, in 2005, the overarching commitments to addressing terrorism took on a more functional form with the AU informing the EU of its new African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism and welcoming the EU contribution in this regard.

**Peace and security** is one area where there has been significant discussion at the EU–Africa Ministerial Troikas and these concerns often dominate the agendas of the meetings. Momentum has certainly been building regarding the issue from 2001 onwards, with a number of specific requests noted. The most significant of these was the decision to create an EU funding mechanism – the African Peace Facility – following a specific request from the AU Maputo Summit of 2003. A commitment that has been reiterated consistently relates to working, in the UN context, towards sustainable, flexible and predictable financial support for African-led peacekeeping operations, in particular to follow up on the “Prodi Panel Report” on the topic. In relation to peace and security however, it is usually the individual cases of Somalia and Sudan that make up the agenda. On issues of concern outside of Africa and Europe, Kosovo and Myanmar were mentioned in Ministerial Troikas in 2007. In 2008 Kosovo and Georgia were also placed on the agenda but here Africa again simply “took note” of the EU’s position and presentation rather than forming any joint positions.

**Human rights** have also been featured in the EU–Africa Ministerial dialogue. An intention to work together on common approaches “especially in the United Nations’ General Assembly and the UN Commission on Human Rights” was first made in the Third Ministerial troika of December 2004. The commitment was followed up by the creation of an expert AU–EU forum to discuss human rights in 2007 and it is unclear what, if any, tangible work alongside the UN materialised on anything beyond an ad hoc basis. The November 2008 Ministerial Troika notes that, “dialogue on human rights has been strengthened”, but independent research indicates that the EU and Africa are frequently taking different positions on human rights issues in UN fora.<sup>21</sup> The recently established EU–AU Platform for Governance is certainly a step forward in providing a forum for dialogue, and will cover issues more holistically than simply human rights, hopefully allowing for more follow-up, follow through and input to the political level.

The difficult issue of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has also been a part of the EU–Africa Ministerial dialogue since its inception. Although the EU and Africa’s positions on the ICC in relation to Sudanese President El Bashir have diverged, there has been an attempt to bridge this divide in the EU–Africa Ministerial Troika, including the setting up of a joint commission on Universal Jurisdiction. So while there is no agreement, attempts have been made to dialogue about this issue using the Troika format.

**Climate change** and environmental issues have been a topic on the agenda of the Ministerial Troikas since the second Ministerial Conference in 2002. Again in 2005 it was noted that there was a need to “strengthen cooperation”. Climate change became an explicit concern of the Ministerial Troika in May 2007 where it was noted as a priority area for cooperation under the then forthcoming Joint Africa–EU Strategy. A Joint Declaration on Climate Change adopted in Addis Ababa on 1<sup>st</sup> December 2008 is noted as an important “early deliverable” of the JAES and there is a comment to use it as a “framework for advancing the Africa–EU common effort regarding the Copenhagen UN Climate Change Conference in December 2009”. In further discussions, the Troika in October 2009 “recall[ed] the AU decision on an African common position highlighting the need for compensation for damages due to climate change” in relation to the COP15 Copenhagen meeting. Another text at this Ministerial Troika on climate change is rather vague with commitments about “capacity building, long-term and coordinated action and facilitating and mobilising support and action on adaptation”. Subsequently it is known that the EU and Africa did not present a united front at the COP15 meeting.

<sup>20</sup> The authors are grateful for additional background research on this topic that was undertaken by Natalie Dansdotter, Intern at ECDPM.

<sup>21</sup> See, Richard Gowan and Franziska Brantner, *The EU and Human Rights at The UN: 2010 review*, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), September 2010 and the previous reviews for 2008 and 2009 available at: <http://www.ecfr.eu>



Different **financing issues** were raised frequently over the years in the political dialogue. One aspect is debt relief. In more direct connection to the JAES, reference has been made regularly not only to the need to improve mobilisation of resources, but also to the need to improve and facilitate better access to the funds available and the existing instruments.<sup>22</sup> Another aspect is the adaptation of EU financial instruments to the needs of the JAES. Here the reference has become more specific over the years, from “pursue efforts to ‘treat Africa as one’ and to gradually adapt relevant policies and working arrangements, as well as legal and financial frameworks to the needs and objectives of the partnership”<sup>23</sup> to “on the initiative of the African partners, the possibilities of applying the funding model of the African Peace Facility to other areas of the Action Plan implementation should be examined.”<sup>24</sup>

In reference to the global financial crisis the EU-Africa Troika meeting noted that “one of the key objectives of the Joint Strategy [is to] jointly promote and sustain a system of effective multilateralism and to address global challenges and common concerns.” The London G20 Summit was welcomed with the statement that “economy recovery was impossible to achieve without strong solidarity between developed and developing countries”. Also, and importantly as it is a tangible deliverable, “they recalled that the Africa-EU partnership had been instrumental to ensure the involvement of the AU, African Union Commission (AUC), and NEPAD Chairman at the London Summit.”<sup>25</sup> Yet Europe’s wider strategic interests within the IMF and the World Bank in terms of maintaining its voting share are not mentioned. Concluding the “Doha Development Round of Trade Negotiations and honouring the commitments made, including at the London and Pittsburgh G20 Summits”<sup>26</sup> is also noted as important for addressing the economic and financial crisis at the EU-Africa Ministerial Meeting of April 2010. Again it would seem both a European and African interest is noted in that statement.

So what can be said about the political dialogue in the EU-Africa Troika format? There seems to be little discernable difference between what occurred before the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and what has happened since. No discernible change can be gleaned from the official statements in the political dialogue after the second EU-Africa Summit – although the JAES and the Action Plan do provide more of a common framework and point of reference. When issues of global concern like terrorism or the financial crisis come into the international agenda there is a commitment to deal with them together. However, the Troikas seem to suffer from a lack of follow through or follow-up and any joint commitments are vague in nature. This might be explained partly by 1) the lack of clarity on how these Troika processes link to political decision-making processes in the EU or Africa 2) turnover of those representing Africa and the EU. With the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty there may be more opportunities for continuity on the European side provided that the new High Representative and Vice President engages and gives political weight to Africa. Analysis of the Troika may also lead to the conclusion that a more thematically focused dialogue is needed at a higher political level than one that can be achieved through this format if real progress is going to be made on issues of “common concern”.

### 3.2 How to deal with politics, interests and incentives?

The points made in the previous section illustrate a major risk in the JAES implementation process: the perceived gradual dilution of the political substance of the new policy framework. This is in contrast to the original discussions for the JAES where there was a much stronger sense of negotiating political differences. It is reflected in the fact that the JAES finds it difficult (so far) to politically lift up the partnership in exactly the ways it was originally intended, that is to go “beyond Africa”, “beyond cooperation” and “beyond institutions”<sup>27</sup>. This political dilution should be a matter of concern considering that the added value of the JAES, compared to existing policy frameworks such as the Cotonou Partnership Agreement or bilateral relations, precisely lies in its ambitious political agenda to renew/transform Africa-EU relations in an evolving global political context.

<sup>22</sup> EU-Africa Ministerial Meeting Luxembourg, 26 April 2010, p 11.

<sup>23</sup> Joint Progress Report on the implementation of the Africa-EU Joint Strategy and its first Action Plan (2008-2010), 21 November 2008, p 18.

<sup>24</sup> EU-Africa Ministerial Meeting Luxembourg, 26 April 2010, p 11.

<sup>25</sup> EU Africa Ministerial Meeting, Luxembourg, 28 April 2009, p 2.

<sup>26</sup> EU Africa Ministerial Meeting, Luxembourg, 26 April 2010, p. 4.

<sup>27</sup> These are the “three beyonds” the JAES sought to introduce in Africa-EU relations.

***The signs on the wall of this ongoing 'dilution' are there and include the following:***

***"Political dialogue"*** was put at the centre of the new partnership. It was meant to cover all relevant areas of shared issues and to involve a wider range of institutional actors. There are undoubtedly positive dynamics in some specific areas, with a potential for further development. However, according to most stakeholders, political dialogue as a whole has not yet been substantially improved or expanded under the JAES. It works well in some areas such as Peace and Security on specific issues but this is strongly linked to building on dialogue structures, processes and resources predating the JAES<sup>28</sup>. In new policy areas progress has been rather limited for a variety of reasons including:

- (i) the tendency to confine political dialogue largely to bi-annual Troika meetings (characterised by overloaded agendas and limited time for matters other than peace and security issues) – see Box 2;
- (ii) the choice of the EU<sup>29</sup> to deal with various sensitive matters *outside* the JAES framework (e.g. the EPA processes<sup>30</sup>, or only selectively and at a low level inside, e.g. migration);
- (iii) difficulties on the African side to elaborate and agree upon regional and continental agendas;
- (iv) duplication of work in other existing multilateral fora (such as the MDGs);
- (v) the objective difficulty for development-oriented EC units (e.g. Directorate-General for Development) to push for a substantial political dialogue on non-development issues (e.g. migration, environment) managed by other parts of the EC (or member-states) with a different culture and confronted with a variety of interests in the policy area in question. This is despite some good and difficult work carried out by DG DEV of the EC to engage and involve non-development units and member-states.

The JAES was expected to establish a ***"continent-to-continent" partnership***. While there is no shortage of institutional links and worthwhile initiatives between the respective Unions/Commissions, it has proven difficult to ensure a focus on pan-African initiatives and on harmonising AU-RECs policy frameworks in the implementation of the JAES. This has even been acknowledged as a persistent problem in terms of implementation of the JAES but despite commitments there is currently little discernable progress.

The JAES has not been instrumental in ***"treating Africa as one"***. If anything, the fragmentation of the Africa-EU relations has increased with the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean and with the potential division of portfolios

<sup>28</sup> Thus the existence of an African Peace Facility has proven instrumental in 'federating' actors and interests and promoting political dialogue. One exception is of course the yearly joint meeting of the EU Political and Security Committee (COPS) and the African Union's Peace and Security Council (AU PSC).

<sup>29</sup> Depending on the issue at stake, this choice reflected either a political decision from the side of the EU/EC or the lack of suitable conditions to address the topic in the JAES (e.g. the lack of sufficient interest/capacity or political sensitivities with the regions on the African side to meaningfully participate in a dialogue).

<sup>30</sup> With regard to EPAs some regions (RECs) have seemed reluctant to give the AUC an effective lead coordinating role, thus somewhat reducing the incentives to deal with the matter in the JAES.

between the new EC and European External Action Service (EEAS)<sup>31</sup>. It also remains to be seen whether the effective implementation of the Lisbon Treaty on the European Union will facilitate greater EU coherence towards Africa. The EEAS having a collective DG for Africa is a good sign, provided its focus is not entirely on security issues. Also on the African side, actors have not spoken with one voice on the issue or used existing dialogue mechanisms to agree on a common African position on a potentially divisive topic<sup>32</sup>.

Little tangible progress has been achieved in establishing the JAES as the overarching political framework for Africa-EU relations<sup>33</sup>. It continues to co-exist, rather uneasily, with other policy frameworks such as the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). During the recent revision of the CPA, the EC tabled proposals to better integrate the AU into the ACP framework. The proposals were accepted and the African Union was explicitly mentioned as part of the CPA. Yet much remains to be done to clarify the overall relationship and complementarity between the two policy frameworks (and related interest groups). So far, the parties have also not taken a firm initiative to align existing programming and financial instruments to the JAES nor is there a clear timetable with benchmarks to achieve this. A structured dialogue on how best to set up the envisaged "progressive establishment of a Pan-African financial support programme"<sup>34</sup> (to fund the continental ambitions of the JAES) is only at a tentative stage with the EC currently contending that the new EU financial framework in 2013 is the earliest time that it could occur.<sup>35</sup>

Constructing a new political partnership requires time, experimentation as well as collective learning. Moving the partnership "*beyond aid*" to issues of "*common concern*", deepening the political dialogue or ensuring coherence between existing policy frameworks and the JAES, are all highly political and complex endeavours. Quick fixes and rapid impacts should therefore not necessarily be expected in such a process. Against this background, the focus on "*quick wins*" (in the form of projects, activities, one-off events, ad hoc funding) in the various JAES partnerships risks undermining the long-term goals parties set out for themselves. To some extent, this approach can be understood as there was pressure to show results in order to increase interest and support for the new policy framework. The problem is that the search for quick wins has become so dominant that it tends to transform the JAES into a bureaucratic tool to implement specific (and often unambitious) activities rather than a framework to construct, over time, a new partnership between two continents around shared interests and global agendas (e.g. on peace and security, energy, migration, climate change, the financial crisis). If the level of ambition is lowered then the possibility of engaging on issues of "common concern" at the global stage is lost.

31 It is currently unclear how much of the Pan-African Unit of DG Development will move to the European External Action Service from the European Commission and what implications this will have to EU-Africa relations and EU coherence.

32 There is no shortage of potentially conflicting agendas on the African side. For instance, Northern African States may be attracted to the special benefits offered by ENP and this may prove a more powerful incentive than vaguely defined pan-African agendas. African States and regions may theoretically support the idea of a pan-African envelope, but may at the same time be afraid that this will jeopardise their interests (and part of the overall EU/EC aid budget).

33 There is usually a rhetorical commitment to the JAES in for example the communiqués on the EU Strategic Dialogue with South Africa or the EU-ECOWAS Ministerial Troika in West Africa and the last EU-South Africa Summit in September 2010.

34 See the Joint Africa-EU Strategy as approved during the 2007 Lisbon Summit, par.114.

35 This process is not helped by the difficulties encountered by the AUC in managing an earlier EC support programme of € 55 million.

**Levels of ownership** tend to be low beyond the inner circle of those concerned with the JAES, particularly among Member States, Parliaments, civil society, local governments, private sector (in both Europe and Africa) as well as among the RECs. While most of these actors strongly lobbied for an inclusive approach during the negotiation process of the JAES, they have been much less active and visible at the implementation level. An overriding reason for this is that many actors do not (yet) perceive that the JAES 'adds value' (in political, operational or financial terms) to existing bilateral and multilateral policy frameworks and instruments. All this means that there are limited incentives to engage in the process (beyond ad hoc events). Further analysis will be needed on how to effectively and efficiently apply the principle of a 'people-centred' JAES, although there have been some recent developments that have brought officially recognised platforms for civil society in Europe and Africa closer together. While lack of progress in this area cannot be laid solely at the door of official parties, it is they who have the most power to ensure the process has the type of political energy and resource allocating power that is likely to gather interest from the already overstretched civil society and private sector.

Depending on the view of the ambitions of the JAES, this state of affairs can either be seen as a transitory implementation problem or as the reflection of a more fundamental crisis affecting the foundations of the JAES. Whichever perspective is taken, an in-depth reflection is needed on the future of the JAES to move forward. Both parties are invited to assess how serious this political dilution is and why it happened. Where does the credibility crisis of the JAES come from? Why are levels of ownership low? How can one explain that the JAES is now primarily driven by bureaucratic incentives (on both sides) rather than by a clear and audacious political agenda, supported by coherent leadership and active support of Member States on both sides?

### 3.3 The dynamics of political dilution?

If there has been a political "dilution" of the substance then this would certainly have a significant impact on the ability of the JAES to address global issues of "common concern". This paper proposes six possible (inter-related) explanatory factors for the perceived political dilution process, although we acknowledge that stakeholders and other informed observers may have others. They are formulated in questions so as to stimulate an open-ended and constructive debate among all parties and particularly policy-makers in terms of the way forward, rather than as a piece of definitive analysis.

**1. To what extent has the political leadership of the JAES implementation process been sufficient?** The JAES is unambiguous about the political ambitions it seeks to achieve. The various Action Plans for each thematic area provided a first, inevitably incomplete, roadmap for implementation. In order to translate the lofty objectives of the JAES into practice, ongoing political leadership and engagement at the highest level, on both sides, was set to be crucial all along the implementation process. However, one can question whether sufficient leadership was effectively provided by the AUC, the EC and African and European member states. The perception is that following the 2007 Lisbon Summit, implementation of the JAES was largely delegated to high officials/experts located

in specific units within the two Commissions and officials in member-states heading each thematic partnership. These units and officials invested heavily in the process yet they generally lacked the power and leverage (or support/interest) to move the political agenda of the JAES forward. From their position, they found it difficult to consult, develop and articulate collective interests at the continental level to be furthered as part of a political dialogue on the issues that they were working on. Putting real "interests" on the table rather than projects requires political engagement. These systemic limitations may, quite naturally, have encouraged officials to largely 'avoid' the broader political agendas and fall back on things they could manage at their level. This, in turn, may explain the rapid 'bureaucratisation' of the JAES' process and related focus in quick wins so as to demonstrate that good results were being achieved. At present it is also unclear at the highest political levels within the EU where leadership on dealing with Africa should come from. EU President Van Rompuy has a clear role in all Summits, yet the European Commission President Barroso leads the AUC to EC College-to-College meeting process, and Baroness Ashton is the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Vice President and would normally represent the EU in the EU-Africa Troika Format replacing the EU revolving presidencies led by member-states. Furthermore, Andris Piebalgs is the European Commissioner for Development – traditionally a position where EC political leadership has come from with regards to sub-Saharan Africa. It should also not be forgotten that on the European and African sides certain Heads of State have in the past offered significant political leadership, which is now less visible than it was in the past. The lack of clarity on political leadership in Africa and Europe with the holistic vision of the JAES at its heart is a concern for its future implementation.

**2. To what degree are parties prepared and able to reconcile (diverging) interests through political dialogue?** As a fundamentally political partnership, the question of interests is at the heart of the JAES. Between Africa and Europe there may well be shared issues, but not necessarily shared interests (as illustrated through recent positions at the Copenhagen Climate Change conference). This does not negate the value and premise of the JAES as a framework for continental interaction but rather the importance of the quality of a **robust political dialogue** that should create it. While key officials (on both sides) claim that "there are no taboos" in the JAES, it would appear that the JAES has so far not been sufficiently exploited as a political framework through which to creatively articulate, further and protect interests in Africa and in the EU, particularly on sensitive topics where interests may be divergent. As regards the issue of migration, Libya and Italy preferred to make a controversial high-level political and financial agreement to limit those from Africa seeking entry to Europe. France also continued to hold its own Africa Summit which African leaders were happy to attend. Both are examples of how bilateral political agreements continue to triumph over more continental approaches. This reflects the weak political buy-in and ownership so far of the JAES in Europe and Africa. It also suggests that the parties are still struggling to apply the 'JAES spirit', i.e. to open up the political dialogue to *all* issues of concern for each continent and to arrive at a truly *joint* agenda-setting. This does not necessarily mean that the EU and Africa have to seek and come up with joint answers and positions on all subjects, but it implies that there is a robust dialogue that allows both parties to understand different positions, clarify perspectives and, eventually, promote common understandings. This also illustrates further problems regarding the ability of Africa

and Europe to articulate continental common interests within themselves, leading to a shortfall of strategy on both sides and the lack of an agreed continental agenda with which to negotiate with the other. Furthermore, analysis on specific issues has shown that far from working more closely together in global forums on issues of “common concern” such as human rights, Europe and Africa have actually become further apart in their voting patterns.<sup>36</sup>

**3. Inclusive partnership to include “actors” or “experts”?** One of the potential strengths of the JAES is its focus on inclusiveness. This reflects a welcome recognition that all relevant actors need to play a part in the construction of different types of Africa–EU relations. Yet organising such a multi–actor partnership has proven to be a complex matter. Currently, the JAES architecture is generally perceived to be far too heavy, cumbersome and inflexible. There is also a disturbing blurring of roles and responsibilities between “actors” (i.e. institutions with formal political mandates) and “experts” (i.e. individuals with specific competencies and/or representing particular interests). This confusion of roles is manifest in the functioning of the JEGs, where both sets of players are mixed up (e.g. with Parliaments being invited to participate as ‘experts’). This has reduced both the legitimacy and effectiveness of the JEGs but has a wider implication for the ability of the JAES to actually address issues of common concern (see Box 3). In its current form, it seems improbable that the JEGs would be the forum in which genuinely political issues of common concern could be discussed as the first step to becoming common positions at the global level that could actually be followed through on.

### Box 3: The mandate of Joint Expert Groups – Mission impossible?

The informal Joint Expert Groups (JEGs) are seen as the motors to implementing the JAES. Under the political steering of the Troika, they are tasked to carry out crucial technical work regarding implementation, coordination, mobilisation of actors and resources. It was expected that the work of the experts could be linked back to the political level, resources and implementation agencies.

It is now widely acknowledged that this scheme has not worked well, even by the EU–Africa Troika/Political Dialogue meeting on the future of the JAES, in April 2010. In most cases, the JEGs’ ability to ‘make things happen’ proved rather weak as a result of limited clarity on: (i) their structural links to the political level, (ii) resources at their disposal, (iii) connection to implementation (e.g. existing programming cycles) and (iv) membership issues. In the absence of ongoing political guidance, the JEGs are largely left on their own to implement the JAES, with ambiguous mandates and roles, stretching far beyond their remit as an informal technical body of experts. One of the weaknesses of the JEGs is in limited participation and engagement, both in Europe and Africa. There are few incentives for “experts” to attend JEGs other than a bureaucratic imperative – even then it is unclear what kind of continental or regional mandate the participants have. All this suggests the JEGs suffer from a structural design flaw, requiring fundamental adjustments.

**4. Incentives for effective implementation: invest in processes or projects?** The political vision of the JAES is couched in language with strong ‘process’ connotations. There is much talk about constructing a new partnership, defining common agendas, supporting the pan–African architecture, building coherence, etc. These are all, by nature, process outcomes to be achieved over a longer period of time. Yet in practice the JAES has been under heavy pressure to deliver quick outcomes in the form of ‘projects’. While the concern for tangible outcomes is perfectly le-

<sup>36</sup> For detailed research on this see Richard Gowan and Franziska Brantner, *The EU and Human Rights at The UN: 2010 review*, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), September 2010.

gitimate, the parties still need to find a way to reconcile the search for short-term results with the inherently political and long-term objectives of the JAES.

**5. Are both parties open to a real change in the 'culture' of cooperation?** The JAES goals are to move from the previous EU-Africa relationship based on donor-recipient roles into a modern partnership geared to managing and reconciling common interests and global challenges. This means addressing a wide range of new issues "beyond aid" that are not historically a part of the regular EU-Africa policy dialogue conducted by these institutions. The entire JAES approach therefore profoundly challenges existing norms and ways of working of institutions in Africa and Europe that have been established over decades and have a longer historical legacy in the history of colonialism and liberation. Most of the dialogue is still focused on "how Europe can help Africa" and the Strategy is still regarded, both by the European and the African sides, as a space for the aims and actors of "Development", when one of its goals is exactly to go "Beyond Aid". This means that any efforts to improve EU-Africa relations and the JAES should also consider the following questions: To what extent have European and African officials been empowered to work creatively or differently on EU-Africa relations because of the JAES? Has there been sufficient leadership to drive the required institutional change process? Have the necessary incentives been put in place to gradually transform traditional behaviour, adapt mindsets, rethink dialogue approaches, adjust working methods and develop new institutional arrangements? What steps have been considered to 'open up' the traditional aid sector (on both sides) to think in a different, broader way? What has been done to bring non-traditional development actors 'on board'?

**6. Were the asymmetries in capacities between the two Unions adequately considered?** The African Union, with its expanded mandate to promote pan African integration agendas, was launched in 2002. Inevitably, there is still a way to go before these continental structures, processes and capacities are fully in place and working. In addition, in many African countries bureaucracies do not have the same resources at their disposal as EU member-states. Whereas many EU states can field hundreds of bureaucrats specifically working on Africa and thematic issues related to Africa and the JAES – the same is obviously not true of African countries. The lack of capacities on the African side has repercussions at several levels in the JAES and it becomes evident in the thematic partnerships, where the African position is often reactive instead of being proactive, given problems regarding the degree of participation of African actors and an evident shortage of human resources at the AU, which is usually overloaded with several actions and partnerships. The asymmetry between the EU and the AU in terms of resources and capacities often results in a tendency for the EU to take it upon itself to be the 'dominant partner' of the partnership, which sometimes leads to negative reactions from the African side. At EU level, the high expectations generated by the creation of the AU has increased the pressure to make decisions, in large quantities and quickly, at the risk of overloading the AU's already limited capacities. This results in a dilemma between the need to implement the JAES priority actions and to make progress in terms of policies and decisions, on the one hand, and, on the other, to ensure that the time needed to sustainably strengthen the AU's structure and its internal experience is granted. How was this reality reflected in the JAES process and in the demands the stakeholders made of each other?

The combined effect of these factors may help to explain the difficult start of the JAES and the resulting gradual 'political dilution' of the new partnership framework.<sup>37</sup> In general, we can see that, on the one hand, several African actors/sectors are still sceptical about the motivations of European actions. While there is some fear that political dialogue can replace development cooperation, others point to the JAES as an EU attempt to invert the growing presence of China and other emergent actors in Africa. On the other hand, some European actors are worried about the real African capacities to move forward with the Joint Strategy and about Africans' political will to talk about politically sensitive issues, while some have the perception that African actors may be interested only in actions involving a financial contribution from Europe. Despite all the efforts of dedicated units, particularly at the level of both Commissions, the JAES does not seem to be making headway as the overarching political framework needed to modernise and transform Africa-EU relations. If anything, stakeholders tend to (informally) agree that the JAES is functioning as a 'stand-alone', primarily bureaucratic process, without strong political clout or suitable financial resources to make things happen, providing limited added value compared to existing multilateral and bilateral policy frameworks.

#### 4. The continuing relevance of the JAES vision

Between 2007 and 2010, the JAES has not yet managed to become a critical instrument to change political dialogue dynamics between the two continents and move towards a global and more strategic partnership. However, it also appears that the current difficulties experienced by the JAES are linked to fundamental political choices in the implementation strategies followed so far rather than to the validity of the overall vision underlying the search for a renewed Africa-EU partnership.

The vision of the JAES founders – to establish a strengthened political partnership between two Unions – seems even more pertinent now than in 2007. A wide range of geopolitical events in the global arena make it clear that both continents badly need a JAES to manage crucial interdependencies.

- First, the financial crisis and the Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change have shown that national attempts at solving issues are a thing of the past for both African and European stakeholders. In an era of globalisation, there is a significant need for platforms (such as the JAES) where parties can collectively further their interests and enter into a political dialogue with others to pursue them and negotiate and follow-through on common positions.
- Second, there is a clear (albeit slow) move towards greater integration on both continents, reflected in the Lisbon Treaty in Europe and the AU in Africa. To achieve global and continental outcomes it makes no sense for the political dialogue and interaction between the two continents to move in the opposite direction towards fragmented bilateral relations. While in the short run this may be easier to manage, in the long run it will undermine collective interests.

<sup>37</sup> For other examples of more critical analysis of the achievements of the JAES process (including from EARN members) see, Oladiran Bello, *The EU-Africa partnership: At a strategic crossroads – FRIDE Policy Brief, No. 47, May 2010*. <http://www.fride.org/publication/766/a-crucial-moment-in-eu-africa-relations> and Daniel Bach, "The EU 's 'strategic partnership' with Africa: Model or Placebo?", in Osita Eze & Amadu Sesay, eds., *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: Implications for Nigeria and Africa*, Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 2010, forthcoming.



- Third, the global governance systems are also evolving rapidly, as exemplified by the rise of the new G20 structure. This creates opportunities for joint Africa–EU cooperation on global issues, which could be mediated through the JAES.
- Fourth, the steady rise of new actors (China, Brazil and India) invites Europe to rethink its position and overall approach towards Africa in order to remain a relevant partner.

A well–implemented JAES could be an effective instrument to broker a new relationship based on common interests and provide real added value (compared to what other international players offer). Expectations would need to be modest but a small amount of progress could go a long way to addressing continental issues.

## 5. Trends before the 3rd EU–Africa Summit

In 2010, in recognition of the nature of the challenges with the JAES and with a mandate for a “fundamental review of the Action Plan” from the October 2009 Troika, both parties have formulated *reform proposals* that go beyond mere technical adjustments. These include, amongst others, the need to (i) concentrate JAES efforts primarily on continental and regional priorities; (ii) ensure that JAES activities are better aligned to existing (pan–) African policies, programmes and strategies; (iii) promote the full participation of the RECs (by ensuring that their priorities are taken on board and supported by the JAES); (iv) mainstream, where possible and relevant, the JAES in national structures and cooperation processes; (v) strengthen the political and policy dialogue; (vi) enhance the steering mechanisms and streamline the implementation arrangements; and (vii) improve communication on the JAES.

Arising from this, the April 2010 Troika meeting in Luxembourg endorsed the *Draft Joint Paper – Options for improving the implementation of the Joint Africa–EU Strategy*.<sup>38</sup> Specifically it was confirmed that “[b]oth sides agree, in view of the political nature of the [JAES], not to reopen the Strategy text”, meaning that there would be no official lowering or heightening of ambition, while also recognising that there was no political appetite to renegotiate the text, nor the feeling that it was necessary to do so. On the next Action Plan itself, despite calls to narrow the focus of thematic areas or priority actions by some stakeholders, there was a commitment to keep all areas and seemingly all priorities. The more radical overhaul for the JAES that some actors privately thought should occur has not happened. There was however a call for the JAES to focus on activities with, “a proven buy–in of a critical mass of competent actors on both sides, including the necessary political, human and financial resources.” In relation to the JEGs there is a further realisation that there needs to be a balance between, “political dialogue and policy with the development dimension in order to ensure that these mutually reinforce each other and that both European and African strategic interests [are met]”. This would seem to indicate that there is an official recognition that in the past this has not been the case. With regard to the content of the second Action Plan of the JAES, it is reported that the more bottom–up

<sup>38</sup> Annex to the 14th EU–Africa Ministerial Meeting – Draft Joint Options Paper, Options for improving the implementation of the Joint Africa–EU Strategy, Brussels, 23 April 2010. [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/114049.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/114049.pdf)

process of definition of projects in the JEGs has led to a promising agenda for cooperation over the next three years. Yet it remains to be seen whether these projects will really deliver on the bold political ambitions set out in 2007.

There was also commitment in the *Joint Options Paper* to, "further strengthen political dialogue and development cooperation by **enhancing frequency, scope and effectiveness of thematic policy dialogue in key priority areas.**" The September 2010 Declaration of the First High Level Meeting of the Africa–EU Energy Partnership seems to offer an indication of a way forward for the JAES.<sup>39</sup> The declaration clearly includes specific commitments that are of interest to Africa, then to Europe, and finally to both parties on the issue of energy as well as covering climate change. Indeed it would seem that this thematic specific high level format (rather than the overcrowded general EU–Africa Ministerial/Political Dialogue format) may be the way to get progress made on issues of common concern that has proved so illusive over the past three years. As was noted at the energy event, it was the first ministerial level meeting of any of the eight African–European partnerships agreed upon in Lisbon in 2007. Yet for even these types of meetings to really bear fruit they have to be well prepared with the appropriate level of political support and participation and concern all thematic areas genuinely of interest to both Africa and Europe. Also, although no reference to the JAES process was made, the recent Joint Communiqué from the Ministerial Meeting on Piracy and Maritime Security in the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Region and the EU High Representative of the 6 October 2010 also offers some insight on how cooperation on issues of concern can be framed. This is seen as mutually beneficial and in line with existing African commitments on maritime security rather than simply as an EU concern for piracy.<sup>40</sup> In addition, the **EU–Africa Governance Platform** also appears to be moving forward after a long period of difficult negotiation and limited progress with a successful meeting in September 2010 in Addis Ababa.<sup>41</sup> Again, this forum could also supply a platform to nourish the political level on related issues – including at the global level. There is also a European and African civil society organisations (CSO) continental dialogue taking place before the Summit, moving forward a long process that had long been stalled not by official parties but by the very action of the CSO groups. Yet the ultimate success of any of these initiatives has to be judged on the follow through to impact rather than simply agreement on formats or declarations before they can be fully held up as triumphs in addressing issues of "common concern".

A commitment contained in the *Joint Options Paper* is to "consider as **appropriate major global and regional events**". The same goes for the collaboration in forums such as the United Nations as the *Joint Options Paper* notes, "we agree that there is a need for additional arrangements in order to improve our dialogue in multilateral fora in view of establishing a structured dialogue". Yet the EU suffered a setback in its bid in September 2010 to gain observer status in the United Nations with most African states voting against this.

In terms of concrete measures the *Joint Options Paper* does however note the need to consider "the progressive establishment of a **Pan–African financial sup-**

<sup>39</sup> Declaration of the First High Level Meeting of the Africa–EU Energy Partnership, Vienna, 14 September 2010

<sup>40</sup> See, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/116942.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/116942.pdf)

<sup>41</sup> For a description of the meeting and a link to the background papers produced and agenda see, ECDPM Weekly Compass, 17<sup>th</sup> of September 2010 editors pick feature available at: [http://www.ecdpm.org/Web\\_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/077EEF538778F7BD1C12577A1004DEAED/\\$FILE/309\\_Weekly\\_Compas--Issue\\_50--17\\_September\\_2010.pdf](http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/077EEF538778F7BD1C12577A1004DEAED/$FILE/309_Weekly_Compas--Issue_50--17_September_2010.pdf)

**port program**", and also examine "possibilities of applying the funding model of the African Peace Facility to other areas of the Action Plan implementation." While the JAES was supposed to go beyond "donor-recipient" kind of relations, there can be no denying that aligned resources can help address issues of "common concern" as has been witnessed in the peace and security field.

The *Joint Options Paper* was discussed in the **new format for the Joint EU-Africa Troika** with the entering into force of the EU Treaty of Lisbon. The role previously being taken by the revolving EU "Troika" of EU member-states is now being fulfilled by Baroness Ashton as EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Vice-President of the EC. The African side chose to retain their full Troika format. The formal role given to the EU High Representative in leading the Troika, along with supervising the European External Action Service (EEAS), has wider implications for EU-Africa cooperation<sup>42</sup>. The first post-Lisbon Treaty Troika meeting made it clear that the way the formal changes play out in practice will be seen in the longer run only, while the interest and capacity of the HR and the EEAS (which is still yet to be fully established) to engage in the EU-Africa dossier seems limited to classical EU strategic and security interests at the moment.

There was agreement on the overarching theme of **"Investment, Economic Growth and Job Creation"** for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Summit by mid 2010. Yet, some key differences in the **priority issues to be raised and discussed at the Summit** came to the fore. The expectations differ in general insofar as the EU side seems to be interested in a smoothly run event that serves as a public display of its engagement and investment, while the AU side seems keen to bring some key concerns including contentious issues to the attention of a wider audience. In September 2010 the European Commissioner for Development gave a positive diagnosis of the state of EU-Africa relations, stating that "now is the time to *consolidate our partnership*, based on what we have already achieved together" since the last Summit.<sup>43</sup> He called again for the EU and Africa to work together on the global stage but mentioned no past successes specifically. While talking about the *importance of economic issues*, no mention was made of the major contentious issue between Africa and Europe – EPAs – although several African sources report intentions to put this on the agenda of the next EU-Africa Summit. Some analysts note the entire EPA process is in 'disarray' and it will require concessions from both sides and higher level of political engagement with strategic vision to put the process back on track.<sup>44</sup> It is progress on these difficult thematic issues that will be the real test of the partnership in the coming year. The European Commission will outline its new vision for engagement with Africa in a communication before the Summit. How much this will build on the JAES process or simply outline a new vision for the Commission's development engagement in Africa remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, the President of the AUC, in a speech in September 2010<sup>45</sup>, mentioned a number of key concerns that the AU would like to discuss and find joint

<sup>42</sup> For an overview see ECDPM Implications of the Treaty of Lisbon for EU-Africa relations. Background paper ECDPM for AUC "Friday's at the Commission" meeting forthcoming 2010.

<sup>43</sup> Andris Piebalgs, European Commissioner for Development, *Partnership Africa: New Horizons for EU and Inter-African Cooperation*, SPEECH/10/485, 27th of September 2010.

<sup>44</sup> See, San Bilal and Isabelle Ramdoo, *Losing old friends: The risk of an EPA backlash*, *Trade Negotiations Insights* · Volume 9, Number 8, October 2010.

<sup>45</sup> Ping, Jean (2010) Speech by Dr Jean Ping, President of the African Union Commission delivered at the opening of the high-level EU-Africa conference "*Partenariat pour le développement et la sécurité*", held at the Belgian Senate in Brussels on 16 September, available at <http://appablog.wordpress.com/2010/09/16/ouverture-de-la-conference-de-haut-niveau-union-europeenne-afrique-%C2%ABpartenariat-pour-le-developpement-et-la-securite%C2%BB-discours-de-se-le-dr-jean-ping-president-de-la-commission-de-ll>

solutions for in Tripoli. He called for *political decisions, i.e.* to speed up the adaptation of EU financial instruments (including establishment of a pan-African envelope, mechanisms to facilitate 'treating Africa as one'), to put in place an EU fund for an "African Integration Facility" (as requested by the AU Summit in July 2010), to realise a flagship project with visibility in all five RECs, to facilitate the issuing of entry visas to the EU, especially for African researchers, academics and students, and to address the foreign debt of Africa. In addition, the AUC President mentioned the need to establish an AU-EU crisis management mechanisms, and further EU support for the participation of Africa in global governance (G20, G8, UNSC reform, International Financial Institutions reform).

## 6. Back to Basics: Promoting the JAES added-value

The future of EU-Africa relations will not be determined by the JAES and the successes or failures of the JAES or the next EU-Africa Summit alone. Yet if EU and Africa cannot make some progress on JAES' goals that they themselves set up, then it does not bode well for the future of relations at the continental level.

The tendency to downplay and remove the more systemic (political) issues affecting the JAES may reflect a sense of realism – among both parties – of what is most feasible at this stage. Yet it is difficult to see how the JAES can live up to its original vision and expectations if these issues are not included and addressed in the near future. This would imply agreeing and engaging at the highest levels upon a 'political roadmap' (not one solely of projects) indicating the processes that need to be organised to put in place the structural conditions for an effective functioning of the JAES. Some of the concrete steps to implement this broader political reform agenda and to create an enabling environment for the JAES are proposed in Box 4. While some of these are acknowledged by both parties, they will require real commitment to follow them through to action.

### Box 4: Fulfilling the JAES mandate and vision: some concrete steps

#### 1) Reinvalidate the political agenda of the JAES:

- Give a clear explicit and implicit political mandate to frankly and honestly discuss and confront both successes and implementation problems of the JAES to date. Try to agree on the (pre-) conditions that are required for the JAES to achieve its full potential<sup>46</sup>.
- Firmly align JAES behind already agreed continental positions and programmes in Europe and Africa (such as the African Union's Strategic Plan) but also AU brokered positions in other thematic areas.
- Jointly explore ways and means to elevate the JAES beyond the Commission-to-Commission dialogue to a real partnership owned by African and European Member States. One way of doing this is for both Commissions to consult member states and reflect on their internal agendas and on the specific and concrete issues they wish to be part of future continental political dialogues. Choose to pursue these at a high level in a limited amount of fields aligned to the thematic partnerships where the buy-in is likely to be the highest and where the JAES can add real value.

<sup>46</sup> Inspiration could be drawn from the JAES Peace and Security Partnership. There is agreement that the JAES has helped to further deepen cooperation between the two Unions in this critical area. Yet this was possible because there was already some kind of an enabling environment for effective dialogue and collaboration in place. Thus, the JAES Peace and Security Partnership could benefit from (i) the existence of continental agendas; (ii) a set of specific institutional arrangements on both sides allowing for peer-to-peer interactions; (iii) clarified relations between the AU and the RECs; (iv) the availability of dedicated and aligned funding; and (v) active engagement of member-states. Building blocks as these are also necessary for other partnerships to deliver over time.

- Look to engage or continue to engage the highest political clout (Ministerial level) in the different ‘themes’ covered by the JAES in Europe and Africa (on Energy, Migration, etc).
- Accept and factor in that continental positions both in Europe and Africa take time to develop; joint positions that are not “well grounded” at the start are unlikely to be sustainable.
- Address contentious issues (Zimbabwe, ICC, EPA) while ensuring that they do not slow down/derail the overall JAES dialogue in other areas.
- Clarify during the Summit where the higher level political leadership in the EU/EC (beyond the Development Commissioner) and the AU/AUC (beyond the Department of Economic Affairs) on the JAES is going to come from and ensure active and sustained engagement from that level.
- Jointly define a relevant political agenda beyond the next Summit focusing on core topics that are likely to dominate the partnership and require bold responses (e.g. the financial crisis, the follow-up to the Copenhagen Summit, etc.). This, in turn, should help to prove that the JAES provides an adequate political framework to address (controversial/divisive) policy issues head on.
- Clarify unambiguously the role of civil society in the JAES including in the partnerships then challenge and encourage civil society to effectively organise itself in Europe and in Africa and to engage.

### ***2) Use appropriate processes and institutional forums to push forward the JAES:***

- Identify, support and utilise legitimate continental and regional processes and forums (within Europe and Africa) that can articulate sustainable (not ad hoc) common positions on shared interests (e.g. the AU Peace and Security Council, the EU Political & Security Committee (COPS), COAFR in Europe, Permanent Representative Council (PRC) in Africa (including PRC Sub-Committee for Multilateral Affairs).
- Confine the role of the JEGs to providing an inclusive consultative forum and organise clear lines of political leadership, decision-making and accountability at the level of appropriate joint AU-EU-member states committees to be clearly identified for each partnership.

### ***3) Ensure greater coherence among various policy frameworks dealing with Africa***

- Jointly raise, in appropriate fora, the question of compatibility/complementarity of the JAES with the ACP framework (over time). Enter into a structured dialogue on how the two frameworks could be made more compatible. This needs to happen among the ACP group as much as it needs to occur within Europe.
- The EU, the AU and the governments of the Maghreb and Mashrak should enter into a dialogue on how the European Neighbourhood Policy and Instrument could be made more compatible with the JAES.
- Member States on both sides should undertake to review their national policies towards the continent with a view to ensuring greater coherence and synergies with the JAES.

### ***4) Think creatively about sustainable sources of joint funding for the JAES***

- The first pre-requisite is to *not* think in the old ways of mobilising (new) donor money, but rather to ensure much better transparency, utilisation, ease of access and alignment of existing resources.
- “Cost” the tangible priorities in the second Action Plan: it is a general management principle that action plans without a cost estimate lack credibility. Costing the action plan does not require immediate commitment and identification of joint resources but does clarify the level of ambition.
- Start the dialogue to consider sustainable funding strategies for the continental agenda of the JAES.
- Identify the challenges to be overcome in order to establish a dedicated pan-African envelope linked to the JAES, to be jointly funded and managed by the EU and AU (possibly using the funding model of the Africa Peace Facility to ensure ownership within Africa).

The transformation of the JAES – from a sum of projects towards a more structured and process-based relationship and from a technocratic exercise towards a more strategic dialogue – requires a solid and profound analysis of the interests, incentives as well as ‘drivers of change’ that can contribute to address head on the more fundamental political bottlenecks to effectively implement what has emerged over the past two years. They concern thorny questions such as: how should one specifically tackle the ownership deficit (especially from Member States and RECs)? What incentives may push both sides to consistently use the JAES framework for a substantial political dialogue (including for sensitive issues where interests diverge)? Are parties willing to define a clear roadmap to gradually transform the JAES into the ‘overarching’ framework for Africa–EU relations? Can they agree on the steps required to ensure effective coherence between the JAES and existing agreements, policies and instruments (with their respective vested interests on both sides)? What type of strategic and sustainable funding could be mobilised in Europe and Africa to ensure implementation of the JAES’ political objectives while simultaneously addressing the problems of ‘absorption capacity’ at the level of the AUC?

Insights for such an analysis of the interests, incentives and ‘drivers of change’ could be gained for example from trying to understand the characteristics of partnerships or priority areas where cooperation in the past three years has made satisfactory progress. An attempt to understand some of these success factors is made in Box 5. By building on these factors and being realistic about the possibilities of progress it would be possible to move forward.

#### Box 5: Identifying success factors for cooperation in the JAES framework

In general, more progress seems to have been achieved in relation to actions and partnerships where the following elements can be found:

- The pre-existence of dialogue between the two continents before the launching of the Joint Strategy (e.g. Peace and Security).
- The recognition of issue/theme as an important common problem about which there was already an ongoing effort to formulate continental agendas, in both the EU and African side (e.g. climate change, energy).
- The recognition of the JAES as the most adequate forum for concerting positions between Europeans and Africans on a particular issue (e.g. the negative examples of the Partnership on MDG and the Partnership on Trade, where the most important questions are addressed in other *fora*).
- The leadership and an indisputable mandate for the continental organisation are in place. For the EU this is problematic in the area of migration that remains the primary domain of member-states, and for the AU it is problematic in trade where the RECs and the member-states have more of a mandate. This can result in very little progress in formulation of robust common positions – so political dialogue at continental level can be of limited value; negotiations are only fruitful/ promising for follow through at regional or more likely the national level.
- A continental architecture is in place – a positive example of the Partnership on Peace and Security that can build on an articulated continental architecture (the African Peace and Security Architecture) and on a Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and RECs; the EU has also its emerging Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy.
- An adaptation of the institutional framework, working methods and information/communication to the Partnership’s particularities (e.g. the mechanisms of information sharing within the Partnership on Peace and Security, the use of the EUEI Partnership Dialogue Facility for technical support in the Partnership on Energy, etc).
- The level at which the discussions take place, depending on the degree of participation and effective engagement of experts and Member States from each side – a positive example would be the recent high-level meeting on energy.
- The availability of targeted financial resources (e.g. the African Peace Facility in the Peace and Security, the EU–ACP Partnership on Energy).

In terms of moving forward, notwithstanding learning the aforementioned lessons, significant questions remain for both Africa and Europe. From a European perspective this soul-searching exercise should probe into questions such as: how much of a geopolitical priority is Africa for Europe in the coming years? Can the EU develop and maintain genuinely common positions in its dialogue with Africa or is further fragmentation likely to prevail (with a Community-driven JAES' process co-existing with other policy frameworks and bilateral policies)? How much political support is there for the idea to effectively treat Africa as one or for the declared objective to bring more coherence into the policy frameworks and instruments dealing with Africa? Who is prepared to champion these reforms (beyond the EC) and promote the institutional innovations to make it work? Can the European Council and EU President Van Rompuy better define the collective Union's strategic objectives and interests? What can be expected from the EEAS in the post-Lisbon configuration? Is Europe willing to think about new ways to move forward difficult issues such as the EPAs, ICC, Migration, Zimbabwe?

Also on the African side there are no shortage of 'existential' questions to be addressed. How do African member-states collectively see the future of the ACP and its relationship to the JAES? The AUC may call for a unified approach to Africa and a pan-African envelope of financial resources, but for this to happen it will have to muster sufficient political support among its Member States and RECs, who will have to speak with one voice in Brussels on the topic. This has been conspicuously absent so far and it is the primary responsibility of African states and their regional/continental bodies to foster this agenda. This, in turn, will require concerted efforts to articulate, elaborate and follow through on clear pan-African agendas, from the bottom up, in line with national and regional interests that have credibility on a range of policy issues. Clarity should also be provided on how and in what form the African side will co-finance this Joint Strategy (so as to avoid falling into the traditional donor-recipient approach). Finally is Africa also willing to think about new ways to move forward on similar difficult issues such as EPAs, ICC, Migration, or Zimbabwe?

## Conclusions

Over the past three years the Joint Africa-EU Strategy process has not significantly fulfilled its stated goal to deliver more action on issues of common concern. Most of the examples of genuine progress on issues of common concern resulting from the JAES are too few, too new and not of a different character than those that existed beforehand. There are clear structural reasons for the political dilution of the JAES that have led to this, as noted in the paper, which could be addressed by providing political leadership and energy. However, there are also wider issues of geopolitics, the weight of history and different interests that have also undermined the ability of Europe and Africa to act together on issues of common concern.

The JAES process, however, when compared to other multilateral initiatives such as the Union for the Mediterranean, can claim to have delivered more.<sup>47</sup> Also,

<sup>47</sup> For a brief commentary on the Union for the Mediterranean see, Balfour, Rosemary. "Euro-Mediterranean blues", *European Policy Centre Commentary*, 6th of June 2010.

such a politically complex and ambitious undertaking should not be dismissed because it has not lived up to its ideals after only three years. Some trends in governance, energy, and peace and security are positive, which demonstrate that there can be a minimum level of understanding on some global issues that provide common ground for discussing a set of shared concerns. Yet there is much more work to be done.

The actions (or inactions) of policy makers from both continents (respective Commissions and Member States) will determine whether the JAES and the goals they set themselves in 2007 will contribute to the transformation of EU–Africa relations over the next few years or whether we will have “more of the same”. The ball is in their court before, during and after the 3<sup>rd</sup> EU–Africa Summit. However, the responsibility for “making the JAES work” as intended should not only be ‘dumped’ on the respective Commissions, or merely transferred on the European side to the EEAS. It is a shared responsibility between the African and European Institutions, Member States as well as all other key stakeholders (RECs, Parliaments, civil society, local governments, and private sector).

Yet if the search for a coherent, overarching framework for a renewed Africa–EU partnership was to lose momentum, much would be lost and in a few years’ time a similar framework may have to be reinvented to deal with global agendas and major cooperation challenges between the two continents. This is particularly the case if Africa wishes to gain a greater and stronger collective voice in international affairs, and if Europe wants to fulfil the potential of its new EU Treaty of Lisbon and become more of a player in global affairs with a “strategy” as well as strategic partners. Neither the status quo for the EU–Africa relation nor a further fragmentation is likely to serve either continents’ mid and long-term interests in an increasingly globalised world.



## Africa–Europe: A relationship in need of change

Siphamandla Zondi

## Think Piece

### Introduction

EU–Africa relations have benefited from a consolidation of continental agendas and institutions on both sides. While the EU has been integrated for decades, it only recently adopted a common policy on foreign and security affairs, an area of public policy considered by many observers in Africa as critical for facilitating a cordial relationship with Africa. The view is that in order for Europe to enter into a new partnership with Africa, one that recognises geopolitical changes globally, it needs to make clear the fundamental principles, values and interests that underpin its view of the world today and in the future, in particular the role of the parts of the world that it once colonised and continues to control economically and culturally. In Africa, the wave of democratisation combined with the unshackling of Africa that followed the end of the Cold War produced a new kind of leadership and citizenship, committed to democratic values, peace and sustainable development. But this transition has also stalled in a number of cases, creating an ambiguity of 'African progress', with many leaders considered part of the ugly past still active in politics.

In this context, Africa evolved a development blueprint premised on a strategic partnership with other parts of the world, a partnership founded on the principles of equality of nations, justice, respect for international law, and progress. However, the continent still had many institutions of governance and leaders ill-suited for the implementation of these ideals. This think piece suggests that the Africa–Europe partnership remains fundamentally weak beyond the less-than-warm regular gathering of the top leaders on both sides. This is because of the different, and sometimes diametrically opposed, political trajectories that the two continents have taken in the past decades. For this reason, the difficulty to start a serious political dialogue between the two continents to support the technicalities of policy design and implementation is a real challenge.

### EU–Africa and the burdens of history

It is a common view among African observers that the Berlin conference of 1884 defined the relationship between Europe and Africa well beyond the end of colonialism in the mid-1970s. The conference sought to define how Europe would access Africa's untapped natural resources for its expanding population and industries. Given the lack of a specific and coherent African agenda on Europe, beyond development aid and trade in primary commodities, it is very possible to see the Lisbon Summit as about Europe defining its access to African resources once again<sup>1</sup>. After Berlin, colonialism was a political strategy in service of this hunger for resources. In Lisbon, Europe is able to impose its will in spite of the partnership, as is thought to be case – rightly or wrongly – with the manner in which the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are being negotiated with arbitrary groups of African countries<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> 'Africa: From Berlin to Lisbon', at <http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/mawere107.17300.html> (3 November 2007).

<sup>2</sup> See 'Africa: Lobbies Want Talks On EU Trade Pacts Held Up for Three Years,' at [http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php?id\\_article=9392](http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php?id_article=9392) (3 March 2008), and 'ESA countries must determine agenda of Economic Partnership Agreements Negotiations' at <http://www.seatini.org/bulletins/7.06.php> (5 June 2009).

Dubbed 'the Summit of Equals' by the Portuguese Prime Minister, Jose Socrates, the Lisbon Summit hoped to undo this burden of history and lead to a partnership founded on equality, common interests and mutual respect. Socrates recalled the fact that it was from Lisbon that Europe set out to discover Africa at the beginning of imperialism, and in 2007 the idea was for Lisbon to be 'the bridgehead between Europe and Africa'. However, this declaration had the opposite effect, as African observers argued that it was presumptuous of Europe to talk about a relationship of equals before reconciliation and atonement of past and current sins. This refusal, including among African leaders that attended Lisbon, to look beyond a past of unequals to a future of equals underpins Africa's failure to live up to its part of the bargain struck at Lisbon. On this basis, weak outcomes should not be reduced to weak implementation capacity alone, but also the lack of political will on the part of African leaders and governments to assume equality before the past of inequality is atoned, one way or the other.

In response to Socrates' optimistic declaration, the African Union (AU) chairperson, John Kuffour, a committed liberal, retorted that history divided the two continents. He thought that the Lisbon Summit needed only to lay the basis for redefining this relationship, which means he expected the Summit to begin a process of removing the burden of history that militated against a cordial relationship of equals. Several African leaders pointed to various elements in this divisive history, including some moderate (like the Prime Minister of Morocco) and more radical African leaders (like Muamar Qhadaffi). The history of colonialism remains important in understanding the ambiguity of Africa's perspective on its relations with Europe. There is no better illustration of the burden of history than the response of African countries to Europe's concerns about Robert Mugabe's presence at the Lisbon Summit in 2007<sup>3</sup>. In fact, clearly differences over this, and other matters, partly explain the long time it took for the two continents to convene the Lisbon Summit after the Cairo Summit of 2000.

Of course, Europe did not just express optimism in the future to be built, but turned the heat on Africa by suggesting the real problems were post-colonial. For instance, Chancellor Merkel implored European countries not to let the human rights abuse perpetrated by African governments like Zimbabwe go unchallenged. This helped force Africa not only to close ranks, but to resist a new partnership on Europe's terms. Some of these fundamental differences over history remain unresolved, but were swept under the carpet as the partnership moved to matters of action plans and implementation. However, this unresolved framework of relationship undermines the possibility of an optimistic future.

Does Africa not have to take responsibility for missed opportunities after the end of formal colonial rule? African countries are also responsible for the harm caused by misrule and oppression to the African economy and politics since colonial rule, although many destructive governments and leaders were protected by some European countries. The fact that coup leaders in Madagascar and Niger receive support from the likes of France, in defiance of the AU's principled decision on unconstitutional change of political power, simply undermines the idea of equals.

<sup>3</sup> See 'The EU-Africa relationship post-colonialism', at <http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/mawere106.17269.html> (June 2008).

## Africa: the global problem child

While average economic growth rates in Africa have improved and, in some cases, been excellent, Africa's economic condition has remained largely unchanged. The continent has not benefitted visibly from stronger economic relations with major economic centres of the world, both in the East and the West. In fact, it is generally agreed that the new economic partners remain an opportunity, yet to be translated into concrete economic benefit, partly due to Africa's weak policy engagement and because these actors are largely driven by a craving for Africa's natural resources just like the old partners. Under these conditions, poverty, under-development, the curse of resources and external dependency continue to define the African condition, in spite of the changes in the global economy. The current global economic crisis has had a devastating effect on human development, as development partners cut back on their spending, external trade declines and foreign direct investments weaken.

Conscious of this condition, African countries continue to present their case in strategic partnerships, begging for assistance, debt forgiveness and, to some extent, market access. This helps promote the view of Africa as a beggar in a relationship that is supposed to be one of equals. While the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) provides a framework for African countries to take responsibility for their destiny and to enter into partnerships based on comparative strengths, in practice African countries continue to bring a list of demands and wishes to negotiation tables. The continent has not taken full advantage of the external interest in its rich natural resources in order to bargain for a more equitable economic partnership.

While developed countries, and indeed the new actors from developing countries, speak the language of equality and justice on public platforms, in practice they continue to espouse a patronising attitude towards Africa, with African leaders expected to queue for a handshake with heads of states of China, Iran, Japan, the UK, and France. While the EU, under the Portuguese presidency, talked about a relationship of equals, it was plotting to divide Africa into groups that do not match Africa's own regional blocs for negotiations on the EPAs. Key EU role players like France continued to act in contravention of common African positions on the political situation in Niger and Madagascar in 2008-9.

## No new African agenda for EU-Africa relations?

Africa lacks a coherent and thought-through agenda for an Africa-Europe partnership. While the NEPAD is a useful, all-embracing framework for key external relationships, Africa needed a specific common position or policy on Europe, given the potential for this relationship to benefit Africa immensely. African countries, of course, agree broadly on colonial sins to be atoned and want to be cautious not to be reduced into stooges of Europe. They also agree that Europe is significant for market access and trade, and recognise that Europe has evolved into a positive global player due to its commitment to multilateralism. However, they do not have a specific set of priorities on which to shape, rather than respond to, Europe's initiatives in the process of building the partnership.

Part of the challenge for Africa is the manner in which decision-making takes place. The first challenge is that decisions are taken in national capitals and harmonised at continental level through consultation and consensus building. As a result, common positions tend to bear strong hallmarks of national interests of member states, rather than enlightened common interests for the greater good of Africa. The second challenge is that, while regional economic communities (RECs) are expected to act as building blocks for the continental governance architecture, they are hardly involved in shaping continental policy positions on major issues facing Africa and its external relations. The third issue is the weak consultation of non-state actors in major decision making at the AU. Where the AU central organs innovates common policies, these are treated with suspicion by representatives of national capitals. As a result, the mandate of the AU Commission, for instance, is so restricted that it is unable to lead the development of a supranational agenda for Africa.

### The new cold war: North-Atlantic versus Asian Interests

There has been a sort of an economic cold war between the West and the new economic actors in Africa, especially China and India. The global transformations that followed the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s led to the emergence of new global powers. These new global actors are driven by strong national consumption, large populations and industrialisation. As a result, their demand for natural resources and primary commodities have caused them to look to Africa, in much the same way that some sectors of the industrialised North continue to see Africa as a source of much-needed raw materials for its industries. This has led to a sort of competition between the old power in the North Atlantic zone and the emerging Asian giants, which is most visible in countries rich in natural resources such as oil, minerals, forestry, fishery and so forth; hence the intense scramble for access to economies of the DRC, Sudan, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Angola and so forth.

China, in particular, has attempted to change the terms of its partnership with Africa by emphasising this idea of mutual respect and mutually beneficial relations. It has invested heavily in areas of the African political economy that could help stimulate sustainable economies, the transport and communications infrastructure – albeit driven by its interests in natural resources. Its commitment not to intervene in the internal political affairs of countries has also endeared it to the resource-rich countries, which tend to have questionable governance records<sup>4</sup>.

Large sectors in several African countries generally see Europe's renewed interest in an enhanced partnership as an artifact of this scramble, much the same way they see China's intense use of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation. In their view, neither party is motivated by common good or a real interest in the renaissance of Africa, but by strong interests on resources and markets, given Africa's growing population and slowly expanding middle class. For this reason, Africa looks to play one power block against the other. It is much more willing

<sup>4</sup> See Samkange, SJTM (2002) African perspectives on intervention and state sovereignty. *African Security Review* 11(1): 73–84.

to resist forced partnership with the North because it knows that the North will not want to let China and the emerging powers completely control the region's economies. While it makes sense for Africa to drag its feet in order to extract as many concessions from partners as possible, the lack of a coherent continental policy means that the continent does not know how to behave once concessions are exhausted or if a partner simply refuses to budge. So, Africa tends to adopt whatever comes out with no regard to the capacity to implement or alignment with Africa's broader interests. This translates into what is called a lack of capacity to implement, when in fact it is a weak policy framework for Africa to implement commitments made in partnership agreements.

## The future

Therefore, expectations of the 3rd Africa–Europe Summit in Libya in November 2010 should be moderate. The burden of history, in subtle or obvious form, will remain part of the undertones of the discussions. The idea of Africa as a blemish on the global progress, and a continent in need of help, will also perpetuate a sense of entitlement on the part of Africa and a patronising attitude on the part of Europe. The discussions will take place in a context where Europe's kindness will be seen by some African actors as a ploy to win the competition for natural resources against the new economic players. Africa's common position on Europe remains elusive, meaning that the continent will lack an organising framework to guide its input into building a relationship with Europe that seeks to benefit both continents equitably and redefine the terms of their relationship for good.

Given the fact that political relations will continue to experience some difficulties over the next years, the focus should be on developing functional co-operation on the basis of converging socio-economic interests, which should succeed without political will. In fact, the success of functional co-operation will lay the foundation for improved political understanding and will. A new cadre of leadership will emerge, for whom improved functional co-operation is more important than history. In that fashion, Europe would have indirectly atoned for its sins and Africa delivered itself from the burden of its ugly past.

While interfaces with the AU are critical for high-level political dialogue, it is my humble view that actually greater effect would be realised if the RECs were given space to work out specific co-operation programmes. As the building blocks for AU integration, they are well positioned to deepen Africa's strategic partnerships, not only just with Europe, but also with China, Japan, India, Brazil, and other emerging powers.

Attention should be paid to a small set of high-impact priorities rather than a laundry list of what is desirable. These priorities would include co-operation in agriculture, natural resources (including beneficiation), health and education, as well as innovation and technology. Regional secretariats would be tasked with the task of co-ordinating the implementation of cross-boundary co-operation programmes. The AU Commission would manage the political dialogue and keep the dialogue between the continents going.



## Peace and Security Unremitting Challenges for African–European Relations

Stefan Mair and Kerstin Petretto

# Peace and Security

Peace and security rank high in the Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES) and the accompanying action plan.<sup>1</sup> The new Africa–EU partnership launched in December 2007 has three priorities: to increase dialogue on common challenges; to operationalise fully the African peace and security architecture (APSA); and to secure predictable funding for peace support operations. While decisive progress has been made in the latter two categories, there seems to be a lack of enthusiasm for enhancing and deepening the partnership. The priority of increasing the dialogue on common challenges has not progressed much recently, with the result that the vision of a shared understanding of security, threats and how to approach them is increasingly at risk.

The (actual and perceived) asymmetry between the two partners hampers their relationship, which, according to the JAES, should be on an equal footing. This is especially important as, over the past few years, actors other than the EU have been putting enormous effort into building close relationships with African states and, on a continental level, with the African Union. For example, the United States (US) and China are strengthening bilateral or regional ties, and do not shy away from clearly articulating their interests, which may have severe effects on the EU–AU partnership. In light of their common achievements so far, the EU and AU should try to find ways to revitalise their dialogue, in order to overcome (where possible) or to deal with these asymmetries.

The first part of this paper outlines the achievements of the joint EU–AU peace and security partnership, focusing on visible outcomes, such as the establishment of APSA, operational actions, peace initiatives and deeper co-operative structures between the two organisations. The second part concentrates on the key challenges that the two partners face within their relationship, especially the increasingly divergent approaches to the understanding of security, and the prolonged asymmetry between the two partners. As a result of both these challenges, there is a declining enthusiasm for openly exchanging views, which is essential for maintaining and deepening the partnership between the two continents – and making it special and valuable, particularly with regard to potential (perceived or actual) competitors.

### Progress: less conflicts, improved institutional framework and enhanced co-operation

In 2007, the aim of the JAES was to change the security landscape, both inside and outside Africa, in a co-operative way and to create an environment for sustainable and peaceful development. Two years later, peace and security is certainly one of the areas, if not *the* area where the African continent has achieved

<sup>1</sup> EC Commission, The Africa–EU Strategic Partnership, [http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/regionscountries/euafrika\\_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/regionscountries/euafrika_en.cfm)

the most remarkable progress so far.<sup>2</sup> A feature of the 1990s, and the early years of this century, was complex, transnational wars, which involved a multitude of different actors, such as regular armies, international peacekeepers, rebels, warlords, mercenaries, tribal militias, and criminal gangs. These conflicts were extremely brutal, affected mainly the civil population, and destroyed the physical and social infrastructure of many states and regions. They predominantly took the form of regional conflicts (in the Mano River region and around the Great Lakes), and civil wars (in Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, Northern Uganda, or Angola).

Although civil strife and mayhem persist in some areas, for example in Chad, the Central African Republic, Darfur, parts of Southern Sudan, Somalia and eastern Congo, the present situation is completely different from that of the 1990s. While available datasets vary considerably in absolute numbers, most sources recognise the remarkable downward trend of violent conflicts in Africa. Although the numbers have been rising slightly since 2009, the improvement can be found in a decrease of battle-related deaths and the more limited geographical scope of conflicts.<sup>3</sup>

This progress results from a variety of factors such as: improved governance and socio-economic indicators (despite ongoing conflicts), an increased engagement of civil society and better humanitarian assistance to war-affected populations. In large part, the progress can be attributed to the establishment of the APSA and the increased engagement of the international community. Playing a crucial role in mitigating the suffering of millions of Africans, and preventing the continent from collapse, were the diverse mediation efforts of the UN and AU, regional organisations and African and international leaders, as well as the deployment of troops by the UN, the AU, the EU and individual states to enforce and stabilise peace. At a time when foreign interventions in national conflicts are coming under greater criticism, it is of utmost importance to emphasise the benefits of such an engagement.

The AU's progress in building APSA is undoubtedly impressive, and the structure established during the last decade can be called one-of-a-kind: APSA aims to create continental co-operative mechanisms for preventing, managing and resolving African conflicts. APSA has a central decision-making organ – the Peace and Security Council (PSC) – and a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) for anticipating and preventing conflicts in all of Africa. A panel of the wise and a military staff committee act as advisory bodies, while the African Standby Force (ASF) is its operational arm.<sup>4</sup> ASF is envisaged as a rapid response mechanism and builds upon reaction forces assembled by the Regional Economic Communities (RECs).<sup>5</sup> ASF, and to a lesser extent CEWS, is one of the main pillars of APSA that endeavours to build a close-knit working relationship between the AU and its regional-level partners.

<sup>2</sup> For an in depth assessment see Africa Progress Panel, "From Agenda to Action Turning Resources into Results for People", Geneva, 2010.

<sup>3</sup> See for example, Harbom, L & P Wallensteen, "Armed Conflicts, 1946-2009". *Journal of Peace Research* 47, (4): 501-509, 2010; Human Security Report 2009.

<sup>4</sup> The ASF will consist of five regionally based standby brigades. See Cillier, J & J Pottgieter, Johann. "The African Standby Force". In: Engel *et al.*, *Africa's new peace and security architecture: towards an evolving security regime?* Farnham *et al.* Ashgate: 111-141. 2010; Dersso, S, "The role and place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture". ISS Paper 209, 2010.

<sup>5</sup> Particularly the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Union du Maghreb Arab (UMA).



The new structure is based on a framework of norms and principles, which gives the AU a wide-ranging authority to intervene in African conflicts that far exceeds that of its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU). With the adoption of its Constitutive Act in 2000<sup>6</sup>, the AU has undergone a paradigm shift, as the principle of non-intervention and the formerly sacrosanct respect for sovereignty have been restrained considerably. According to Article 30 of the Act, the AU can suspend a member in the case of 'unconstitutional changes of government', while Article 4(h) provides for the right to intervene in a member state 'pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity'. Member states have therefore recognised – at least formally – that sovereignty is not a safeguard for rulers but a responsibility to protect their citizens' lives. Although competing with the still-enshrined principle of non-interference in domestic affairs (Article 4(g)) and not yet applied, Article 4(h) at least provides more room for manoeuvre than ever before.<sup>7</sup> Since 2007, the AU has suspended four member states due to unconstitutional changes of government, which demonstrates an increased willingness to implement the AU's principles.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, the organisation has deployed numerous peacekeeping operations during the last decade.<sup>9</sup>

However, the AU could not have raised its peace and security profile to such an extent without the assistance of its main external partner, the EU. While the EU has already invested heavily in the original build-up of the new AU structure, JAES is aimed explicitly at raising the relationship between the two continents to a higher level: It envisages a 'strengthened political partnership' based on a 'consensus on values, common interests and common strategic objectives' – a partnership of equals from continent to continent, where both partners recognise and respect each other's needs and concerns for co-operative working on solutions.

Since 2007, the EU has channelled about € 700 million into the continental APSA, specifically via the Africa Peace Facility.<sup>10</sup> The biggest share, up to 70 per cent, has thereby been dedicated to continuing continental or regional peace missions, such as the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS), the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the AU missions in the Comoros (AMISEC/MAES), and the two regional missions in Central African Republic (FOMUC<sup>11</sup>/MICOPAX<sup>12</sup>). A much smaller amount has been spent on capacity-building and evaluation and monitoring. Moreover, currently four EU missions are deployed on the African continent with a personnel strength of almost 2 400:<sup>13</sup> the EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (since 2005); the EU police

6 See Constitutive Act of the African Union at [www.africa-union.org/root/au/Aboutau/Constitutive\\_Act\\_en.htm](http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Aboutau/Constitutive_Act_en.htm)

7 See Sturman, K & A Hayatou, "The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: From Design to Reality". In: Engel *et al.*, *Africa's new peace and security architecture: towards an evolving security regime?* Farnham *et al.*: Ashgate: 57–76, 2010; Murithi, T, "The African Union's transition from non-intervention to non-indifference: an ad hoc approach to the responsibility to protect?" *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft* (Bonn) 1: 90–106, 2009.

8 See Franke, B & S Gänzle, African developments: Continental conflict management – a glass half full or half empty? Briefing Paper 7/2010.

9 The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB, 2003–04); the African Union Mission in the Comoros (AMISEC, 2006); the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM, 2007–ongoing); the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS, 2004–07); the Hybrid AU–UN Operation in Darfur (UNAMID, 2007–ongoing); the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX lead by ECCAS, 2008–ongoing).

10 See [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/index_en.htm); Bello, O, *The EU–Africa partnership: at a strategic crossroads*. Madrid: FRIDE, 2010; Pirozzi, N, "Towards an effective Africa–EU Partnership on Peace and Security: Rhetoric or Facts?" *International Spectator*, 45, (2): 85–101. 2010.

11 Force Multinationale en Centrafrique

12 Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en République Centrafricaine

13 See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=en>

mission for the Democratic Republic of Congo (since 2007); and, in Somalia, the EU naval force operation 'Atalanta' (since 2008) and EU training mission (since May 2010). On 30 September 2010, the EU mission in support of the security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau, which had been active since 2008, was closed down, having completed its mandate. The EU has also played a key role in improving predictable and sustainable funding of peace-support operations led by African organisations, for example within the G8 or UN.

Together, the AU and EU have been major contributors to UN peace management and peacekeeping processes and operations. By acknowledging the UN's overarching position as principal global peace and security organ, mutually beneficial collaboration between the three organisations has progressed significantly in the last years. Furthermore, the EU and AU have stepped up efforts to coordinate and co-operate with the diverse African RECs, which are a cornerstone of APSA, through establishing and/or strengthening RECs liaison offices to the AU (and vice versa), as well as enhanced funding of Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs), particularly in West African countries. Moreover, the operationalisation of CEWS and ASF was brought forward by (in the case of the latter) successfully implementing the Amani training cycle tasked with improving ASFs' decision, command and control structures. They have also worked out common strategies and positions relating to specific areas, such as the illicit trafficking of arms and the handling of small arms and light weapons. Moreover, a trilateral AU-RECs-EU roadmap is in progress, which will continue, stabilise and boost co-operation procedures, furthering the full operationalisation of the continental APSA.

What has made co-operation easier is the fact that both partners have a stock of institutions to build on, and regard peace and security as a strategic priority and a prerequisite for further development. Thus, they have an intrinsic motivation to co-operate on this issue, and can be applauded for their joint efforts and successes, which surely can be a model for other thematic partnerships within JAES.

### **Challenges: diverging perceptions of security and persisting asymmetry**

Nevertheless, severe challenges remain, as many root causes for the complex, transnational conflicts ravaging the continent are still in place: widespread poverty and social inequality; increasing competition for scarce resources, such as water and land; continued social and political exclusion in many African countries, where the experience of violence is often fresh and the seek for revenge alluring. Warlords, criminal gangsters and other war profiteers have a massive interest in instigating new, reviving old and escalating other conflicts. Peace and security is far from guaranteed in Africa, and yet the attention of the international community, including the EU, seems to diminish and is diverted by other challenges.

Moreover, two major obstacles hold back the further deepening of the AU-EU peace and security partnership: increasingly divergent approaches to the understanding of security, and continuing asymmetry between the two (ought-to-be) equal partners, accompanied by a decline in enthusiasm for exchanging views on common challenges. These setbacks are deeply interconnected, as asymmetry can heavily hamper any ambition of pursuing a frank dialogue based on an equal footing.

Despite the affirmation that their partnership is based on a 'consensus on values, common interests and common strategic objectives', the assessment of threats takes very different paths in Africa and Europe. The growing gap, between the Europeans' perception of a stable, peaceful Africa and the Africans' knowledge of how fragile the present situation is, does not result solely from European ignorance. It reflects, above all, the divergent security interests and different approaches to security: European security concerns are, firstly, the effects of international Islamic terrorism on their societies, followed by organised crime, especially drug dealing, human trafficking and piracy. A special worry is maritime security in African coastal waters, be it around the Horn of Africa or along the West African coastline. The classical security threat of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is still seen as a top priority, at least within the European security community. And, if asked, the European public would probably add to this list migration from Africa to Europe: many European societies do not regard the influx of African migrants as an asset, but as a danger to social cohesion, cultural identity and job security. In contrast, Africa's conflicts and wars do not appear to be an immediate threat to Europe's security. Beyond these commonsense perceptions of security threats, there is a growing awareness that Europe's security could be undermined by the rise of new constellations, resulting from the shifts in global power – China and other states emerging as new superpowers, diminishing the influence of EU and other western partners such as the US – and an increasing competition for critical raw materials. In addition, the emergence of a new form of international, African-based terrorism, arising from protracted misery in some African regions, cannot be excluded.

The African perception of security threats is markedly different from this European perspective. Personal security, which is the norm for Europeans, hardly exists for many ordinary Africans. Africans are not only threatened by the violence perpetrated by soldiers, but also assaulted by gangsters, religious sects and ethnic communities, warlords and "big men" and, last but not least, their own state. Therefore, in Africa, state and non-state actors emphasise the notion of human security, applied in a very broad sense that resembles the definition of human development. International terrorism – one of the main security concerns in Europe currently – has claimed victims in Africa but very few compared to the other challenges faced by Africans. Non-proliferation is not seen as a major issue, as Africa is free of weapons of mass destruction. Although organised crime certainly affects the majority of Africans, for many it also constitutes the only available mode of survival. Migration from Africa to Europe is perceived as an opportunity, not as a threat, and the same can be said for global power shifts and the competition for scarce resources. From an African perspective, the emergence of China, India, Brazil and others as important partners in many sectors, diminishes the dependence on the US and Europe and provides additional bargaining chips. The competition for scarce resources is not perceived as a threat; quite the contrary, increased prices and values benefit the many African countries that depend on the export of raw materials.

The very different perceptions of security risks do not make for easy co-operation between AU and EU in the field of peace and security. In addition, notwithstanding the 'equal partnership' mantra, their co-operation suffers from a substantial asymmetry between both entities, which has an institutional, operational and contentual expression.

Institutionally, the AU is far weaker than the EU. It still depends on outside support for establishing and maintaining its core organs and field operations, as its peace fund is usually empty due to non-payment of its member states. Currently within the AU, the burden of financial and troop contributions is borne by a few members, such as Nigeria, Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya.<sup>14</sup> The AU is also not even able to absorb and fully make use of the financial flows received from its main partners.<sup>15</sup> The PSC is permanently understaffed and struggles to fulfil its many tasks, while the EU's growing delegation staff at AU's headquarters undermines still further the already overstretched African capacities.<sup>16</sup> The implied danger is that EU-funded projects and programmes are not really owned by the AU, but based on European proposals and implemented in European ways. Thus the institutional asymmetry clearly results in an operational one.

The co-operation frameworks, such as the European neighbourhood policy, the Cotonou partnership agreement with African countries south of the Sahara, and the trade, development and co-operation agreement with South Africa, severely undermine the goal of JAES to treat Africa as one, divert already limited capacities of African actors, and advocate fragmented policies that are not favourable for the intended comprehensive approach.<sup>17</sup> To compound the situation still further, the EU's policies are hampered by its persisting polyphonic set up, specifically with regard to Africa: The interests of some states, such as Great Britain or France, are linked to their close-knit relationship with certain countries or regions, while others, particularly Germany, certainly pursue their interests in Africa, but rarely make them explicit. The European institutions – parliament, commission and council – also tend to define their own positions and policies with regard to Africa. The lack of transparency of positions taken by European actors, member states and EU institutions, of alliances and conflict lines between them, as well as the complex decision-making process makes it extremely difficult for African partners to deal with 'the EU'.

Finally, most of the norms and principles guiding peace and security issues are the product of European, or at least Western-based, concepts. Particularly controversial are those that refer to certain governance and democratic standards, which are generally regarded as being interdependent with sustainable peace and security. Rhetorically, African leaders echoed these norms very much in the past years. Yet, on the one hand, the conditionality the EU often attaches to its funding reinforces the African perception of a one-way dialogue and, again, undermines the notion of want-to-be-equal partners. And, on the other hand, justifiable doubts persist over whether African leaders wholeheartedly support the softening of the principle of non-interference, are committed to non-violent conflict settlement and have truly internalized the significance of governance as cause for conflicts. While membership of the EU requires compulsory compliance with certain democratic standards, notwithstanding AU's improved record

14 Franke, B & S Gänzle, African developments: Continental conflict management – a glass half full or half empty? Briefing Paper 7/2010.

15 See United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2008/178, 14 March 2008; United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2008/186, 7 April 2008; Dersso, S, "The role and place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture". ISS Paper 209, 2010.

16 Bossuyt, J & A Sherriff, Andrew, *What next for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy? Perspectives on revitalising an innovative framework*. Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2010; Lieb, J, *Die EU-Delegation bei der Afrikanischen Union: Lehren für die nächste Phase im Aufbau des Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes*. Berlin: SWP, 2010.

17 See Pirozzi, N, "Towards an effective Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security: Rhetoric or Facts?" *International Spectator*, 45, (2): 85-101. 2010.

of applying sanctions, the commitment of a significant number of AU states to democracy is dubious, thereby undermining the foundations of peaceful and secure livelihoods.

These three forms of asymmetry prevent a deepening peace and security co-operation in various ways. On the one hand, the persistent donor–recipient relationship severely undermines the partnership between the two continents, both in terms of ownership and equality. This is due not only to the AU's dependence on outside support, but also to the EU's steering power that comes from earmarking and conditioning donations according to its own agenda. Some have concluded that, as the lion's share of EU investments flows to peace operations, not capacity building of its overburdened partner, the EU's engagement is driven mainly by the quest to enhance its common foreign and security policy rather than a genuine interest in a strong continental neighbour and partner.<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, the two partners' diverging perceptions of security and threats might lead to a slow but steady drift apart, with other actors filling the gap.

The EU has for a long time been the prime partner of Africa countries, and relationships have developed through several stages since colonial occupation. Yet, new actors have emerged, particularly in the field of peace and security: next to the US, which under the premise of fighting international terrorism has put more and more emphasis on African security in the last decade, this is especially true for China. For a long time primarily interested in its own economic development, China has invested heavily in, for example, African infrastructure projects or the extraction of resources. However, in recent years, China has become more involved in peace and security.<sup>19</sup> Of the five permanent Security Council members, China has been the biggest contributor to UN operations on African soil throughout the past years. Moreover, many were surprised by its current contribution to curb piracy around the Horn of Africa, particularly as China has recently begun revitalising its maritime forces, starting from almost zero capabilities. Although China has not yet stepped up its military aid budget or established any permanent military basis on the African continent, growing economic ties and investments will obviously foster the need for a stable and secure environment for Chinese firms and citizens investing and working abroad. One of China's decisive advantages, compared to the EU, is that conditionality does not accompany its support, investment and co-operation, as its policies are based on the principles many African rulers still seem to cling to such as upholding sovereignty as sacrosanct norm while not tolerating any interference in domestic affairs. Hence, China is a very favourable partner for African states and its engagement might very well have repercussions on the EU–AU partnership.

## Conclusion and suggestions

The partnership between Africa and the EU, which may have grown and deepened, should not be taken for granted and needs some serious reconsideration. In particular, the sustained gap in capabilities, threat perceptions and principles

<sup>18</sup> Olsen, G, "The EU and military conflict management in Africa: for the good of Africa or Europe?" *International Peacekeeping* (Hford) 16, (2): S. 245–260, 2009; Vines, A, "Rhetoric from Brussels and reality on the ground: the EU and security in Africa", *International Affairs*, 86, (5): 1091–1108, 2010.

<sup>19</sup> Holslag J, *China's Next Security Strategy for Africa*. Brussels: Institute of Contemporary China Studies, 2008.

and values, which could undermine the envisioned equality between the two partners, should be dealt with immediately.

The gap in material capacities will not be closed in the near future, as the economic output of the two continents differs greatly, and a catch-up would require considerable patience – and practical commitment – from both sides. Nevertheless, as burden-sharing is one of the main co-operation principles in JAES, this matter needs to be urgently and openly discussed. The noble aim of co-operating, as equal partners in a strategic relationship, will be insurmountably hampered by turning a blind eye to the factual imbalance of capacities and funds, and avoiding discussions about the limits of acceptable burdens on both sides and how to deal with persisting disparities.

Furthermore, the divergent perceptions of security threats need to be tackled seriously. The April 2010 ministerial meeting took a step in this direction, by acknowledging the need to enhance dialogue in this regard. Yet, instead of openly debating diverging security interests, differing approaches to peace and security and the consequences of asymmetry, it is still more the rule than the exception for Europe and Africa to pretend repeatedly in joint summits and communiqués that their relationship is based on common values and interests and on equal partnership. While this criticism does not mean that Europe and Africa do not have common values and interests, not all African leaders, who determine the AU's fate and policies, share them. The JAES contains a multitude of principles that provides grounds for cherry picking and the setting of different priorities among member states of the AU and EU, and so it is legitimate to ask whether listing so many ambitious principles makes sense.

A debate on truly shared values and interests appears overdue, not only within the two organisations but also between the two partners. The result of such a debate between Europe and Africa might be the identification of security threats (which they both *genuinely* regard as priorities) and approaches for dealing with them that combine African and European ways and means. A calibration of European and African values, interests and approaches might also result in a less asymmetric institutional, operational and contentual relationship. The overarching aim should therefore be to lift the partnership beyond the persisting unequal donor-recipient relationship, i.e. *beyond development*. Moreover, Europe could more clearly and honestly express its specific security interests related to Africa (such as reducing African migration, balancing the emergence of China and getting access to critical raw materials), and review the diverging approaches to the continent measured by (and in relation to) JAES approach of treating Africa as one. In addition, Europe should confirm clearly the value of Africa's contribution to diminishing the respective security risks, being more active in (for example) combating piracy and organised crime, and being more supportive in the non-proliferation issue. This is also what Africa could offer in exchange for Europe's massive investment in APSA and Africa's development in general. Such reconsiderations and investments of both partners could make the African-European partnership more balanced and represent a decisive move in the direction of a truly equal partnership, where the two continents can jointly strive for a more secure environment, both within and outside Africa.

## The African Union Peace and Security Partnerships

Tim Murithi

# Peace and Security

### Introduction

The African Union (AU) is developing a series of global partnerships covering a range of issues including peace and security. To date no consensus exists among AU member states on a principled platform from which to engage with global partnerships. Specifically, there is no internal AU consensus on whether global partnerships should be predicated on the principles of democratic governance, accountability, and economic transparency of states on both sides of the partnership.

This paper will assess the AU's peace and security partnerships, in particular, the European Union (EU) and Africa framework of collaboration, as well as the evolving partnerships with the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM). It will also consider the prospects for establishing a relationship between the European common security and defence policy framework and the African peace and security architecture (APSA). It will conclude with a discussion of the major challenges in the operationalisation of APSA and the scope for the AU's partnerships to play a constructive role in addressing them. This paper will conclude by highlighting a number of strategies enhancing the AU's peace and security partnerships.

### EU–Africa collaboration on peace and security

A Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES) was adopted in December 2007 to guide the relationship between the two continents, with exchanges at the inter-governmental, parliamentary, civil society and private sector levels. The understanding is that the two continents would co-own the JAES. One of the priority areas is to enhance dialogue on peace and security in Africa: Article 17 of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol states that the Council shall maintain close and continued interaction with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the fulfilment of its mandate to promote and maintain peace, security and stability in Africa, while Article 17(4) stipulates that the Council shall co-operate and work closely with other relevant international organisations on issues of peace, security and stability in Africa.

On 14 May 2008, the AU PSC issued a statement in which it reiterated its willingness to consolidate its relationship further with the EU Political and Security Committee or *Comité politique et de sécurité* (COPS).<sup>1</sup> In this regard, the EU working with the AU PSC and Commission can collaborate to enhance the organisation's capacity to plan, manage and deploy effective peace operations. Specifically, a new African peace facility has been established with €65 million for capacity development for a period of three years. In addition, the 10<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund has made a provision of €110 million for peace and security issues.

<sup>1</sup> African Union Peace and Security Council, Statement of the Council on the AU and EU Partnership, PSC/PR/BR/(CXXVII), (Addis Ababa: African Union, 14 May 2008).

The EU is funding a number of the AU's activities, including liaison officers in war-affected countries and the AU's engagement with disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD), security sector reform (SSR) issues as well as the AU border programme. The EU has also committed itself to financing AU-led peace operations to the tune of €200 million, which is supplemented by individual contributions from EU member states.

### ***Key challenges***

The key challenges are to ensure predictable and sustainable funding for peace operations in Africa. The AU's commitment to advancing internal peace and security is evident in its deployment: of AU missions, unilaterally in the Comoros and initially in Burundi (AMIB) and Darfur (AMIS); of AU special envoys and the establishment of AU liaison offices in war-affected countries on the continent. However, AU member states are not yet deploying the level of resources required to make the organisation a self-sustaining agent for the resolution of the continent's internal challenges, and a viable international actor. For example, the serious challenges to the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM); the AU's inability to engage effectively with non-compliant member states such as Sudan, Zimbabwe and currently Guinea. In addition, there is a need to ensure the efficient utilisation of financial resources and transparent reporting of expenditure. It is also necessary to improve the administrative efficiency within the AU, and a level of professionalism has to be inculcated in the relationship between the partner organisations.

## **Collaboration with other relevant actors: The UN, NATO and AFRICOM**

### ***United Nations***

Chapter VII of the UN Charter identifies co-operation between UNSC and regional and sub-regional organisations as an important pillar of the international system of collective security. The UN has recognised the need for effective co-ordination and collaboration, given that more than 60% of the Security Council's agenda focuses on crisis situations on the continent.

Both organisations have identified the need to establish a mechanism of co-operation and co-ordination between the PSC and the UNSC. Consequently, the PSC emphasised the 'Establishment of a Coordination and Consultation Mechanism between the African Union Peace and Security Council and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)'.<sup>2</sup> Article 17 of the PSC Protocol stipulates that, where necessary, recourse will be made to the UN to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the PSC activities in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of regional organisations. In December 2008, a panel headed by the former prime minister of Italy, Romano Prodi, issued a report on 'the modalities for support to African Union peace-keeping operations', stating that the role played by regional organisations in promoting peace and security is indispensable to the work of the UNSC.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> African Union Peace and Security Council, Communiqué PSC/PR/Comm(LXVIII), (Addis Ababa: African Union, 14 December 2006).

<sup>3</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution, A/63/666-S/2008/813, (New York: United Nations, December 2008).



The UN is already engaged in a joint initiative with the AU, notably the deployment of the AU/UN hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The deployment of UNAMID clearly brought challenges, specifically in the design and planning phases, and major difficulties remain in the operationalisation of the joint mission and implementation of its mandate. It is still too early to conclude definitively whether UNAMID is a model for the co-operation between the UN and AU, not least because the situation in Darfur has not been adequately resolved. The co-ordination difficulties facing UNAMID at a strategic level between the AU and the UN should serve as a catalyst for reviewing and improving the working relationship between both bodies. Some key members of the UNSC feel that the perception, that the PSC and the Security Council are equal partners in form and substance, should be neither entertained nor encouraged. In May 2009, a meeting between the UNSC and the PSC, in Addis Ababa, spent an inordinate amount of time discussing whether the two bodies were engaged in an informal or formal meeting. Implicit in this debate was the issue of whether the UNSC and the AU PSC are in effect 'equal' partners. Essentially, as the only body officially mandated to oversee international peace and security, some key members of the UNSC prefer to view their counterparts in the AU PSC as playing a subsidiary role and function to their initiatives.

The UN can further assist the AU in specific areas, including enhancing capacity and institutionalising regular consultations and exchange of information. With specific reference to peace operations, this presupposes co-ordinating joint fact-finding missions, co-ordinating mediation efforts, and planning, designing and implementing peacekeeping operations.

On 6 October 2010, the UN appointed its first Assistant Secretary-General (ASG), Ambassador Zachary Muburi-Muita, to head the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU), which was established by the General Assembly on 1 July 2010. In particular, the ASG will represent the UN in the area of peace and security at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. This is the first UN office of its kind in the AU and could serve as a basis for enhancing co-operation between both organisations.<sup>4</sup>

### **Key challenges**

A challenge to the AU's relationship with the UN is the breakdown of internal AU coherence and common positions, which occurs when AU policy diverges from the national interest of specific member states. For example, the Ezulwini Consensus on UNSC reform was initially undermined by individual states (South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt) advancing their own interests. The core premise of the Ezulwini Consensus remains the AU's policy on UNSC reform but the continent's regional hegemony still harbour designs for securing a permanent seat on the Council. Therefore, the AU's co-ordinated engagement with the UN can, at times, be disorganised and unfocused. The current AU policy on non-engagement with the International Criminal Court (ICC), and its request to the UNSC to defer and postpone the indictment of the president of Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir, for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, has also generated controversy. The AU's stance of non-engagement with the ICC has seen the dissension of South Africa and Botswana with more countries expected to publicly diverge from the AU position.

<sup>4</sup> United Nations/African Union Press Release, *The First UN Assistant Secretary-General to the AU Commission presents letters of credence to the Chairperson Jean Ping*, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 6 October 2010.

## **NATO**

In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, NATO has been struggling to define its role in the absence of its nemesis, the Warsaw Pact. With its extensive professional expertise and logistical capabilities, NATO can clearly play a role in supporting the AU's fledgling security institutions. However, the precise nature of this support has to be delineated, given that NATO's original mandate was to offset any threat to its members, and was thus predicated on a defensive and reactive posture. Playing the role of peace supporter in Africa is therefore a new venture and an unknown quantity for NATO.

The AU's collaboration with NATO was inaugurated in 2005, following the AU's request to NATO to provide support for the now defunct AMIS in Sudan. NATO also has the AU-UN hybrid mission in Darfur, Sudan (UNAMID) and AMISOM in Somalia.

NATO provided airlift services to AU peacekeepers to and from Darfur, when there was a shortage of cargo capacity as well as helicopters. Between July and October 2005, NATO co-ordinated the strategic airlift of about 5 000 peacekeepers from African troop-contributing countries to Darfur. When AMIS was terminated in December 2007, NATO subsequently became involved in the UNAMID operations. To date NATO has provided airlift to a total of approximately 24 000 AU peacekeepers.

NATO also provided training to AMIS personnel. Training initiatives focused on strategic and operational planning issues. In particular, the training imparted insights into how AU assets could be optimally deployed to ensure that they enhance the overall operational initiatives.

NATO is also part of the international counter-piracy effort off the Somalian coast and has escorted a naval vessel dedicated to the AU, which was transporting Burundian military equipment to one of its battalions in Somalia. In addition, the co-operation between the AU and NATO has extended to the areas of air logistical co-ordination and military manpower management.

In general, NATO has also assisted with supporting the operationalisation of the African standby force. Specifically, NATO undertook a study to evaluate and assess the operational readiness and peacekeeping capabilities of the force.

On 2 March 2007, the former AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Said Djinnit, visited NATO's headquarters in Brussels. Djinnit who met with the then NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, also addressed NATO's principal decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council, and acknowledged that the co-operation between the two institutions had been 'very positive'. During the visit, the two parties agreed to explore the possibilities for extending the ongoing co-operation to support AU capacity building.

## **AFRICOM**

General Keith Ward, head of the US military command for Africa (AFRICOM), visited the AU in February 2010, where he met with AU Commissioner for Peace

and Security, Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra, and announced that AFRICOM was willing to assist the AU in its peace and security efforts within the APSA framework. The visit was aimed at strengthening ties between the organisations and improving the Command's image on the continent – which is still viewed as a combat force in Africa. AFRICOM had never featured on the agenda of the AU Summit. Lamamra further noted that individual member states would adopt their own specific responses to AFRICOM, and that the AU had not yet sought to have an institutional engagement with the Command.

AFRICOM's launch in 2007 brought a renewed strategic focus, but also attracted initial criticisms of being effectively 'a militarisation of American diplomacy in Africa'. A number of pivotal AU member states, including regional hegemony Nigeria and South Africa, promptly stated their opposition to the Command.

AFRICOM, which is currently based in Stuttgart, Germany, has a staff complement of about 600 military personnel and 600 civilians. Despite issuing an official statement that AFRICOM has no plans to relocate to Africa in the near and medium future, suspicions remain around the ultimate objectives of the Command, whose focus is on security sector governance. This specific programme aims to improve civil military relations and civil military co-operation initiatives in Africa by assisting in the development of professional, legitimate, effective and accountable African security institutions, which support democratisation processes.

In 2008, the Command helped to deploy 1 600 Ugandan peacekeepers to Somalia and has also participated in an airlift support of AU personnel to Darfur in the context of AU-NATO collaboration. There are clearly components of APSA that could collaborate and partner with AFRICOM based on a genuine partnership. However, in September 2009, the Command's commitment to democratic governance was questioned following AFRICOM's joint military exercise with the armed forces of Gabon, after the nation's disputed election that witnessed a crackdown by the security forces.

### **Towards a working relationship between the European common defence and security and the APSA**

In December 2009, the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon inaugurated a new legal and political structure to frame the EU's external relations. The EU's High Representative (HR) for foreign affairs and security policy now has the mandate to focus attention on Europe's foreign policy priorities. The current HR, Laura Ashton, and her 'diplomatic corps', the European external action service (EEAS) working through the EU's delegation, can enhance the working relationship between the European common defence and security policy framework and the APSA. Specifically, future EU support for APSA will be co-ordinated through the HR's office. The HR's office, EEAS and the EU delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa, can play a constructive role in co-ordinating European common defence and security policy initiatives and provide a more robust platform to follow-up on objectives already articulated in the JAES on the peace and security partnership.

However, such a working partnership will not be straightforward, since the AU expects the EU to address peace and security challenges on the African continent, but on the AU's own terms, rather than on the basis of dictates from the EU. Specifically, the AU thinks that the EU should consult with the AU or take the AU positions into account prior to issuing policy prescriptions that could fundamentally undermine efforts to consolidate peace. The AU also expects the EU to support the operationalisation of APSA and AU peace operations, although, again, the mode of engagement remains a key issue. The AU wants to be able to define its needs and then receive the required support from partners such as the EU. In practice, the lack of capacity to identify and develop effective innovative proposals on how external actors can support the AU creates the vacuum that is readily filled by international partners and donors (like the EU) as well as civil society and think tanks.

The AU Commission also expects the EU not to create a situation in which Regional Economic Communities (RECs) receive EU support in a way that effectively undermines the ability of the AU to operationalise APSA. Sentiments among some RECs diverge on the primacy of the AU. Some RECs consider themselves to be more 'institutionally' experienced and effective than the AU, but the reality contradicts this, as the majority of RECs suffer from the same institutional constraints as the AU.

Specifically, with regard to support for peace operations, the AU expects support for some of its unilateral initiatives such as AMISOM. Major resource constraints have hampered the effective operationalisation of this mission, which is still fraught with serious challenges. There are similar expectations for AMISEC/MAES and support for AU liaison offices.

The scope exists to enhance the working relationship between the European common defence security framework and the APSA. For example, the PSC and the EU COPS have already begun to convene joint meetings once a year, alternatively in Addis Ababa or Brussels.

### ***Specific areas of EU-AU collaboration***

In terms of specific areas of collaboration, both organisations can work towards: i) establishing a regular exchange of information and views; ii) co-ordinating their joint fact-finding and assessment missions in potential crisis situations; iii) co-ordinating the design, planning and implementation of peace operations; iv) co-ordinating their mediation efforts; and v) strengthening the capacity of the AU military staff committee.

### **Collaboration to enhance the operationalisation of the APSA**

The degree of co-ordination and harmonisation on how to enhance the operationalisation of the APSA needs to increase. On 12 September 2008, the Council convened a preparatory consultation of the joint PSC/EU-COPS meeting, which was held on 30 September 2008 in Brussels, Belgium. The two bodies met again in October 2009. The relationship between the two bodies should be clearly articulated, as well as characterised by mutual respect, legitimacy and effectiveness.

***What are the indicators for a successful peace and security partnership?***

No precedents exist for monitoring and evaluating a peace and security partnership. However, the trend towards a successful partnership could be identified, when the AU is able to conduct an effective peace operation, and has clear channels of communication with its partners on the delivery of assistance and the co-ordination of logistics and implementation on the ground.

AU and EU have established a basis for dialogue and the building of a partnership on security co-operation. Monitoring success will also remain a challenge because the EU-AU dialogue is not yet bi-directional, in the sense of two interlocutors exchanging ideas. The EU interest in stemming further insecurity in Africa, which has a spill-over effect in its own back-yard (in terms of increased immigration, and the concomitant social pressures imposed upon their societies), means that the EU tends to assert itself as the dominant partner in the relationship. This is also evident in the EU PSC's ability to 'call the shots' on the allocation of funding and effectively determine and define the extent to which it will co-operate and support the AU.

Monitoring and evaluation will always be constrained by the lack of effective communication. In such a context, it becomes very difficult to ascertain the degree to which a successful partnership has been consolidated. The issue of communication is regularly emphasised by individual AU member states due to the absence of an effective internal communication framework within the AU and also between the AU Commission and partners like the EU.

Another constraint on monitoring and evaluating a successful partnership is that the AU has capacity limitations, and so cannot, and does not, always take the lead in defining its own internal requirements. Often the AU finds itself in the position of a recipient of ideas, proposals, and external consultants (from the UN and other partners like the EU) in order to operationalise key components of APSA. These constraints are undermined by arcane administrative procedures, which mean that staff recruitment is in itself a substantial hurdle to the operationalisation of APSA. In this context, monitoring and evaluation becomes quite an uphill task.

***The effect of political interests on preventing effective collaboration***

Even though certain principles currently define the EU-Africa partnership, there are clear political interests which determine the nature of collaboration between the two bodies. The AU seeks to engage with the EU as a partner, but not one that dictates the terms of the relationship. In addition, a majority of AU members have an inherent resentment at the patronising tone, when the EU and individual member states advocate for specific approaches to address the peace and security challenges on the African continent.

The AU's primary political interest is ownership of its initiatives that is recognised by external partners. However, the AU's lack of extensive capacity to operationalise the APSa makes this desire an aspiration. AU ownership is also constrained by the asymmetrical nature of the relationship between the EU and AU, based on the EU's continuing role as a net 'donor' to AU activities.

The AU's other political interest is to ensure predictable support for the operationalisation of APSA from partners like the EU. However, this is not guaranteed due to the internal political interests, dynamics and will of EU institutions to unlimited and un-earmarked funding, particularly the challenges of internal financial management and accountability within the AU.

### The role of civil society in advancing the EU-AU partnership

The AU has entrenched a culture of paying lip-service to engaging with civil society organisations (CSOs), while internally establishing obstacles for effective engagement with them. AU's lack of effective engagement with civil society undermines the credibility of the commitment of AU member states to undertake genuine internal and domestic transformation and collaborate effectively with partners, like the EU, to achieve the required aspirational change. Without stating it openly, some AU member states do not want to see the EU empower African civil society, due to domestic political undemocratic agendas.

African civil society is constantly establishing relationships with European civil society. Civil society from both continents will need to collaborate actively, in particularly on policy development, advocacy and pressurising the AU and EU to uphold the rhetoric of the security policies. Ultimately, this can only be beneficial towards achieving the objectives of the JAES, by increasing the ability of African and European civil society to engage effectively with the AU and EU to ensure that norms, values and principles are upheld – using increased capacity building, training and awareness-raising to achieve this interest. Therefore, short-term goals should include consolidating civil society networks to engage the AU and EU, and for CSOs to become a permanent fixture in the activities of these institutions.

### Conclusion

The AU would like to oversee the stabilisation of the continent, based on an autonomous definition of the strategy and action to manage continental peace and security challenges. Inter-African support systems to resolve continental problems also need to be increased, which in an inter-connected and globalised world, has to be predicated on regional and international partnerships. It is self-evident that increased internal coherence and consensus between AU member states, in order to speak to the international system with one voice and influence global policy formulation, would be beneficial. Building global partnerships will advance continental and domestic economic interests – notably by reducing the debt burden, increasing access to trade markets (limited by tariffs and subsidies by non-African countries), and promoting inward investment into Africa.

The lack of internal coherence among AU member states on a number of issues will continue to undermine the organisation's international image. Regrettably, the divide-and-rule doctrine still applies in Africa and governments gladly ignore or sideline AU policy positions when domestic national interests demand. This means that global partners, like the EU, may continue to have doubts about the veracity of statements and positions adopted by the AU.

By agreeing to institutionalise an annual meeting, both the EU and AU recognise each other as key interlocutors in Africa. Co-ordination mechanisms between the EU and African need to be further strengthened and, where necessary, new ones developed. These co-ordinating mechanisms should be based on joint strategic plans and joint work plans in order to ensure common expected outputs and results, and clearly defined, periodic, technical meetings should be held to consolidate the partnership.

Predictable and sustainable funding for peace operations in Africa needs to be assured. The EU needs to approach the AU as a genuine partner rather than as a patron. In the absence of a relationship based on mutual respect and dialogue, the EU may begin to be seen as having a virtual controlling or 'policing' function over the AU's operational activities. Therefore, the future relationship between the EU and the AU should be characterised by mutual respect, legitimacy and effectiveness.

The AU's partnerships should not be premised exclusively on relationships between governments, but also between the continents' peoples. The AU's inability to whole-heartedly embrace African civil society as a partner, and not as an interloper, will continue to undermine the effective implementation of the continent's peace and security strategy and the operationalisation, monitoring and evaluation of APSA.





## International Governance Reform in the Africa–European Union Partnership

Adebayo Olukoshi

# Global Governance

### Introduction

International governance reform is one of the issues on the agenda of the on-going Africa–European Union (EU) dialogue. Weighed against other themes of interest, such as trade, migration and security, it is arguable that to date, the discussion on international governance reform has occupied a much lower order in the scheme of things<sup>1</sup>. This is not helped by the fact that while Africa and the EU may appear to share an interest in the reform of the workings of the international system, they do not have the same concerns and interests, or even a similar sense of urgency. They also do not approach the reform project with the same power endowments and capabilities that could contribute to a more purposeful focusing of efforts on the questions that need tackling. In consequence, beyond official rhetoric about shared interests, international governance reform appears to be predicated – thus far at least – on Europe’s enlightened self-interest and quest for the protection of long-term, geo-political interests in a rapidly changing global order, and on Africa’s pleading of a primarily moral case for a more just world order in which it plays a bigger role than is presently the case.

Global governance reform has not exactly been the most dynamic among the several dialogues going on simultaneously between Africa and the EU. And the onset in 2007/2008 of the most severe economic and financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1920s has further pushed discussions about medium-to-long-term international governance reform to the back burner. Instead governments, acting alone and in half-hearted international partnership, seek to focus on the more immediate challenges of limiting the effects of the global crises on their countries, through a host of domestic policy measures designed to safeguard their national interests. True, players have seized upon the crisis as an opportunity to accelerate the reform of the global governance system, but in reality their instinct has been to retreat to the domestic arena and to respond to the immediate concerns of their domestic audiences. This instinctive reaction is not new in history<sup>2</sup>. History also teaches that such responses tend to penalise the weaker members of the international system due to their lower capacity to absorb shocks of all kinds.

This paper broadly explores the scope and opportunities for Africa to push an international governance reform agenda that will serve its long-term interests of securing the development of the continent and increasing Africa’s voice in the international system. In so doing, the paper briefly reviews the roots of the contemporary international governance order, its dysfunctionality, and the historic case for a new international order that the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America made between 1960 and 1980. The paper also examines

<sup>1</sup> While trade, security and migration could be considered as the issues of ‘high politics’ in the Africa–EU dialogue on account of the massive interest, especially on the European side, which they elicit, global governance reform seems to belong to the category of ‘low politics’. Indeed, from the EU point of view, domestic governance issues within African countries themselves seem to attract a much greater interest within the dialogue than issues of global governance reform.

<sup>2</sup> During the Great Depression years, for example, the measures implemented by different national governments translated into beggar-thy-neighbour policies that further exacerbated the crisis.

the tensions within the contemporary governance architecture, and the rise of new important players in the international system, symbolised by the biggest of them all, China. The growing weight of these new players is already forcing a redistribution of power in the global order that has direct implications for global governance. Therefore, the Africa–EU dialogue is taking place within a context of global change that concerns both regions, but that neither of them solely or primarily drives. It is within this framework that Africa must shape an agenda for global governance reform, which accommodates the collective interests of the countries making up the continent. This paper suggests that Africa’s case for reform may possess important moral dimensions that are worth pursuing, but it also needs to build on argument and strategy much more than morality.

### Makings of the contemporary global governance order

The existing international governance order is essentially the patchwork product of the US domination since the 1940s, in which some of the core countries of what is today the EU occupied a central place of influence alongside the other main victors of the Second World War, most notably Russia (formerly the Soviet Union)<sup>3</sup>. Prior to the Second World War, Europe was the epicenter of the global order, although European dominance in world affairs contained a distinctive *pax Britannica*, which was forged from intra–European wars, underpinned by industrial–commercial–financial prowess, and manifested in an aggressive global imperialism. This changed, however, during the course of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, as the US, a former colony of Britain, burst onto the world stage, overtaking Europe as the dominant economic and military force in the world. Its politico–military pre–eminence was confirmed in the lead up to the Second World War and afterwards, when the US proceeded to fashion a new framework for global governance that included the creation of the United Nations (UN) as a successor to the ill–fated League of Nations. The broad balance of power in the post–Second World War period is reflected in the rules governing the functioning of the UN, especially the Security Council (UNSC); the Bretton Woods institutions; the G7 caucus; and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that later transmuted into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). From the 1940s, the US projected itself on the world scene as the single leading power and *pax Americana* sought to consolidate itself<sup>4</sup>.

By the end of the 1940s, America’s dominant position in the international system was no longer in doubt, evidenced by the sheer size and transactional volume of its domestic economy, its share of global trade, investments and services, its technological prowess, and the rise and global reach of its transnational corporations that became the new face of economic imperialism. Worldwide political influence came with the US dynamic domestic economic and international economic weight, which was complemented by the spread of American culture onto the world stage through a variety of means, including Hollywood. The American military was pre–eminent, underpinned by the single biggest and most formidable arsenal and nuclear capability in the world, capable of deploying on a global scale.

<sup>3</sup> There is a huge literature on the making of the pre and post–1945 global order but perhaps two of the most interesting include Hobsbawm, E., *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991*, London: Penguin, 1991; and Morgenthau, H., *Politics Among Nations*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961.

<sup>4</sup> See Inis C., *Swords into Ploughshares: The problems and progress of international organisations*, New York: Random House, 1971.

However, despite America's significant advantages, the post-war world was not exactly a unipolar order. In political terms, other important centres of influence included the now defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) that, together with China and a number of post-Marshall Plan Western European countries, 'balanced' America's military might with credible nuclear arsenals of their own – even if only for deterrent purposes<sup>5</sup>. As the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century wore on, Germany and Japan also emerged as key global economic centres, playing an important role alongside the US in 'managing' the global economic system. Oil-rich players, such as Saudi Arabia, similarly came to represent a major source of power and influence after the 1973 Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil price revolution. *Pax Americana* was, therefore, constantly tested in an environment of global power alliances, competitions and rivalries. The core countries at the heart of the EU today were the prime partners of the US in forging the contemporary global governance order, managing its core institutions, and steering relations with those countries considered military–ideological rivals, most notably the USSR and China, which also attempted to build an alternative domestic and global model of economic governance and development.

### Discontents of the global governance system

When the contemporary international governance regime was established, most of Africa was still under colonial rule. Africa's colonial status served as an additional factor in the claims of some of the major European powers, most notably France, to a prominent role and status in world affairs. The French not only pursued measures aimed at ensuring that they maintained some visibility in their own right in world affairs, but also tried to be autonomous, while remaining under the US overall umbrella<sup>6</sup>. From the second half of the 1950s, African countries gained independence and entered into an international system that already had its set rules, conventions and practices. They were not alone, and, together with Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia, forged the Bandung spirit on Third World/South–South solidarity. They also created the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) through which to advance their own interests in world affairs and project their perspectives on key global issues. Within the UN system, they formed the G77 group of countries to push their collective concerns through reciprocal solidarity. Very early on, through the NAM and the G-77, the South–South grouping was able to press their case for major reforms in global governance and for a new international economic and communications order.

The new world order that Africa and the other members of NAM and the G-77 proposed was all-encompassing. Among the many issues covered were specific proposals for the:

<sup>5</sup> This 'balancing' out of American power by other centres of influence generated a lively debate on inter-dependence in the international system. One aspect of the debate was most eloquently represented by Keohane and Nye (1971) who also underscored the significance of the growing importance of soft power in world affairs. Keohane, R & J Nye, *Power and Interdependence, World Politics in Transition*, Boston: Little Brown, 1971.

<sup>6</sup> The French under General Charles De Gaulle, for example, refused to be part of the military aspects of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), preferring to maintain an independent nuclear *force de frappe*. It was only recently, under Nicholas Sarkozy, that the French joined the military component of NATO. Spirited efforts were also made to keep French colonies under the French umbrella for as long as possible and, even after the independence of most of the countries, economic, political, cultural and military investments were made to keep the ex-colonies as French as possible.

- a) reform of the UN system in general, and the UNSC in particular, with a view to broadening representation at the highest levels of global decision making, and to disciplining the use of the veto by the big powers in order to prevent the routine subversion of the will of the international community;
- b) recalibration of the voting rights and decision-making processes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, to ensure a greater voice for the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America;
- c) generalised reform of the international trading system, to make it fairer, remunerative and development-oriented;
- d) creation of a global integrated programme for commodities (agricultural and mineral) that would assure more stable and fairer prices;
- e) creation of a new global currency, based on the special drawing rights, that could safeguard the development interests of all members of the international community;
- f) adoption of rules that would govern the conduct and practices of Western transnational companies in the economic and political spheres, as well as in matters of technology transfer, patents, and copyrights;
- g) adoption of a global tax on the brain drain, to ensure that less developed countries would receive some form of compensation for losing skills to more advanced countries; and
- h) reform of the global information and communications order, to allow for greater North-South balance.

### **Dysfunctionalities of a polarised global order**

Even as African and other NAM/G-77 countries pointed out the multiple disequilibria and injustices, the rules underpinning the contemporary global governance order were coming under growing stress and strain. The existing order looked increasingly anachronistic and misaligned in relation to the changing international geopolitical realities and the emergence of important new centres of economic power – and associated military and political power and influence. A heightened East-West ideological divide and an intensifying arms race fuelled rival interpretations of global rules and the behaviour of states. The situation not only allowed certain forms of injustices to be entrenched, but also led to growing dissatisfaction among citizens across the world – even if the frustration was from differing vantage points and for different and sometimes conflicting reasons. Although the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s removed some of the dysfunctions in the global order, new ones emerged that produced violent conflicts and challenges to the legitimacy and sustainability of the existing system of governance.

Post-1945, Japan's rapid rise and Germany's speedy economic recovery revealed the limits of the economic rules, while the Cold War demonstrated the pitfalls of

an international political system in which the UN was increasingly reduced to a forum to be used, abused, ignored and sidetracked according to competing big power interests – a far cry from its founding ideals of collective security and indivisibility of peace. For their part, the Bretton Woods institutions became tools aligned to the global strategy of the G7 countries led by the US. Despite being repeatedly questioned, the multilateral system somehow survived, for lack of an instantly viable alternative and because powerful states felt able to act both within and outside its rules. However, as more countries gained independence, the face of the UN General Assembly changed. Since the system for passing resolutions was based on one-country-one-vote, big powers could no longer fully dominate the Assembly, and so they shifted to the UNSC as the effective and more manageable site for pushing and bargaining their competing interests in a polarised world. The UN General Assembly was reduced to a talk-shop which at best could only muster a moral authority. Yet, the UNSC also saw countries frequently resorting to the veto, which produced regular gridlocks in international governance broken only by the competing powers taking open or clandestine unilateral action.

The UN's leadership in generating ideas and formulating broad economic perspectives for effective global co-operation was severely eroded by the less transparent IMF and World Bank, where weighted voting allowed the US and its allies to shape and impose global economic governance policies. It was more than a passing coincidence that from the late 1960s into the early 1980s, the UN was where members of NAM (most of whom were also in the G77) campaigned for a new international economic order and, most notably, pushed for a UN conference on trade and development, among other such initiatives<sup>7</sup>. The shift by the US and its allies towards the Bretton Woods institutions, to the detriment of the UN, significantly expanded the IMF and World Bank's influence in economic management and broader policy processes of the NAM/G77 countries; the Executive Committees of the Bank and the Fund were also effectively dominated by the G7 countries.

## Makings of a New Global Order

The forging of a new economic, social and political governance order that is the culmination of an accelerating global realignment process, is evidenced by the re-emergence of China along with India, Russia, and Brazil; the increased significance in global economic affairs enjoyed by the East Asian countries, Turkey, South Africa, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States – to cite the most prominent new entrants; and the prospect of long-term decline that the old economic powers, many in the EU, face. It will be an order that will come complete with a radical redistribution of power, authority, and influence, and involve a rewriting/reinterpretation of rules pertaining to the global multilateral institutions. The old world order is gradually dying, while the new is struggling to be born. Debates have already been held and theories are presently being spawned about how such a new order might eventually emerge: by war or by peaceful means; through revolution or evolution; by negotiation, compromise-

<sup>7</sup> The UN General Assembly proclaimed the 1960s and 1970s the first and second development decades, in recognition of the enormous development challenges faced by the countries of Africa.

making and consensus-building or through politico-military fiat; or through a complex combination of all these elements. While interesting, the only relevance of these debates and theories to this paper is the extent to which they appear to be influencing the choices of major players regarding the need for change in the existing global governance order.

Even as debates for more far-reaching changes continue, some changes have already been introduced, in the face of the existing global governance system's dysfunctionalities, and on account of direct pressures or changing objective realities. Within the UN system, high-level discussions for the reform of the General Assembly and the UNSC have been held and consultations continue. The UN family of organisations is looking at the need to work and deliver as 'One UN', rationalising and streamlining agencies with overlapping mandates in order to improve effectiveness and impact and to cut down on costs. Furthermore, recognising the growing importance of non-state actors in global affairs, steps have been taken to accommodate voices such as those represented by global social movements and civil society groups, which not only wish to contribute to the governance agenda but also demand that increased accountability and responsibility be integral elements of change. Gender concerns, originally absent from the high tables of the UN, are now formally accepted and integrated into its work programme. The ICC has been grafted onto the broader governance system through the assiduous pressure mounted by civil society coalitions whose voices in world affairs are also growing in significance. The IMF and World Bank weighted voting systems have also been occasionally tinkered with in order, initially, to accommodate countries such as Japan and, more recently, Saudi Arabia and China, and to replenish the funds put at the disposal of the institutions. Membership, or prospective membership, of the WTO has also been opened up to some of the new or emerging global powers. Furthermore, for all intents and purposes, the G7 has been replaced by the G22, which is the new global forum of the powerful for governing the world economy. It is a process of inclusion, adaptation and co-option that, while taking on board changing realities, still excludes a swathe of less powerful nations that constitute the majority of the UN members.

Adjustments made thus far to the workings of the existing international governance system are limited in scope and fragmented and piecemeal in nature. They have also been essentially reactive, rather than proactive. Unsurprisingly, the calls for more comprehensive, integrated reform remain as strong. It is to be expected that the weak and the marginalised in any political order would always have a strong interest in a radical reform programme, in the hope that the changes will offer them more say and benefits. By the same token, the strong and the main beneficiaries from an existing political regime would be most reluctant to embrace any change that could remove their privileges, whittle down their influence, and curb their power, even if they make gestures in favour of reform out of enlightened self-interest.

Furthermore, new, important players, whose power has grown considerably but do not feel adequately represented in the existing governance order, can be expected to join the weak and marginalised in calling for reform. A mixture of all of these is reflected in the existing global governance reform. Within the ambit of the Africa-EU dialogue, it is clear that, when exploring the scope for co-

operation, the two partners must not only relate to each other's concerns and interests but also take cognisance of other 'stakeholders' in the international governance reform agenda.

### Uneasy quests for global governance reform

On the face of things, both Africa and Europe appear to agree that, because so much has changed in the post-1945 world, the reform of the international governance system is both necessary and unavoidable. Other interested parties in the international system also share this view that reform is necessary and inevitable. Different regions of the world, or at least countries located in different regions of the world, have sketched out their proposals for reform of particularly the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the post-G7 framework. Their reasons, approaches and ambitions differ, which is why the formal work of reform promises to be a complicated process, to say the least. In addition, although Africa and Europe share a long – not always happy – history, their shared interest in reforming international governance cannot be taken to mean a commonality of concerns and approach. This being so, a key question that emerges is what does Europe stand to gain from seeking a partnership dialogue with Africa on the matter, and *vice versa*. For Africa, the need for clarity in the decision to engage is a strategic question that is related with its ability in mobilising reliable EU support for any common position.

The argument advanced by African countries for reform in the international governance system is primarily predicated on the need for greater justice and a more equitable representation in world affairs, with special emphasis on the institutions of global governance. Africa has the single biggest bloc of states in the General Assembly, yet does not have a permanent seat on the UNSC – complete with the power of veto. As outlined in the Ezulwini Consensus of 2005, the region has staked a claim for two permanent and five non-permanent seats. The continent has also added its voice to calls for the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions, and the restructuring of the existing weighted voting system, both to increase the African share of influence and to broaden the decision-making base. In recent years, routine invitations have been extended to selected African leaders to attend G7 meetings, usually sessions devoted to discussing the continent's problems and offers of aid. These invitations may have been designed as a gesture of inclusivity and solidarity that speaks simultaneously to Africa and the civil society/social movement critics of that forum's role in global economic governance, but have hardly succeeded in redressing the fundamental imbalances in the rules and operations of the international financial system. That is why, alongside the basic political governance issues, African countries also have a strong interest in pursuing a reform of the international development architecture.

In some senses, Africa's case for global governance reform is a radical call for change and could be seen as maximalist in its thrust, both for reasons of history and the *real politik* of forging a common African front built on an agenda to which most of the states of the continent can subscribe. After all, Africa itself is not homogenous, and competing interests among the region's countries mean that bargaining strategies must be evolved for forging a common African posi-

tion. For its part, while recognising that the existing post-1945 global governance arrangement needs to be amended, the EU takes a much more cautious and even minimalist approach to reform. Within this minimalist approach, the major EU states would seem to have staked a position that favours keeping their historic advantages while recognising new major powers, finding gentle avenues for accommodating them and making gestures to acknowledge the interests of unrepresented and grossly under-represented regions such as Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Asia.

Although the EU umbrella provides a framework within which efforts have been made to develop and deploy a collective European view of global governance reform, individual EU members have not hesitated (like several key African countries) to resort to self-help in a quest to ensure that whatever reform is undertaken reflects their particular concerns and interests. Thus, an intense diplomatic effort has been deployed by regions and individual states to win allies and friends in the unfolding international politics of reform. Given that Africa represents the single biggest bloc of votes in the General Assembly, the region has been particularly targeted by various countries and blocs ranging from individual European countries such as Britain, France, and Denmark to others like the United States, Japan, China, Turkey, Brazil, and South Korea. Each interested party reaching out to Africa has come with a bag full of carrots and sweeteners with promises of more. Some have tried to lock as many African countries as possible into their spheres of influence using a variety of tools, from historic ties to trade pacts and various notions of shared interests and values.

The on-going dialogue between African countries and EU member-states on the reform of global governance is one of several dialogues taking place in the international system. Each of these dialogues is laden with its own power dynamics – within Africa as in Europe, delicate exercises are at play in the balancing of interests. Alliances within each group are complemented by alliances outside of the groups. All these differing ambitions for reform complicate the prospects for Africa and the EU – and within each group of countries – to develop joint positions. Also, other important players must embrace whatever joint position is agreed upon for it to stand a chance of being adopted – and this is not a given.

### **Towards common principles and values for global governance reform**

Under the circumstances, perhaps a greater effort should be devoted to outlining principles, values and fundamental action points for a more representative international governance system that all key players within Africa, Europe and beyond can agree to. These principles, values and action points are either taken for granted or simply implied in the current discussions about the reform of the UN, the Bretton Woods system, and the G7. They will benefit from being unpacked and openly discussed as a prelude to the re-engineering of the system.

Seen from the vantage point of Africa, a meaningful global governance reform effort must necessarily:



- a) Allow for a more broad-based, inclusive and open system of international decision-making and enforcement, which recognises that cumulative processes of globalisation have made all parts of the world much more closely interlocked than ever before.
- b) Recognise the full and inalienable rights of each member-state of the international system to determine their own economic and social development path and the development policies that correspond to the path they have chosen.
- c) Accept that there is no single model of democracy and democratic governance to which all members of the international community must be compelled to adhere and, in consequence of that acceptance, recognise that states and peoples have the fundamental right to develop democratic systems to administer their affairs that are attuned to their needs and circumstances.
- d) Accommodate long-term development concerns and democratic aspirations where they exist, on the basis of the priorities defined by the member states of the international system themselves and the sub-regional commissions, and regional institutions.
- e) Include a radical rationalisation of the UN family of organisations in order to overcome needless duplication, increase synergies, reduce costs and substantially improve developmental impact.
- f) Re-engineer and refocus the Bretton Woods institutions to ensure that they are governed by basic democratic principles, their leadership posts filled on the basis of open competitive recruitments, their policies driven by the long-term development needs of their clients, their performance assessed on a more open basis and their management accountable to the global commons.
- g) Deal with the flow of illicit capital from the less developed to the more developed regions of the world, which is particularly valid for Africa where the proceeds of corrupt practices transferred to financial centres overseas should be repatriated to the countries of origin as a matter of duty, responsibility and principle.
- h) Redress the brain drain through an appropriate international compensatory mechanism, which will contribute to ensuring that the capacity of African and other affected countries to govern their development is sustained on an on-going basis.
- i) Institute a global mechanism, possibly in the form of a tax on cross-border financial transactions, which goes beyond aid flows, to mobilise finance for the development of African and other developing country economies on the basis of priorities defined by those countries themselves.
- j) Re-affirm the need for all inter-state disputes in the international system to be resolved by peaceful means.

### Concluding remarks

There should be no illusion: In a world of asymmetric power relations, global governance will always carry internal dysfunctionalities that have to be redressed. For Africa, in successfully pressing for a reformed international governance system that accommodates its legitimate concerns, the chief challenge must be the domestic arena, where the task of accelerating all-round economic development, alongside building inclusive and representative democratic governance propelled by active citizens, will be the first, but crucial and unavoidable, step towards an effective presence in the international system. The democratic developmental states that Africa needs to build will also promote much greater intra-African trade, investment and cross-border production, as another important next step towards a more effective presence in world affairs. An enhanced domestic productive capacity, anchored in regional co-operation and integration, would improve Africa's ability to increase trade with itself and the world. To achieve these first steps, no reform of the global governance system that limits the policy space or closes the doors to the pursuit of self-reliance should be acceptable. This is a minimum condition that could then be meaningfully coupled with the need for a more just presence in global decision making.

## Opportunities and Obstacles for EU–Africa Cooperation on Global Governance Issues

Tom Cargill

# Global Governance

### Introduction

Within the international system, there is a clear imbalance in the influence between the European Union (EU) and African Union (AU) and their respective constituent countries. The EU, composed of 27 countries and with a population of 500 million, is a highly influential global player, representing more than 25% of worldwide GDP and contributing more than 20% of international trade. EU members control 32% of IMF voting rights and hold a large share of World Bank voting rights. The EU is responsible for around 10% of global carbon emissions<sup>1</sup>. It contains two of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), while an EU member hosts the International Criminal Court (ICC), and a number of European countries have been active in extending the principles of universal jurisdiction for serious crimes against foreign nationals.

By contrast, the AU, although composed of 53 members and over one billion people, represents less than 2% of global GDP and 3.5% of global trade. Its members control less than 2% of IMF voting rights and have a similarly small degree of influence within the World Bank. AU members contribute only around 4% of global carbon emissions. A number of senior African policymakers have been arrested and accused of various crimes by the ICC, which has carried out five investigations and indicted 16 people, all African.

Yet both continental groups also have shared interests in working together. Ties of geography, history, culture, economics and deeply linked communities mean that the future security of each is greatly influenced by the other. What is debatable, and requires some critical examination, is whether they share values concerning the need for mutually agreed global governance arrangements, as is often implied in joint declarations.

In recent years, both organisations have taken tentative steps to seek common ground on a number of issues related to global governance. The Africa–EU Strategic Partnership, which is due for renewal in 2010, is a principal foundation for co-operation. The partnership concentrates largely on issues of mutual concern within Africa itself, but also outlines some basic points of consensus on issues relating to international governance.

However, most EU–AU co-operation involves addressing challenges within Africa itself. There is very little co-ordinated action between the two groups to address broader global governance issues, and even less awareness of the extent to which such co-operation may be possible. This paper will outline some of the key areas of global governance and summarise respective EU and AU positions, where they exist. The emphasis is on outward-facing positions – that is, positions related to global governance as a whole, rather than simply issues of immediate concern to

<sup>1</sup> Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 2009 figures. <http://www.pbl.nl/en/publications/2010/No-growth-in-total-global-CO2-emissions-in-2009.html>

the two organisations, which are set out in the AU–EU Strategic Partnership. These positions will then be considered critically and compared to actions that might be interpreted as confirming or undermining these aspirations.

## EU and AU positions on governance

Several documents (including the 2008–10 Africa–EU Strategic Partnership plan and heads of government communiqués over several years) imply that a common basis for co-operation on global governance issues exists between the EU and the AU. In recent years, both EU and AU summit documents have expressed the desire to reform global governance in various ways. Particular emphasis has been placed on UNSC reform and IMF and World Bank voting rights, as well as the composition of more ad hoc groupings such as the G8 and more recently the G20, and on issues related to the trade, climate change, and international justice.

## UN reform, G8 and G20

The AU position on UN reform is formally enshrined in the Ezulwini Consensus of March 2005, which is based on the Sirte Declaration of 1999 that called for Africa to be given two permanent places, with full powers of veto, and five non permanent places, all to be decided by the AU itself<sup>2</sup>. Yet, the AU is not as aligned as its formal position suggests, and much friction exists between larger players, in particular Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt, but also others, over which countries should take the lead. These rivalries, which suggestions of an alternating system have failed to quash, point to the limitations of Africa and European integration arrangements, on both continents.

Even less consensus exists in the EU, where Germany is part of the G4 group of countries, which are demanding reform that would probably lead to other EU states becoming members of the UNSC, and the UK and France pooling or losing their seats. France has also appeared inconsistent on this issue, recently calling for reform that delivers a voice for Africa, although not at the expense of France's position.

Similar contradictions exist on the related issue of post-G8 arrangements, as the G20 contains not only four EU members, but also the European Commission, while the AU has no formal place and South Africa is the only African country admitted. The French president, Nicholas Sarkozy, has displayed marked ambiguity towards the G20, at times calling for a G14<sup>3</sup>. The French government plans to use its joint presidency of the G8 and G20 in 2011 to make the Africa partnership a G8 prerogative, although, strangely, development will remain with the G20<sup>4</sup>.

Compromise by the Europeans seems unlikely, given the desire of EU members to retain disproportionate influence, which is linked to their national self-in-

<sup>2</sup> The Common Position on the proposed reform of the United Nations 'The Ezulwini Consensus' AU document – Retrieved from [www.centerforunreform.org/system/files/Ezulwini+Consensus.doc](http://www.centerforunreform.org/system/files/Ezulwini+Consensus.doc)

<sup>3</sup> In 2009, France announced that intended to push for the G8 group of industrial powers to admit the major emerging economies and thus become a G14 when Paris presides over the group in 2011.

<sup>4</sup> Interview with French official.

terests. The AU is more united behind calls for an AU permanent place in the G20, but there are grumblings about Nigeria and Egypt not being included as members of a post G8 group. There is also understandable resentment that EU members receive privileged representation, at the possible expense of a permanent AU seat. South Africa is actively seeking alternative alliances to those of the AU, via IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) and other alliances, in order to influence both the UN and G20 agendas, with a particular eye on reform.

## International justice and the ICC

In recent years, international justice has been one of the most emotive and contentious issues between and within the EU and AU, although members of both organisations support the need for some sort of universal jurisdiction. Indeed, in many ways the crimes that took place in Africa, such as the Rwandan genocide, and the poor international response to them, accelerated the debate about the need for universal jurisdiction and led to the development of several experimental processes, including the special court for Sierra Leone and the international criminal tribunal for Rwanda. The EU, with the possible exception of the UK, has been fully behind the formation and mandate of the ICC. The ICC plays a significant role in the debate between the EU and the US over what form international emerging legal governance should take; the US historically favours special UN courts or tribunals along the lines of those on Sierra Leone and Rwanda.

African states, on the other hand, have been far more ambiguous about the ICC. Although initially supporting the organisation, the AU became increasingly suspicious as the ICC has appeared to focus largely on cases in Africa, to the point where (in 2010) the AU called for the termination of all pending indictments<sup>5</sup>. The case of the ICC indictment of President Bashir of Sudan is a particular source of frustration for the AU. Officials argue that the UN has consistently ignored AU requests to defer the indictment pending the AU-sponsored peace processes in Sudan – an unprecedented snub by UNSC towards a continental grouping. In fact, although the ICC has only investigated cases in Africa, a joint AU–EU expert group on universal jurisdiction found that, taken as a whole, European countries' legal systems had not unfairly targeted Africans<sup>6</sup>. Some African states, such as Botswana, initially distanced themselves from AU attacks on the ICC<sup>7</sup>.

While obvious cases of friction and disagreement exist between the AU and EU and their constituent states, there is also much basis, in principle, for shared vision. This stems from the fact that 29<sup>8</sup> of the AU's 53 members and all EU members are signatories to the Rome Statute of the ICC, and that EU and AU documentation show common agreement on a number of principles related to the functioning of international justice. African states have welcomed, and indeed initiated, many of the criminal investigations and proceedings carried out by European countries against African nationals<sup>9</sup>. The AU Constitutive Act clearly

5 Division of Communication and information Press Release No. 30/ 14 AU Summit. Decisions of the 14<sup>th</sup> African Union Summit <http://www.africa-union.org/root/ua/Conferences/2010/Summit/doc/Media/PR%2030%20-%2014%20EME%20SOMMET%20UA%20-%20DECISIONS%20SOMMET%20-%2004-02-10%20english%20translation.doc>

6 Arimatsu. L. 'Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Africa's Hope for Justice?' Chatham House Briefing Paper, April 2010

7 'Botswana says al-Bashir must stand trial at ICC', *Mail & Guardian Online*, July 6 2009 <http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-07-06-botswana-says-albashir-must-stand-trial-at-icc>

8 The 30<sup>th</sup> African signatory, Morocco, is not an AU member.

9 Arimatsu. L. 'Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Africa's Hope for Justice?' Chatham House Briefing Paper, April 2010

provides for extraterritoriality, in a manner that sets it apart from its predecessor, the OAU – ‘the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’<sup>10</sup>. The EU has similar aspirations, as shown in the Lisbon Treaty. This similarity extends far beyond AU and EU level, with nearly all member states being signatories to the various UN conventions covering the application of international law. The AU Commission on International Law, established in 2009, is specifically designed to develop and codify international legal issues as they affect the African continent<sup>11</sup>. Despite this, issues of European-dominated legal processes ‘targeting’ Africans tend to dominate international justice discussions relating to Europe and Africa, which points to the essentially emotive nature of the debate, touching on historical grievances, the legacy of colonialism, and the ongoing imbalances of power between Europe and Africa.

## International trade

Establishing an AU position on global trade is complicated by the degree to which EU–AU trade issues dominate the AU’s global trade agenda. Establishing a clear, common EU position to which an AU position might relate is hindered by the sheer complexity of ongoing international trade negotiations. Taken together, the EU is by far the AU’s largest trading partner, and Africa accounts for a surprisingly high proportion – 9% – of EU exports<sup>12</sup>.

Agreement exists regarding the general principles on which international trade should be based, with broad commitments to free trade, the removal of barriers to market access and trade that promotes development. The AU has no fixed position on international trade, beyond the commitment made by members at the AU’s 14<sup>th</sup> Summit to support the Pittsburgh Declaration of the G20, although the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa plays an important role in promoting consensus on trade issues. Instead, over the past decades, a series of AU or OAU Summits have been held, focusing mainly on promoting development inside the continent, but also taking stances on international trade issues. One of the earliest and boldest was the Lagos Action Plan of 1980 for the economic development of Africa<sup>13</sup>. This declaration established a common African position, which in many respects opposed much of the Western prevailing orthodoxy, calling for a larger role for states, measures to control foreign trade, and an emphasis on centrally planned economies. However, by 2001, quite a different tone was apparent in NEPAD, which all AU members agreed to<sup>14</sup>. The emphasis was on the need to integrate Africa into the global economy and to promote private sector investment and enterprise. In practice, informal AU positions have vacillated between the principles espoused in these two documents.

10 The Constitutive Act of the African Union 2000 [http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAU/Constitutive\\_Act\\_en.htm#Article4](http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAU/Constitutive_Act_en.htm#Article4)

11 Statute of the African Union Commission on International Law <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/text/STATUTE%20OF%20THE%20AUCIL-Adopted%20-%20Feb%202009.pdf>

12 EuroStat Press Release ‘An EU27 trade deficit of 35 bn euro in 2006 with Africa’ [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/february/tradoc\\_138001.pdf](http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/february/tradoc_138001.pdf)

13 Lagos plan of action for the economic development of Africa 1980–2000 [http://www.uneca.org/itca/ariportal/docs/lagos\\_plan.pdf](http://www.uneca.org/itca/ariportal/docs/lagos_plan.pdf). The Lagos Plan of Action built upon the earlier ‘Monrovia Declaration of Commitment of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU on the guidelines and measures for national and collective self-reliance in economic and social development for the establishment of a new international economic order’.

14 New Partnership for Africa’s Development [http://www.nepad.org/system/files/framework\\_0.pdf](http://www.nepad.org/system/files/framework_0.pdf)

A similar ambiguity can be found on the European side, despite a clearer institutional framework for negotiating trade issues. While on the one hand committed to a single set of global rules promoting market access for the poorest<sup>15</sup>, the EU also explicitly supports preferential access for European goods under particular circumstances, for instance the Common Agricultural Policy. The manner in which the EU negotiates Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with less developed countries of the Africa–Caribbean–Pacific (ACP) grouping has also caused friction, given the disparities in negotiating power and perceptions that negotiations undermine and cut across African regional integration efforts. However, European countries (understandably) consider trade and political power to be so strategic that it is hard to imagine individual states, or the EU as a whole, significantly changing their behaviour. Problems over EPAs are linked to World Bank reform, as it is argued that the revised WTO rules, which prevent special treatment for developing countries by developed states, have led to the need for EPAs. Here, African finance ministers have agreed a common position that seeks to incorporate such 'Special and Differential Treatment' provisions in WTO rules<sup>16</sup>.

This apparent conflict between principles of equality and self interest are even clearer within the Bretton Woods institutions of the IMF and World Bank. The EU and US have an in-built, veto-wielding power over these institutions, as votes are distributed based on the level of financial contributions. African finance ministers have called for more African representation on the IMF<sup>17</sup>, and the 14<sup>th</sup> AU Summit restated its support for the Pittsburgh Declaration that outlines a general commitment to reform of both the IMF and World Bank<sup>18</sup>. Ongoing proposals to reform the IMF have only increased the impression that narrow European interests directly conflict with those of Africa, as individual European states fiercely resist moves to reduce European and expand African representation on the IMF board<sup>19</sup>. World Bank reform is an even more complex issue, as voting rights in its constituent parts deter lobbying for reform on a continental basis. However, but by aligning itself with the Pittsburgh Declaration, the AU is supportive, at least in broad terms, of ongoing reform efforts. At present, African states have little influence, although they are among the most affected by IMF and World Bank actions.

On the issue of trade, there appears to be only a general commitment to shared principles. The EU and AU interests diverge considerably because of very different economic circumstances and the massive difference in resources available for negotiations. This difference has been mitigated in some areas, such as providing support to smaller states for building negotiating capacity. However, such support cannot wholly compensate for the sheer size of the EU negotiating teams. This has caused particular resentment amongst African states when it comes to negotiating EPAs, and makes a common position in international negotiations highly unlikely.

15 What is Europe's Trade Policy? Anonymous EU Publication [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/may/tradoc\\_143154.pdf](http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/may/tradoc_143154.pdf)

16 State of EPA negotiations in May 2009, ECDCM Briefing Note, [http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/library/files/ECDCM%2005-09%20State%20of%20EPA%20negotiations%20in%20May%202009\\_final.pdf](http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/library/files/ECDCM%2005-09%20State%20of%20EPA%20negotiations%20in%20May%202009_final.pdf)

17 Oyuke. J. 'Officials want bigger vote at IMF', *The Standard*, August 2007, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200708211179.html>

18 Leaders Statement, The Pittsburgh Summit, September 2009 <http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm>

19 'IMF boardroom crisis: Europeans stubbornly cling to chairs', Bretton Woods Project <http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-566647>

## Development assistance and the MDGs

Although a central concern of the Joint Strategy, development issues go beyond Africa; India for instance, has more people in poverty than the whole of Africa. The EU policy, clearly articulated in 2005, states that its development assistance is based on reducing poverty, supporting equitable globalisation and promoting European democratic values, with an emphasis on developing countries being primarily responsible for their own development<sup>20</sup>. The AU's position on development is primarily indicated through NEPAD, which emphasises democracy and good governance, African ownership, macroeconomic stability, and the role of women<sup>21</sup>. NEPAD also emphasises the role of the MDGs as 'confirm[ing] the global community's readiness to support Africa's efforts to address the continent's underdevelopment and marginalisation'. The EU has also expressed its active support for the MDGs in a number of documents, most recently as part of the EU-US development dialogue in the autumn of 2010<sup>22</sup>.

If trade and political power impede full co-operation between the EU and AU because of entrenched interests, commitments to international development suffer from the reverse. In recent years, and during the long decade of growth that started during the last few years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the EU has felt obliged to increase the quantity and quality of its development assistance. However, that sense of obligation appears to have weakened, especially since the financial crisis and transition to the G20. The era of the Africa Partnership Forum between African and G8 countries appears to have passed. With Africa looking less likely to meet many of the MDGs, or to receive the promised increases in aid, there is doubt over the future of such commitments after 2010 and, more importantly, 2015. After an apparent consensus in 2005 on the desirability of committing 0.7% of gross national product to official development assistance (ODA), European positions now seem to be diverging once again.

## Climate Change

The Conference of African Heads of State on Climate Change (CAHOSCC), held prior to the Copenhagen Summit of November 2009, agreed on a common African position, which centred around the need for immediate and deep reductions in carbon emissions by developed countries, allowances for developing countries to keep increasing their emissions, and mitigation, and adaptation and compensation measures to benefit African states<sup>23</sup>. Although this position foundered under the pressure of the international negotiation process, it remains an important assertion of principles<sup>24</sup>.

Two 'conclusions' set out the views of the EU environment ministers and European Council<sup>25</sup>. The EU and AU positions overlap in broad terms, with the main differences being over scale and timeframes. In the autumn of 2010, a key difference

<sup>20</sup> 'The European Consensus on Development', policy statement, 2005 [http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/consensus\\_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/consensus_en.cfm)

<sup>21</sup> New Partnership for Africa's Development [http://www.nepad.org/system/files/framework\\_0.pdf](http://www.nepad.org/system/files/framework_0.pdf)

<sup>22</sup> EU-US Development Dialogue: Roadmap on the Millennium Development Goals in 2010-2011 [http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/eu\\_us\\_roadmap\\_mdg\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/eu_us_roadmap_mdg_en.pdf)

<sup>23</sup> Africa Position on Climate Change [http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/csd/csd15/statements/africa\\_cc.pdf](http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/csd/csd15/statements/africa_cc.pdf)

<sup>24</sup> Hoste, J. 'Where was united Africa in the climate change negotiations?' Africa Policy Brief, Egmont Institute, February 2010 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/10/afri/2010-feb-Afr.P.Brief-Hoste-climate-change.pdf>

<sup>25</sup> Building a post-2012 global climate regime: the EU's contribution [http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/future\\_action.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/future_action.htm)



remains the transfer mechanisms for mitigation and adaptation funding: European countries favour their own individual development agencies, while African states argue that UN agencies would be more democratically accountable. Despite this difference, climate change is one area where the Africa–EU partnership offers significant overlap and potential for co-operation on global issues beyond immediate mutual concerns, which the joint Africa–EU Declaration on Climate Change of 2008 highlights<sup>26</sup>. Yet, as with trade, the very different circumstances of the EU and AU offer significant obstacles to establishing a common position for international negotiations involving other developing and developed regions.

In Europe, short-term national interests create tensions in the EU position on climate change, but in Africa, although fully aware of the reality of climate change, governments are uncertain how to place a response amongst the range of policy tools available. Financing is a particular bone of contention, as African governments do not, understandably, consider themselves responsible for the cost. This is changing slowly and is at risk of reversals in the aftermath of the financial crisis, which tested the commitments from all parties. For many African leaders beset with more clearly defined concerns, an added deterrent to prioritising climate change is the shortage of compelling policy-relevant predictions on the impacts of climate change and timescales. However, at the 14<sup>th</sup> AU Summit in February 2010, the AU reaffirmed its support of the CAHOSCC position, which shows a commitment to a common stance that may become more substantive over time<sup>27</sup>. This is important, as the process by which the AU negotiated the common stance could serve as a useful blueprint for co-ordinating common positions on a range of other issues, including governance and trade<sup>28</sup>.

## Conclusion

On the one hand, while the EU and AU agree on some fundamental aspirations concerning international governance, they differ significantly on how it should be implemented in practice. On the other hand, the EU and AU have deep and inextricable links, and longer term interests that may in some ways be set to converge while other interests are clearly divergent.

Managing such a transition will not be easy, and it is unrealistic to expect relations to be divorced from the fading but still potent historical context of colonialism. In many respects, the current imperfect dispensation may be the most practical, as both groupings concentrate on resolving the developmental gap between them that prevents more firmly grounded partnership on global issues. In this sense, the Joint Africa–EU Strategy, while capable of improvement, is a good process. Yet, also important is minimising the scope for conflict, accepting the inevitability that positions will conflict and mitigating the impact of such conflicts in the longer term interests of the partnership. Here, diplomacy will continue to play a fundamental and growing role, particularly as the international system becomes less predictable.

<sup>26</sup> Africa EU Declaration on Climate Change [http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/20081201\\_africa\\_eu\\_declaration\\_on\\_climate\\_change\\_1.doc](http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/20081201_africa_eu_declaration_on_climate_change_1.doc)

<sup>27</sup> Division of Communication and Information Press Release No. 30/ 14 AU Summit. Decisions of the 14<sup>th</sup> African Union Summit <http://www.africa-union.org/root/ual/Conferences/2010/Summit/doc/Media/PR%2030%20-%2014%20EME%20SOMMET%20UA%20-%20DECISIONS%20SOMMET%20-%2004-02-10%20english%20translation.doc>

<sup>28</sup> Keating. M. 'With One Voice', *World Today*, October 2009, P10.

Given the inextricable links outlined above, over the longer term, it is in both continents' interests to establish areas of consensus, in order to prevent one regional grouping from continually offering more threats than opportunities to the other. Realistically, this can only take place after substantively addressing the source of much mistrust – the disparity in relative power between AU and EU due to Africa's developmental, security and governance challenges. In this sense, the EU and its member states need to recognise that addressing these challenges is a strategic imperative and in their self-interest. Both groupings need to develop a more self-confident and well-defined narrative of what they can offer the world, and each other. For Europeans, this means a more practical and grounded appeal rather than lofty rhetoric about being a 'moral power'. For the African Union, it may be a more confident narrative, beyond one of historical grievance and resistance. Both groupings must be prepared to engage with the messy and compromising business of diplomatic and trade engagement without returning to an exploitative and short-termist relationship. Such an approach might also influence the manner in which both groupings approach global governance reform issues, encouraging them to share more power and promote greater mutual consensus and trust.

Given the apparently intractable obstacles to substantive co-operation on the big issues, the apparent level of co-operation is in many ways surprising. Some of this might be cynically explained by the quantity of money that the EU, as Africa's largest donor and trade partner, brings to the relationship. On this basis, the relationship is set to decline inevitably, if gradually, as the balance of global power shifts, with African states becoming wealthier and emerging powers, such as Brazil, China and India, increasing their influence. Indeed, these powers have legitimate claims to be more reliable, coherent and appropriate partners for the AU, given their shared practical experiences of the situations currently facing many African states.

Yet, money is not the only driver of EU-AU relations. What sets the relationship apart is the historical and emotional complexity of the relations between the two regional groupings, which suggests that far brighter prospects for co-operation exist than cynical logic might dictate. Certainly, the AU and its members are becoming less Eurocentric in outlook and are developing relationships with a whole range of international actors. This greater freedom of manoeuvre and decreasing dependency could open up space for a more genuine co-operation between the EU and AU – of which the Joint Africa EU strategy is perhaps evidence. It is not only from the African side that historical ties are loosening. Many of the EU's newest members have very little common history, and some (such as the former communist countries) have a different historical engagement with Africa, compared to the Western European countries that dominate EU relations with Africa, for now.

The former colonial powers, which still dominate the EU side of the EU-AU relations, are also becoming socially and culturally more linked to Africa, as immigration establishes increasingly influential communities of African-origin Europeans with extensive ties across the AU. While Brazil, the United States and other parts of the world contain large diasporas, the shared time zones, strong political, cultural and sporting links, geographical proximity, and relatively easy communications between the EU and AU, give added power to European Africans and underpin the importance of the EU-AU relationship. Despite all the mistrust, for now at least, fundamental cultural affinities and shared outlooks remain among most political elites in both groupings.

## Regional Integration, EPAs and the Trade & Development Agenda: Africa–EU relations reconsidered

Sanoussi Bilal<sup>1</sup>

# Trade & Development

### Introduction

Regional integration processes, at the pan–African and sub–regional levels, are high on the African political and development agenda. The European Union (EU) has been a strong proponent of regional integration initiatives and a key role model for many. But how do Africa–EU relations contribute to foster regional integration processes in Africa and strengthen the trade and development linkages? This paper looks at the initiatives adopted jointly by African countries and the European Union and critically assesses their impact on the regional integration dynamics in Africa.

In the context of the Cotonou Agreement, the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) process has contributed to stimulate attention to the trade and development nexus and enhanced the focus on integration in several African regions. However, the EPA process, and more broadly the role of the EU in supporting development and regional integration, has come under increasing scrutiny and criticism, as EPAs are often perceived as restraining African development and generating both systemic and practical impediments to regional integration.

The Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES), adopted at the Lisbon Summit in December 2007 to foster political dialogue on strategic issues, has the potential to coordinate and rationalise support to regional integration initiatives, as well as to better strategise trade and development concerns. However, it has so far failed to rise to the political challenge of addressing key trade and development divergences between the EU and Africa. On the contrary, the JAES has carefully avoided to address any politically sensitive issue, such as the coherence of African regional integration initiatives, the EPA process, and integration with Mediterranean countries, as well as the coherence between regional integration, trade and development initiatives supported by the EU in Africa. Nonetheless, the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)/Africa–EU frameworks (such as the Cotonou Agreement, the JAES and the EPAs) and the EU instruments – including the European Development Fund (EDF) with its national and regional indicative programmes – have the potential to play a more effective role in fostering regional integration in Africa and the linkages between trade and development. It is up to the partners to rise to this challenge.

### EU support to regional integration, trade and development

The drive for regional integration should be understood as part of a broader strategy to exploit the many links between trade and development. International trade has long been recognised as a key factor of economic growth, development and poverty reduction. The creation of effective regional markets,

<sup>1</sup> The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Europe–Africa Research Network (EARN) and the UK Department for International Development (DFID). Special thanks go to Fernanda Faria and Quentin de Roquefeuil for their precious help and to the participants to the EARN workshop held in Praia, Cape Verde on October 15 2010 for their useful comments.

encompassing not only institutional arrangements but also physical integration, policy coordination and the pooling of resources, can be decisive to stimulate production capacities, trade, investment flows and thus stimulate economic growth and development. In the current context of global recession, with its impact being felt hard in some developing countries (e.g. decline of trade and investment flows, lower remittances, lower and more volatile commodity prices, unemployment, etc), it becomes more urgent to unleash the potentials of regional integration processes.

Nowhere are the economic growth and development benefits of trade and development links more necessary – nor are they probably as much a tale of missed opportunities – than in Africa<sup>2</sup>. Intra African trade has remained at very low levels since independence. Not only are African economies mainly oriented towards developed and emerging countries, therefore producing few goods that could be traded regionally, but the barriers to trade amongst African countries also remain very cumbersome. The infrastructure necessary to support regional trade is also woefully underdeveloped; transport costs in Africa are estimated to be amongst the highest in the world.<sup>3</sup> Regional integration is seen as part of a remedy to these ills by encouraging intra African specialisation and by shifting the overwhelmingly North–South pattern of trade flows in Africa. Nevertheless, reducing tariffs, custom procedures, harmonising national standards and providing the necessary infrastructure to sustain intra–regional trade are perhaps the most daunting tasks facing regional groupings.

### ***Principle and action***

The European Union has a long tradition of promoting the ideal of regional integration and supporting effective integration processes, namely through political support on the principles of regional integration. But besides this ‘political support’ and experience sharing, the EU has also committed a sizeable share of its development aid and technical assistance to support regional integration and cooperation, which is one of the six priority areas of its development assistance.

In the framework of its partnerships with the ACP and Mediterranean countries (MEDA), the EU has jointly elaborated regional indicative programmes in complement of its national support.

It has also undertaken comprehensive free trade agreements with regional groupings, which cover not just trade, but also trade–related regulatory issues, development concerns and institutional aspects, as is the case of the EPAs with ACP regional groupings, in the context of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement.

While the EU has inspired many of the regional integration processes around the world and provided active support for several of such initiatives, it is generally

<sup>2</sup> See for instance UNECA (2010), *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa IV: Enhancing Intra-African Trade*, Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa. [www.uneca.org/aria](http://www.uneca.org/aria). See also UNCTAD (2009), *Economic Development in Africa – Report 2009: Strengthening Regional Economic Integration for Africa's Development*, New York and Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. [www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=4923&lang=1](http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=4923&lang=1)

<sup>3</sup> See for instance World Bank (2008), *Transport Prices and Costs in Africa – A Review of the Main International Corridors*, and World Bank (2008), *Trade Costs in Africa: Barriers and Opportunities for Reform*. [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

not at the origin of those integration agendas, which have been embraced by national leaders. There is an endogenous belief by many African leaders that regional integration will foster development and strengthen their position. This is not to say that the EU has not been active in promoting and supporting regional integration, and to some extent actively contributed to export its model. The European Community has indeed dedicated significant effort and resources to effectively support regional integration in Africa,<sup>4</sup> as well as in other parts of the world.

EU efforts do indeed go beyond a mere liberalisation agenda and recognise the need for trade capacity building, e.g. designing harmonious intra-regional regulations, helping producers seize the opportunities offered by the opening of neighbouring markets, developing infrastructural necessities. EU and regional groupings can and do cooperate in this area.

The EU is also a strong supporter of the aid for trade (Aft) international agenda<sup>5</sup> and a significant contributor to the initiative. It has contributed to the development of Aft concepts, reaching internationally agreed definitions on the substance of Aft at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and in areas like monitoring of commitments. It worked with the ACP Group, and notably African countries and regions, to identify their Aft needs and mobilise development assistance to meet them. In the context of the EPA negotiations, both the EU and the ACP acknowledged at an early stage that tariff liberalisation and new commitments in trade-related areas will carry certain adjustment and implementation costs.<sup>6</sup> In a clear demonstration of its commitment to the Aft agenda, the EU adopted in October 2007 a joint Aid for Trade Strategy, which lays down a set of broad principles and activities to guide a coherent, EU-wide approach on Aft. These included the existing commitment to provide support – of at least €2billion collectively (€1billion from the Commission and €1billion from the member states) per year in the ‘narrow’ Aft area of trade related assistance – but also commitments in other areas to improve donor expertise and coordination, which equally have the potential over time to transform the approach to the provision of aid, along the lines envisaged in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and Accra Agenda for Action. The EU is committed to complement the ACP–EU instruments such as the European Development Fund with additional initiatives and support from EU member states.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, Aft is considered as a key component of the support to regional integration initiatives, notably in Africa.<sup>8</sup> This has been illustrated for instance with the recent EU commitment to support the West Africa Aft agenda related to EPAs<sup>9</sup>. The extent to which these commit-

4 See for instance Dinka, T. and W. Kennes (2007), *Africa's Regional Integration Arrangements: History and Challenges*, ECDPM Discussion Paper 74, Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management. [www.ecdpm.org/dp74](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp74)

5 See namely De Lombaerde, P. and M. Schulz eds. (2009), *The EU and World Regionalism: The Makability of Regions in the 21st Century*, The International Political Economy of New Regionalisms Series, Ashgate; and Wilson, J. S. and B. Hoekman (2010), *Aid for Trade: Building on Progress Today for Tomorrow's Future*, Policy Research Working Paper Series No. 5361, July. [http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&theSitePK=469372&piPK=64165421&menuPK=64166093&entityID=000158349\\_20100719153619](http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&theSitePK=469372&piPK=64165421&menuPK=64166093&entityID=000158349_20100719153619)

6 Lui, D. (2008), *The Aid for Trade Agenda and Accompanying Measures for EPAs*, ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 86, Maastricht: The European Centre for Development Policy Management. [www.ecdpm.org/dp86](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp86)

7 Bilal, S. and F. Rampa (2009), “What Does the European Experience Tells us on Aid for Trade”, in De Lombaerde, P. and L. Puri eds., *Aid for Trade: Global and Regional Perspectives*, 2<sup>nd</sup> World Report on Regional Integration, United Nations University Series on Regionalism 2, Springer. Ch. 4, pp. 63–85.

8 See Mackie, J., S. Bilal, I. Ramdoo, H. Hohmeister and T. Luckho. (2010), *Joining up Africa Support to Regional Integration*, ECDPM Discussion Paper 99, Maastricht: ECDPM, [www.ecdpm.org/dp99](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp99)

9 ECDPM (2010), *The EU Commitment to Deliver Aid for Trade in West Africa and Support the EPA Development Programme (PAPED)*, ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 86, Maastricht: The European Centre for Development Policy Management. [www.ecdpm.org/dp96](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp96)

ments are translated into practice and effectively implemented, along the lines of the Paris and Accra agenda, remains a major challenge.

The EU also believes that in parallel to regionalism among developing countries, regional integration between developed and developing countries and regions can be complementary and beneficial. This is part of the underlying rationale for the EPAs negotiated between the EU and six regional ACP groupings. As proposed by the European Commission (EC), they should be essentially enhanced, development-oriented Free Trade Areas (FTAs) between ACP regional groupings and the EU. They should cover not only trade in goods and agricultural products, but also in services, and should address tariff, non-tariff and technical barriers to trade. Other trade-related areas should also be covered, by extending cooperation between the EU and the ACP to areas such as competition, protection of intellectual property rights, standardisation and certification, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, investment, trade and environment, trade and labour standards, consumer policy regulation and consumer health protection, food security, public procurement, etc.<sup>10</sup>

A basic principle of EPAs contained in the Cotonou Agreement is that they should build on and reinforce the regional integration process of the ACP. According to the EC, by building on larger well-integrated regional markets, regional EPAs should contribute to foster the integration of the ACP in the world economy, provide for economies of scale, stimulate investment and contribute to establish and pursue necessary trade reforms. The regional partnership with the EU should therefore help to increase the credibility of regional integration processes, in particular in Africa. On the other hand, the EPAs would also benefit from deeper integration within the regions, allowing them to conclude more comprehensive agreements with the EU, which the EC believes would bring further benefits to the regions.<sup>11</sup>

Stronger regional groupings will in turn be able to provide stronger support to the African Union (AU) process. While the European Commission envisages differentiated specific provisions for each EPA, their general structure should be common. Ultimately, as explicitly indicated in the Commission negotiating mandate from the EU member states, EPAs could over time be merged among regions in Africa to become larger entities. A common EPA for all African ACP countries could thus be envisaged in the long run. This would then be compatible, and perhaps in fact reinforce the pan-African integration process.

While the EU is strongly pledging its support to open regionalism among developing countries and has embarked on bi-regional EPA agreements building on regional integration process, the EU support can be a double-edge sword. EPAs could well complicate or disrupt the regional integration process for some regions, and in several cases have already done so, as discussed in Section 3. In seeking to strengthen regionalism, the EU may put regional integration processes under unwarranted pressures.

<sup>10</sup> For an analytical synthesis, see Makhan, D. (2009), *Linking EU trade and development policies: lessons from the ACP-EU trade negotiations on economic partnership agreements*, Studies 50, Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / German Development Institute. [www.die-gdi.de/CMS-Homepage/openwebcms3\\_e.nsf/\(ynDK\\_contentBy\(key\)\)/ANES-7YUFTE?Open&nav=expand:PublikationenStudies;active:PublikationenStudies\ANES-7YUFTE](http://www.die-gdi.de/CMS-Homepage/openwebcms3_e.nsf/(ynDK_contentBy(key))/ANES-7YUFTE?Open&nav=expand:PublikationenStudies;active:PublikationenStudies\ANES-7YUFTE)

<sup>11</sup> See European Commission (2008), *Communication on Regional Integration for Development in ACP countries*, COM(2008) 604 final/2, 6 October 2008. [http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/Communication\\_on\\_Regional\\_Integration\\_COM-2008-604\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/Communication_on_Regional_Integration_COM-2008-604_en.pdf)

### ***The Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure (TRII) partnership of the Joint Africa–EU Strategy***

At the continental level, the EU has articulated its strategic partnership with Africa in an ambitious political framework, the Joint Africa–EU Strategy.<sup>12</sup> Its main objectives are to enhance a strategic political dialogue, strengthen institutional ties and to address common challenges through a partnership of equals. In line with the principle of policy coherence for development, the implementation of this partnership is expected to bring positive complementarities between sectoral policies and strategies, and between existing frameworks and initiatives, not least in the area of trade and support to regional integration. EU and African priorities and ambitions in this particular area of EU–Africa relations are articulated in the *Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure (TRII) partnership*, one of the pillars of the JAES.<sup>13</sup>

Although the JAES implies a dramatic change of approach to the African continent by treating 'Africa as one', in practice the divide between North Africa (under the Union for the Mediterranean, integrated into the European Neighbourhood Policy) and sub-Saharan Africa (under the Cotonou agreement) persists in EU approach and policy rationale, and pan-African integration is not addressed – it is striking that the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) is not mentioned in the roadmap of the TRII partnership.

This is reflected namely in the different programming processes for the two regions and the two different financial instruments of the EDF and the ENPI, with wider implications for activities trying to bring together actors from the whole of Africa. For instance, the EU–Africa Business Forum does not involve North Africa because it is financed under the EDF. Information sharing on regional integration and exchanges of best practices, defined in the TRII partnership as priorities for fostering regional integration, are still difficult to develop because of such financing constraints. Also in terms of strategic rationale, EU policies and approach towards Northern African and Sub-Saharan African countries are different. The ENP aims at a broad MEDA–EU agreement building on bilateral association and cooperation agreements (i.e. FTAs) with each of the Mediterranean countries. Regional integration among Mediterranean countries is pursued as a next step, the EU thus playing a role of catalyst to effective regional integration among Northern African developing countries. The Cotonou Agreement aims instead at fostering regional integration in the rest of Africa (as in the Caribbean and Pacific) by building on the existing regional agreements and sign with them, or with other self-defined regional groupings, economic partnership agreements. Furthermore, the trade regimes of African countries with the EU still varies across the regions, with countries still falling under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), the 'Everything But Arms' (EBA) regime, or under various forms of Free trade Agreements such as interim EPAs, Mediterranean Agreements or the Trade, Development Cooperation Agreement between the EU and South Africa. The differentiated instruments and approaches therefore call for actions to increase coherence which would be the added value of the TRII partnership.

<sup>12</sup> The Africa–EU Strategic Partnership, A Joint Africa–EU Strategy, December 2007.

<sup>13</sup> For a general assessment of the JAES, see Bossuyt, J. and A. Sherriff (2010), *What next for the Joint Africa–EU Strategy? Perspectives on revitalising an innovative framework*, ECDPM Discussion Paper 94, Maastricht: ECDPM, [www.ecdpm.org/dp94](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp94). On the TRII, see also Colin, S., Walker, A., *The Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure partnership: current state of affairs, Background Note for the 18th Inter Regional Coordinating Committee meeting (IRC)*, 26 May 2009, Nairobi, Kenya; and Colin, S., M. Bouyer and S. Bilal (2009), *The Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure Partnership of the Joint Africa–EU Strategy: Assessment and way forward*, ECDPM note.

Three priority actions for the TRII partnership were identified in the first Action Plan (2008–2010) of the JAES:

1. Support to African integration agenda;
2. Strengthen African capacities in the area of rules, standards and quality control;
3. Implement the EU–Africa infrastructure partnership.

The first priority action ('Support to the African integration agenda') is expected to increase synergies between African integration processes, the EPAs, the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership and bilateral trade agreements. It raises, however, a number of sensitive issues already contentious at the regional level, namely: the integration of the so-criticised EPAs into the JAES, and the Minimum Integration Programme (MIP).

Although support to regional integration is one of the objectives of the EPAs, there has been no political and technical dialogue on EPAs within the JAES, this has instead been addressed at the level of the EPA regional groupings and in the framework of the Cotonou Agreement. Both the European Commission and some African stakeholders (e.g. the South African Co-chair) have shown reluctance to deal with the EPAs within the TRII partnership. It is feared that addressing the many contentious issues and tensions raised by the EPA negotiations can undermine and even impede progress in the partnership. But can there be any progress in the areas of regional integration and trade without taking the EPAs into full consideration? To consider that the TRII partnership should avoid these sensitive issues in order to make progress puts the partnership at risk of losing its substance.

Another sensitive issue in the implementation roadmap of the TRII partnership is the Minimum Integration Programme (MIP) of the African Union. The MIP consists of a set of activities, as defined by the RECs, which should be adopted and implemented promptly to speed up the integration process at the regional and continental levels.<sup>14</sup> Although considered a key activity for implementing the regional integration priority action, the MIP is not a consensual initiative. Significant discrepancies between the reality of regional integration and the MIP's proposal for the rationalisation of the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) at pan-African level have raised strong concerns among many African and European actors about the feasibility of the MIP's objectives. However, the MIP is first and foremost an African issue, discussed mainly at the African level and amongst African stakeholders, with the AUC seeming to be reluctant to engage with the EU on a dialogue on this issue. It is therefore difficult to grasp what the TRII partnership could bring to the MIP and how the TRII could deliver on the MIP at this stage.

Nonetheless, if the TRII is set to avoid the difficulties of the African integration agenda and focus only on those areas which it is likely to deliver better and more quickly on, its added value will remain limited. It will be left with the less sensitive second priority area on 'Strengthening African capacities in the area of rules, standards and quality control'. While important, these issues are mainly technical, and can be (and are already) addressed in other fora, at the national and regional levels. The strategic value added of the TRII partnership cannot rest on

<sup>14</sup> African Union Commission (2010), *Minimum Integration Programme*, [www.africa-union.org/root/arl/index/MIP%20Big%20Doc%20English%20Version%20Web.pdf](http://www.africa-union.org/root/arl/index/MIP%20Big%20Doc%20English%20Version%20Web.pdf)



these technical questions. The third priority area, linked to Infrastructure, is also implemented largely in parallel to the JAES through the Infrastructure Partnership, raising once more the question of the value addition of the JAES priority of action. However, the TRII partnership could foster cooperation between the different actors who could use this continental approach to contribute to the EPA process and to adjust the MIP by using the EU integration experience. Unless it does so, the JAES may have little relevance in fostering regional integration in Africa.

### Impact of EPAs on regional integration

From its inception, the EPA process aimed at strengthening regional integration in ACP countries. Negotiations were envisaged between the EU and a limited set of regional groupings of the ACP; they were not meant to be on a country-to-country level. Despite the problem of overlapping membership in African regional groupings, the ACP countries had to decide on the regional configuration they would adopt to negotiate an EPA with the EU. In the first phase of the EPA negotiations (September 2002–September 2003), the European Commission and the ACP Group as a whole engaged mainly in an exchange of views and clarifications from both parties. A second phase of negotiations started at the regional level in view of concluding regional EPAs, with each of the main ACP regional groupings entering into negotiations with the EU.<sup>15</sup> These negotiations were thus intended to build on and foster the regional integration process of the ACP groupings. However, a common perception expressed by many countries during the independent review of the negotiations (as stipulated in article 37.4 of the Cotonou Agreement), and illustrated by the partial conclusion of interim EPAs, is that there is too little coherence between the EPA agenda and the regional integration processes in Africa. Unless the current EPA negotiations process redresses this incoherence, EPAs may end up undermining, rather than promoting regional integration in some parts of Africa.

So far, and in spite of the good intentions, the EPA process has added an additional layer of complexity to the already intricate picture of regional integration in Africa,<sup>16</sup> and has put African countries in the difficult position of having to speak with one voice within their regional grouping during their negotiations with the EU.


With the exception of the East African Community (EAC), the regional groupings within which African countries chose to negotiate their respective EPAs, did not match the contours of the formally recognised RECs to which they belong.<sup>17</sup> Some regional sub-groupings<sup>18</sup> are more fully integrated than the broader EPA configuration within which they are negotiating with the EU. Besides, many African countries are members of more than one REC with often conflicting objectives and obligations. Graphic 1 illustrates the intricate web of membership overlap between RECs, regional groupings and the configurations of EPA negotiations.

15 Central Africa (CEMAC-plus) and West Africa (ECOWAS-plus) in October 2003; Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) in February 2004; the Caribbean (CARIFORUM) in May 2004; Southern Africa (SADC-minus) in July 2004; and the Pacific in September 2004.

16 Bilal, S. and C. Braun-Munzinger, "EPA negotiations and regional integration in Africa: Building or stumbling blocs", Paper prepared for the 3rd TRAPCA Annual Conference *Strengthening and Deepening Economic Integration In Developing Countries: Current Situation, Challenges and Way Forward*, Arusha, Tanzania, 13–14 November 2008. [www.ecdpm.org/bilal](http://www.ecdpm.org/bilal).

17 The EAC decision to negotiate an EPA as a bloc was made as early as 2002, but this was not concretised until late 2007 when the region initiated an interim EPA with the EU. Until then, the region negotiated within the ESA configuration. In the current state of play, the EAC is the only coherent regional configuration to have initiated an interim EPA in Africa.

18 Notably the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA in its French acronym) within ECOWAS, EAC within ESA, and the South African Customs Union (SACU) within SADC.



**African Regional and Sub-Regional Economic Integration Groupings and the Regional Economic Partnerships Agreement (EPA) Negotiations Configurations**

**Regional Economic Communities (RECs) (full lines):**  
 AMU: Arab Maghreb Union  
 CEN-SAD: Community of Sahel-Saharan States  
 ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States  
 COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa  
 EAC: East African Community  
 ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States  
 IGAD: Inter-Governmental Authority on Development  
 SADC: Southern African Development Community

**Other sub-regional groupings (dotted lines):**  
 CEMAC: Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale  
 IOC: Indian Ocean Commission  
 SACU: Southern African Customs Union  
 UEMOA: Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine

**EPA groupings are shown in discontinuous lines**  
 \* DR Congo has become part of CEMAC-EU-EPA in December 2005

- Least-developed countries (LDCs) are in *italics* and *small letters*
- Countries that have concluded an interim EPA are in **bold**
- Countries between < TAGS > have a FTA with EU
- Underlined countries have signed an EPA

The EPA process has also clearly exposed the weak regional cohesion in most EPA regional groupings, with national interests prevailing over regional integration agendas and conflicting interests generating tensions within the region. Conducting interim agreements bilaterally provided the opportunity to safeguard market access in those regions where regional solutions were not possible in the remaining time. However, the bilateral approach adopted by the EC and some ACP counterparts is clearly at odds with a key objective of the EPAs, i.e. to build on and reinforce regional integration.

While regional integration in Africa has often seen uneven progress and has been hampered by various obstacles and challenges, both internal and external, little consideration seems to have been given to the complexity and importance of existing regional integration efforts in the context of the EPA negotiations. Many African countries, in particular in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA), opted to favour national interests over commitments to regional solidarity and agenda when considering which regional EPA grouping to join, with some countries shifting from one configuration to another a few years into the negotiations (e.g. Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania). Whether a regional integration process can be driven or supported by external forces such as the EU, or whether it should be internally driven in order to be sustainable is a question that can ultimately only be answered by the African countries themselves.

In assessing the impact of EPAs, consideration must be given to the consequences of the parallel implementation of EPAs and of endogenous regional integration initiatives in the ACP. In the context of the ongoing EPA negotiations, EC proposals for tariff harmonisation and liberalisation, cut across or even pre-empted existing regional integration initiatives. Indeed, ACP countries were pressured to negotiate on trade-related issues, such as investment and government procurement, in cases where there is little capacity or incentive at either regional or national level to enter into commitments in such areas. This has raised the concern that the agenda and pace set by the EPA negotiations left little time to focus on internal factors relating to autonomous regional integration. In fact, it has on some occasions undermined such efforts. At the same time, it has been recognised that the EPA negotiations process provided some impetus for further focus on regional integration agendas (e.g. EAC, ESA and West Africa regions) and revived otherwise somewhat dormant economic co-operation initiatives (e.g. the Indian Ocean Commission). Yet, calls for integration at the regional level before opening up to the EU under an EPA remained unanswered.

### ***Conflicting market access commitments***

Of particular concern is countries in the same economic region might liberalise different baskets of products and so create new barriers to intra-regional trade in order to avoid trade deflection. This concern has been vindicated by the interim EPAs agreed so far, where countries have sometimes undertaken conflicting market access commitments that may prevent further regional integration (e.g. ESA).

Having concluded interim agreements with one sub-region and some individual countries, it's not clear whether it will be possible to indeed extend interim agreements to full EPAs covering all the countries of each negotiating region. Instead of moving towards full EPAs at the regional level, different countries within the same region may make different choices of trade regimes:

1. a full and comprehensive EPA;
2. a narrow (or permanent interim) EPA;
3. the standard GSP (or GSP-plus); and
4. the EBA for Least Developed Countries (LDCs).

As only interim agreements have been concluded so far and all African ACP countries are still engaged in the negotiations of final EPAs, the possibility of reconciling regional groupings with the EPA configuration remains. Yet, some countries may chose otherwise. Box 1 presents possible consequences related to choices made in terms of the regional scope of any agreement.

### Box 1. Scenarios regarding the regional coverage of the agreements

Scope of the agreements	Opportunities	Risks
Agreements at the <b>regional</b> level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provided all countries within a region can agree on a common liberalisation schedule towards the EU, it will foster regional integration dynamics and allow for the formation and implementation of customs unions with a common external tariff and trade policies. This could be the case both for existing customs unions (e.g. CEMAC, EAC, SACU and UEMOA) as for emerging/expected customs unions in COMESA, ECOWAS and SADC).</li> <li>• Even though varying degrees of commitment on services and trade-related issues are possible within an EPA, a common understanding across the region on coverage of these issues will be conducive to regional integration.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Possible difficulties in arriving at a regional list of sensitive products and a reduced opportunity to protect nationally sensitive sectors from EU competition.</li> <li>• Different positions and commitments on services and trade-related issues may create political tensions and weaken the cohesion of the regional grouping.</li> </ul>
Agreements at the <b>sub-regional</b> level (leaving out some members of the negotiating group)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preserve narrow deeper regional integration, as is the case in EAC, SACU and UEMOA.</li> <li>• Offer the possibility for some countries in the region not to open their markets to EU imports (e.g. for LDCs that export under EBA or for non-LDCs that apply for GSP+).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prevent broader regional integration, as in COMESA, SADC and ECOWAS.</li> </ul>
Agreements with <b>individual countries</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Offer the possibility for some countries in the region not to open their markets to EU imports (e.g. for LDCs that export under EBA or for non-LDCs that apply for GSP+ or opt for the standard GSP).</li> <li>• Market access offers at individual country level provide the largest policy room for determining sensitive products specific to each country's situation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Counteract regional integration processes and create political tension, as is the case of Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana initiating interim agreements alongside the negotiations at regional level in West Africa.</li> <li>• Counteract regional integration processes, and create a need to introduce new barriers to trade and border controls within a region in order to implement rules of origin and avoid trade deflection.</li> </ul>

The EPA process ought to avoid creating new barriers to African integration. This should be possible with goodwill and flexibility on all sides and a recognition that not all the details of the current texts are set in stone. As regional groupings move towards the agreement of full EPAs, new demands will arise and reinforce this need. In the process of designing a regional agreement, countries will have to determine a common regional position on market access in goods, services liberalisation and trade-related issues, based on the interests of each country, defined at the national level. Where differences of opinion prevail in a region, it is possible that on some issues a final EPA could contain regional provisions that would apply to all members of the group, and country-specific ones that would apply on an individual basis. This is most likely on services liberalisation or possibly on some investment and other trade-related provisions. This would allow a regional agreement to be concluded which is in line with existing integration dynamics, whilst respecting the choices made by individual countries.

However, if the *status quo* in some countries persists and regional partners continue to hold significantly different positions, the regional integration process could be seriously jeopardised. Regional cooperation and the dynamic of further integration would be interrupted: customs unions will be unable to apply the same Common External Tariff (CET); new border controls will be required; heterogeneous rules of origin might thwart production integration and political tensions could rise across the region. Nevertheless, preserving regional unity may not be a sufficiently strong argument to continue negotiations and conclude regional (potentially full) EPAs. Some countries may not find an EPA sufficiently in line with their development concerns and prefer to stay out. Indeed, strategic considerations on development – and not just preserving regional integration – should determine whether an EPA should be signed, and if so, what the agreement would entail.

### ***Implications of the global crisis***

The EPAs approach and negotiations must also feature in the impact of the current context of concomitant crises (financial, economic, food, energy crises), and the implications of the uncertainty and pessimistic growth forecasts on both the EU and African leaders' attitude towards regional integration and the EPAs. While the impact of the crisis in developing countries may be an opportunity to advance the regional integration agenda in Africa, with a greater sense of urgency and in search of alternatives to an economic growth stimulated from dependence on developed countries economies (now in recession or stagnation), attitudes towards the liberalisation agenda may be more cautious and affect their perception on the potential benefits arising from new trade agreements like the EPAs. The EPAs will be ultimately beneficial only if they can also contribute to the objectives of regional integration.<sup>19</sup>

Lower international demand and a fall in global trade will negatively affect the exporting opportunities of African ACP countries<sup>20</sup>, lead to a loss of customs revenues and put further strain on national budgets. As many African economies

<sup>19</sup> See Bilal.S., P. Draper and D.W. te Velde (2009), "Global Financial and Economic Crisis: Analysis of and Implications for ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)", ECDPM Discussion Paper 92, Maastricht: ECDPM. [www.ecdpm.org/dp92](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp92)

<sup>20</sup> This phenomenon of dampened prospect for export-led growth by developing countries was recently described in *The Economist* as "export fatalism" ("*Fatalism v fetishism: How will developing countries grow after the financial crisis?*", 11 June 2009).

heavily rely on export-generated revenues, domestic employment as well as development and social programmes are likely to be negatively affected. As a result, African ACP policy-makers are likely to see less positively the perceived cost-benefits of reciprocal trade liberalisation. Domestic protectionist pressures are likely to rise in several African countries (as in developed countries<sup>21</sup>), including against market opening for EU products in the context of an EPA. In parallel, lower demand in Europe may alter the perception of preferences granted by the EU to EPA countries: while some ACP countries may become even more dependent on the preferential margin granted to their exports by the EU (e.g. in products for which the EU preferential market remains dominant), and therefore more interested in the speedy conclusion of an EPA, others may see less value in preferences whose benefits are reduced due to the fall of EU demands for those products (in which case other markets and product diversification away from Europe might become more attractive). Thus, while some may put a greater emphasis on the positive conclusion of the EPA negotiations in some cases on a comprehensive agenda, others may reconsider their interest in concluding an EPA.<sup>22</sup> Disparities of situations according to countries and sectors suggest that specific measures may also be required.

Other elements must be kept in mind when considering the possible impact on the global crisis on the EPA approach and its objective of supporting regional integration:

1. Comprehensive EPAs aim at liberalising not only trade in goods, but also trade in services, possibly including the financial sector. If there is one general lesson from the financial crisis, it is that the financial sector needs careful and appropriate regulation.<sup>23</sup> But the type of regulation required and the reforms needed are less clear.<sup>24</sup>
2. More broadly, the financial crisis has stressed the importance of effective regulatory frameworks. Comprehensive EPAs offer to cover a number of trade-related issues (competition, investment, procurement, etc.) for which rule setting are required to reap the benefits from market opening.
3. Accompanying support will be required to address EPA adjustments. Europe is taking this issue seriously and has undertaken a number of commitments to this end, notably in the context of aid for trade, with significant Official Development Assistance (ODA) attached to it.<sup>25</sup> It is however unlikely there will new additional money in the near future, as donors

21 On protectionist pressures, read for instance WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy "Retreating from market opening is not a solution to the economic crisis", 24 April 2009 in [http://www.wto.org/english/news\\_e/sppl\\_e/sppl122\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl122_e.htm), and see the new initiative to monitor policies that affect world trade in <http://www.globaltradealert.org> (namely the publications by S. J. Evenett).

22 For instance, the new government in South Africa seems to favour a more sector-based industrial policy that may require tariff increase (see Draper, P. and N. Khumalo, "On the Future of the Southern African Customs Union", *Trade Negotiations Insights*, Vol. 8, No. 6, July-August 2009, ECDPM/ICTSD, [www.acp-eu-trade.org/tni](http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/tni)). Namibia seems to weigh the future potential of beef exports to the EU compare to new regional market opportunities. Botswana seemed to prioritise its relations with Europe by moving ahead with the signing of its interim EPA and advancing in negotiations towards a full EPA. Its only in refocusing on their regional integration objectives that the SADC/SACU grouping has been able to realign on common ground its position on the on-going EPA negotiations.

23 IMF, *Lessons of the Financial Crisis for Future Regulation of Financial Institutions and Markets for Liquidity Management*, 4 February 2009. <http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/020409.pdf>

24 See for instance "Brussels' plans for financial reform need work", *Financial Times*, 8 June 2009 and in the US context "Doubts over plan for systemic risk regulator", *Financial Times*, 11 June 2009, <http://www.ft.com>.

25 Lui, D., and Bilal S. (2009), *Contentious issues in the interim EPAs: Potential flexibility in the negotiations*, ECDPM Discussion Paper 89, Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management. [www.ecdpm.org/dp89](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp89)

will most likely not meet collectively their existing ODA commitments, let alone go beyond.

4. The creation of effective regional markets may contribute to foster development and thus partially alleviate some of the negative impacts of the global crisis. However, the state of regional integration in Africa, though with great potential, remains deficient as mentioned earlier. In addition and as already mentioned, the EPA negotiation process has so far mainly contributed to strain regional integration processes in Africa, notably with the conclusion of interim EPAs with individual countries or groups of countries cutting across RECs.

The global crisis could thus heighten the tensions around EPAs and their potential disrupting effects on regional integration and on development. A successful EPA must not be defined only by the signing of the agreement. It should strengthen the capacity of regional actors to act collectively, through enhanced cooperation and where necessary harmonisation, so as to establish regional frameworks for some *inter alia* economic activities and policies, institutional arrangements and infrastructures, as well as other appropriate policy issues. The form and scope, depth and speed of integration may (in fact should) vary according to the respective conditions and priorities of each regional process. However, an EPA should not undermine it, nor prevent or preclude the creation of regional markets and of regional regulatory and institutional frameworks that could help address some of the negative consequences of the global crisis. As it stands however, EPAs could prove very divisive for some African ACP regions. The extreme tensions raised in Southern Africa by the conclusion and recent signing by some Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries of an interim EPA are an illustration of this danger.<sup>26</sup>

With the global crisis in full force, most African countries can ill afford to become inward looking and neglect the synergies and economic benefits that effective regional economic integration could bring about. It is thus imperative that the conclusion of EPAs preserves the regional integration processes in place. This is likely to require in some regions that the EU adjust its demands and introduces greater flexibility in its approach, as suggested above, so as to bring on board all countries of a regional grouping and hence preserve regional cohesion.

### Practical proposals for the future of Africa-EU relations

Despite their development objectives, Economic Partnership Agreements have become a source of continued tension between the EU and Africa. How does an instrument that was conceived to foster economic development and enhance the partnership between the EU and the ACP/Africa risk turning into a liability in their strategic relations? And how can this be avoided? Not only have the EPAs lost momentum, but if the existing tensions are not resolved, the process may also have lasting negative consequences on the overall economic and political relationship between Africa and the EU.

<sup>26</sup> See Walker, A. (2009), "The EC-SADC EPA: Moment of truth for regional integration", *Trade Negotiations Insights*, Vol.8, No.6, July-August, ECDPM/ICTSD, [www.acp-eu-trade.org/tni](http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/tni), as well as Draper and Khumalo, 2009.

The EPAs have been presented as advanced and far-reaching instruments for binding trade and development. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge the political repercussions that EPAs have on the relations between the EU and Africa. A failure to deliver on these development promises would be a serious setback to the EU trade and development agenda, including in the context of the Doha Round and of the JAES. To find a way out of this impasse, the EU must propose concrete options to its partner countries. Similarly, it is high time for all African countries and regions to assess whether they want to conclude a final EPA – if so, then they must decide by when and under what conditions. Such decisions should be based on their own development strategy and their level of ambition for their domestic and regional reform agenda. Reaching an agreement on EPAs will require concessions from both sides and a more strategic vision towards the Africa–EU relationship, grounded on pragmatic implementation principles and greater flexibility in the EU approach. The following are some concrete proposals:

- To start, all parties must *recognise that the EPA process is first and foremost a political issue*, not a technical one that should be left to trade negotiators alone. To progress in the EPA negotiations, notably on the contentious issues, it is crucial for the parties concerned to reach an agreement that both reflects the development ambitions of the ACP, articulates with integration processes, and can be jointly defended at the WTO. This will require a careful assessment and strong political guidance for possible technical remedies by negotiators.
- *A more flexible approach* – one that acknowledges concerns expressed during the negotiations, even at the price of reduced ambitions – may thus prove a more effective way forward than the imposition of too-tight deadlines by the EU. The latter risks making implementation illusory and souring relations with the EU. Furthermore, speeding up the conclusion of final EPAs could seriously disrupt regional integration processes if a particular region is split on how to move forward. It could also have detrimental effects on development if a deadline forces some countries or regions to endorse an EPA agenda that does not match their domestic development strategies. It would be crucial to recognise that some ACP countries may not yet be ready or willing to conclude an EPA.
- It would thus be important to *conduct a reality check, and assess which type of agreement is most likely to effectively support the regional integration objective* where possible. While a coherent approach on EPAs must be preserved across ACP/African countries and regions, it is important to recognise the diversity of situations and interests across African countries (and the ACP in general) and the difference of opinions on the development merits of some of the contentious provisions in an EPA. Various options can be followed in different regions or countries, based on the driving strategic objectives –including strengthen regional integration– and specific development needs of each region or country. While the EPA process cannot be a substitute for an endogenous regional agenda by ACP groupings, the conclusion of EPAs should not undermine the regional integration processes.



- *The implementation of the JAES provides opportunities for both parties to enhance coherence between their policies and approaches to regional integration, trade and development.* For the EU, it is an opportunity to start a reflection on enhancing coherence of its support to regional integration, trade and development policies through existing cooperation instruments and approaches. The identified priorities of the Strategy should in the first place be mainstreamed into all EU-Africa cooperation instruments. Although the programming cycles and the period of the agreements impede any major change in the near future, the opportunity of the mid-term reviews of the EDF and ENPI instruments should be used to re-programme and align the different resources with the objectives of the JAES (provided this could be jointly agreed by the EU EDF Committee and the ACP Committee of Ambassadors).
- Within the JAES, the *TRII partnership* should also be used as a tool to enhance coherence if given the chance *to play a role in clarifying the links between the existing processes at sub-regional level –including the EPAs– and the activities carried out at the continental level in the framework of the JAES.*<sup>27</sup> EPA negotiations and related assessment needs should remain at the bilateral level. However, meetings between different regions could be encouraged in the framework of the JAES to exchange on the progress in EPA negotiations, on best practices in assessment needs and to allow the identification of regional complementarities. Identifying such bridges is likely to increase further the perception of an added value of the TRII, by the actors currently not fully involved.

<sup>27</sup> The European Parliament has also drawn attention on the coherence issue. As stated in the Report Maertens, *One Year after Lisbon: the Africa-EU partnership at work*, of 19 February 2009: “the Joint Strategy should also address issues which, although formally belonging to a different institutional architecture, have a profound influence on the future of Africa and which shape the relationship between the two continents”.



## Facing the challenges of climate change: The case of EU–Africa cooperation

Romy Chevallier

# Climate Change

In light of the global nature of climate change that no nation can deal with alone, what is the potential for collaboration between the European Union (EU) and Africa in achieving common goals? For the EU and Africa, climate change is an area of mutual significance and an important foreign policy concern. An enhanced EU–Africa partnership could help address some of the climate–energy–security challenges on both continents. The paper will take stock of the EU–Africa partnership on climate change, and discuss what has been achieved to date. It will question whether the EU and the Africa Union (AU) are natural partners and discuss potential collaboration in areas such as technology transfer, climate change adaptation best practices, pre-emptive disaster mechanisms and information sharing. This paper will also address contentious topics, bearing in mind that the stark differences in approaches and ambitions are found at national level. Finally the paper will summarise the most important points of the partnership and provide policy recommendations to decision makers ahead of the upcoming EU–Africa Summit in November 2010.

### The global challenge of addressing climate change

Climate change presents a new type of challenge in the global geo-political landscape, and requires traditional and new partners to engage in novel ways. No one country or region can tackle climate change alone – it is a true global concern that requires mutual trust and a sense of common destiny among all countries of the world.

In this regard, AU and EU members are looking to engage with partners, to share common experiences of how to deal simultaneously with energy security, climate change and socio-economic development. Although representing differing realities and threats to different countries, climate change has become a key pillar around which governments seek potential allies and appropriate forums that offer political or technical support. Alliances can also provide opportunities for information sharing, knowledge and coalition building among policymakers. Both the EU and Africa have become increasingly active on the international scene, seeking to develop bilateral and multilateral coalitions with countries that share their common international objectives. Key EU and African member states are attempting to increase their voices, visibility and partnerships through institutions such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the WTO. Bilaterally, Africa and the EU have entered into a joint strategic partnership to enhance political dialogue and deal with mutual concerns.

Despite the common challenge of climate change, countries act and react to the negotiations primarily from a national standpoint. It would be naïve to expect countries to be driven by anything less than domestic stakeholders, national interests and local realities. Therefore, for climate change coalitions to advance, it is perhaps practical to focus on less contentious issues, and make progress first in 'low-hanging fruit' areas. Common positions can be forged on a number of issues, showing tangible and concrete efforts towards achieving a common goal, and momentum gath-

ers. This can take place through comprehensive international strategies to manage mitigation, common yet separate responsibilities, shared approaches for adapting and dealing with climate-induced development challenges, and best practices for administering and managing shared resources and technologies. For example, fossil fuels are still the primary source of electricity supply for many countries in Africa. These countries can gain tremendous experience by participating in co-operative alliances with industrialised countries, especially when reforming their energy policies through renewable energy and carbon efficient technologies.

### New strategic alliances on climate change

The Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES) provides an overarching, long–term framework for relations between the continents. The EU–Africa Action Plan (2008–2010), emanating from the JAES, specifies concrete proposals for structured dialogue along eight thematic partnerships, two of which (the fifth and sixth) refer specifically to energy and climate change co–operation.

The objective of the EU–Africa partnership is to develop ‘common approaches and enhanced dialogue at the multilateral level on climate change challenges in Africa, Europe and globally’, in particular to achieve a global, comprehensive and legally binding post–2012 climate agreement<sup>1</sup>. This refers specifically to enhanced dialogue on developing, implementing and further improving initiatives and treaties related to climate change<sup>2</sup>.

The partnership’s second objective is to increase Africa’s ability to adapt to climate change, and to strengthen its resilience to the negative impacts of climate variability and related development challenges. To achieve this, the Action Plan proposes implementing climate–risk management and monitoring (through strengthened observation networks and service centres in Africa); reducing deforestation on both continents; increasing the participation of African entities in the global carbon market; and improving energy efficiency and providing alternatives to Africa’s energy economies.

Besides the climate change partnership’s main objectives, the concepts mentioned below are essential to the discussion between both continents.

- a) Climate change is a common threat that requires the co–operation of all global players at all levels. It therefore goes beyond the realm of EU–Africa co–operation, and is a global challenge of mutual concern.
- b) Climate change cannot be dealt with in isolation, but needs to be mainstreamed into all activities of the JAES, including the forums on millennium development goals (MDG), security, science and technology, energy, and space and education.

<sup>1</sup> First EU–Africa Action Plan (2008–2010): ‘Africa–EU partnership on climate change’ [http://ec.europa.eu/development/icercenter/repository/EAS2007\\_action\\_plan\\_climate\\_change\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icercenter/repository/EAS2007_action_plan_climate_change_en.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> The EU–Africa pillar on climate change also considers co–operation on land degradation and the spread of desertification. This initiative consists of a set of cross–sectoral actions aimed at the sustainable management of natural resources. To date this includes the Great Green Wall of the Sahara and Sahel Initiative (GGWSSI). This will not be discussed at length in this paper.

- c) Climate change is principally a development threat for Africa and so the EU, as Africa's most important development partner, needs to integrate climate adaptation into all of its development activities on the continent.
- d) As Africa is the most vulnerable continent and unable to cope with the impacts of climate change alone, the international community has to assist through increased financial, human and technical support.
- e) The starting point for all co-operation must be within existing African climate change development initiatives, allowing Africans to take ownership of these processes.

### Mainstreaming climate change into all other sectors

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Africa is the region most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change because the majority of people depend on rain-fed agriculture and natural resources for their livelihoods.<sup>3</sup> Food production in Africa is closely tied to the amount and timing of rainfall and the availability of water for irrigation. IPCC regional models predict that climate change will result in plant ecosystems suffering further species extinctions. Africa is also expected to experience an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, as well as the spread of vector-borne diseases. These stresses will put tremendous pressure on an already overstretched region.

Experts from Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC also predict that climate change will cause productivity changes, which will directly affect the overall national income and the livelihoods of the people reliant on the agricultural sector. These environmental impacts will impede development and lead to a drop in GDP. While cost estimates are rudimentary and uncertain in the cases of individual countries, even the most conservative figures estimate that a temperature rise of 2–3 degrees Celsius will cost 0–3% of global GDP annually.<sup>4</sup> According to the Stern Review (2006), inaction could cost up to \$5 trillion globally.<sup>5</sup>

These vulnerabilities and expected impacts should serve as guidelines for future policy directions and planning, inform a range of national and regional government decisions, be the basis of co-operation with international partners such as the EU.

National and international government institutions must play a more proactive role in raising awareness, sharing information, and examining best practices in climate risk management, particular related to disaster risk reduction, health, agriculture, and food security. For example, climatic risks should be taken into account when planning and designing bridges and other infrastructure projects. This is referred to as the 'climate proofing' of projects, which, at a policy level, could involve integrating the implications of climate variability and change on development activities, including poverty alleviation, sectoral development and natural resource management into planning strategies.

<sup>3</sup> The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Working Group II contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability, Cambridge University Press. 2007

<sup>4</sup> Uwe Llewellyn J., *The Business of Climate Change: Challenges and Opportunities*. Lehman Brothers, February 2007, <[http://www.lehman.com/press/pdf\\_2007/TheBusinessOfClimateChange.pdf](http://www.lehman.com/press/pdf_2007/TheBusinessOfClimateChange.pdf)>

<sup>5</sup> Stern, N., *The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change*. London: New Economics Foundation, 2006

African states, of which two-thirds are dependent on rain-fed agriculture, must develop a co-ordinated coping strategy. Adapting to climate change is all-encompassing and includes actions that reduce potential vulnerability and damage, such as strengthening/climate proofing bridges against storms and floods, planting a wider range of crops to reduce vulnerability to changes in rainfall, and finding ways to benefit from opportunities associated with climate change. Africa needs to push a pro-poor agenda that includes climate-resilient, poverty reduction schemes. However, Africa also has to address medium- and long-term mitigation scenarios by lobbying the West for further commitments under the Kyoto and future climate change agreements. Adaptation and mitigation action need to be implemented simultaneously, which means that climate change activities in Africa require a mixed portfolio of strategies including mitigation, adaptation, and technological development and research.

The continent, which is heavily dependent on fossil fuels (traditional biomass and coal) for its electricity generation, also needs to find ways to switch to a low-carbon growth trajectory, without jeopardising its economic growth. Although the past few years have seen an increase in cleaner and more energy-efficient, coal-fired generation plants and the retirement of older technologies, much more needs to be done to make existing renewable energies economically viable and feasible for Africa.

### Focusing on the climate change and development nexus

Climate change will affect negatively the development objectives related to the most vulnerable groups and communities. For example, the projected impact of climate change on access to natural resources, heat-related mortality and spread of vector-borne diseases, will have direct implications for the achievement of several of the UN's MDGs. How development occurs, in turn, has implications for climate change itself and the vulnerability of societies to its impacts.<sup>6</sup>

Climate change needs to be understood in the context of socio-economic development. Efforts by the EU to mitigate and adapt to climate variability must complement Africa's broader economic agenda and must not detract from its existing development objectives. Policymakers and project developers should seek to replicate 'co-benefit' models and infrastructure projects that simultaneously address environmental sustainability and socio-economic development in the region<sup>7</sup>.

The EU has made headway on these 'co-benefit/ hybrid projects', creating development needs-oriented efforts to address climate change. The EU has come up with a practical and cost-effective 'no-regrets' approach that benefits environmental sustainability, but also (and more importantly) non-climatic stresses and development needs. An example of a project that supports this approach is in northern Madagascar. Mad'Etole has established a new wind energy plant, which is connected to the grid, to deal with the current shortage in power sup-

<sup>6</sup> 'Poverty and climate change: Reducing the vulnerability of the poor through adaptation'. 2003. Publishers include UNDP, UNEP, World Bank, ADB, AfDB, GTZ, DFID, OECD, EC on behalf of the Poverty-Environment Partner

<sup>7</sup> Chevallier, R, 'Mainstreaming climate change and development co-operation in Africa'. *Adaptation to Climate Change in Southern Africa: New Boundaries for Development*. Earthscan's Climate change and Development special edition, Volume 2. Issue 2. April 2010

ply. This is a co-benefit approach as it address both domestic socio-economic challenges (reducing costs of electricity, creating jobs for locals because part of the turbines is built locally, ensuring technology transfer and enhancing local economic development), and climate challenges (decreasing deforestation and introducing renewable and carbon-neutral electricity production to the area).

### Mainstreaming climate change adaptation into existing policymaking

Climate change should also be systematically integrated into socio-economic development policymaking and planning at a national, regional and continental level<sup>8</sup>. Climate change adaptation should also be mainstreamed across all important sectors, especially economic policies, security and development projects, and international aid efforts. In practical terms, for example, governments need to look at incorporating climate change adaptation into existing national poverty reduction strategies and policies. Regional and continental institutions, such as the AU and Southern African Development Community (SADC), also need to adopt this approach.<sup>9</sup>

*At a local level*, adaptation programmes should involve and give ownership to the communities. Local government needs to incorporate, analyse, and take into account indigenous knowledge best practices and adaptation approaches at a grassroots level. National authorities and international partners should assist local communities with the necessary resources, knowledge and technology, and incorporate these communities more systematically into policy-planning, which would inevitably lead to the development of cost-effective, participatory and sustainable adaptation strategies/pilot projects.

*At a national level*, public bodies responsible for climate change and development need to make a greater effort to include climate change adaptation in national planning, policies and strategies. Although progress has been made, by incorporating the national adaptation programme for action (NAPAs) into poverty reduction strategies papers (PRSP), the approach should be cross-sectoral and cross-ministerial, and have trickle-down benefits for the most vulnerable communities.<sup>10</sup>

*At the sub-regional and pan-African level*, organisations play a crucial role, given the trans-boundary nature of climate change and adaptation strategies. The AU, NEPAD and regional economic communities (RECs) must ensure that climate change adaptation is integrated into their sectoral programmes. The AU Commission, in co-operation with UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the Africa Development Bank is supporting a new initiative 'GCOS-Africa Climate for Development' that began in 2007. This programme forms part of the global climate observation system designed to integrate climate information and services into development, in support of Africa's progress towards the MDGs. One of its major objectives is to mainstream climate information in national and

8 Klein, R. *Climate Change, Adaptive Capacity and Sustainable Development* report prepared for the OECD Expert Meeting on Adaptation to Climate Change and Sustainable Development, OECD, Paris, 13–14 March 2002

9 Chevallier, R. 'Mainstreaming climate change and development co-operation in Africa'. *Adaptation to Climate Change in Southern Africa: New Boundaries for Development*. Earthscan's Climate change and Development special edition, Volume 2. Issue 2. April 2010

10 Kramer, A. 'Adaptation to climate change in Poverty Reduction Strategies'. Human Development Report 2007/2008. *Fighting climate change: Human solidarity in a divided world*. Human Development Report Office Occasional Paper 2007/34

regional development programmes, focusing initially on the climate-sensitive sectors. The AU adopted the Declaration on Climate Change and Development in Africa in this regard (Addis Ababa, 2007).

Just as national and regional adaptation measures need to be integrated, Africa's international development partners should combine socio-economic upliftment and climate change adaptation into their regional development programmes and strategies. Only recently has attention been paid to climate change in development plans at this level. Development assistance, which does not take climate change and environmental sustainability into account, will be less effective (or even futile) and probably lead to the ineffective use of resources. As mentioned previously, donor activities in Africa must be climate friendly or climate proofed.

The EU has attempted to integrate climate change adaptation into its development activities and has many best practice examples, tools and experiences to share. In 2004, the European Commission adopted a framework on 'Climate Change in the Context of Development Co-operation' and its related 'Action Plan 2004-2008',<sup>11</sup> with the aim of including climate change in all its co-operative development programmes in Africa, and enabling countries to integrate climate change strategies into their development plans. The EU's experiences show that more dedicated research is needed into specific tools and instruments for screening and assessing climate risks, evaluating adaptation options, and prioritizing or ranking the most climate-sensitive sectors, regions or activities. Practical guidance is needed on how to integrate adaptation concerns within core activities, for climate change adaptation can be effectively integrated into development as part of country strategies, sectoral policy frameworks, poverty reduction strategies, long-term investment plans, technical consultations and sector reviews, and strategic and project-level environmental impact assessments.

The EU has also initiated a number of high-level activities and key policy endorsements to enhance further its adaptation activities. For example, the EU has established the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA), which provides financial, technical and capacity support for integrating climate change into poverty reduction strategies. At the international multi-agency level, one such initiative that integrates climate change into development activities is the EU's joint African-Caribbean-Pacific group of states (ACP)-EU Declaration on Climate Change and Development (Brussels, 2008).

The EU's approach also attempts to take into account the priorities already identified by African organisations, such as the African Ministerial Conference on Environment (AMCEN), the Conference of African Heads of States and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC), as well as in existing African initiatives such as the Climate for Development in Africa Programme (ClimDev Africa)<sup>12</sup> and the new African Climate Policy Centre in Addis Ababa. The EU is providing financial support (€8 million) for ClimDev Africa and for enhancing capacity at the Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture (AU Commission) through the unit for climate change and desertification control.

<sup>11</sup> 'Climate change in the context of development co-operation'. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. European Commission, 2004.

<sup>12</sup> ClimDev aims to scale-up and incorporate climate observations, services and risk management into policy and decision processes in Africa. [http://uneca.org/eca\\_programmes/sdd/events/climate/climdev.pdf](http://uneca.org/eca_programmes/sdd/events/climate/climdev.pdf)



## Measuring the success of the EU-Africa climate change partnership

Measuring the level of co-operation, the depth and the coherence of this climate change partnership is difficult, as many of the 'results' are qualitative and the partnership is only three years old. A possible measurement of success is to look at the extent to which the objectives set out in the official documentation and Action Plan has been achieved.

### *Pursuing common positions at the multilateral level*

The first objective was to adopt a common position on climate change in preparation for the UNFCCC conference. Thus, in November 2008, an official joint EU-Africa Declaration on Climate Change was adopted, which sought to develop a common position on reaching an ambitious, legally binding post-2012 agreement.<sup>13</sup> Although broad and non-committal, this major political achievement provided concrete opportunities for co-operation and dialogue in the run-up to the Poznan and Copenhagen climate talks. The EU has sought to support Africa in the negotiations on a number of issues.

However, besides the Joint Declaration, the EU and AU are both pursuing national and continental interests at the multilateral climate talks: Although African countries agree that developing countries also have a role to play in reducing greenhouse gas emissions (as future emissions are likely to be dominated by the growth in developing countries, especially South Africa, India and China), countries of the South continue to face developmental challenges, and any further constraints on growth will create a further burden. Countries are pushing for 'climate equity' and 'climate justice', as they believe that countries responsible for historical emissions should bear the brunt of the mitigation obligations, while emission reductions should be based on the IPCC's most ambitious scenarios. Africa believes in a post-Kyoto regime with comparable targets, binding compliance and incentives.

Europe and Africa agree that each country should accept their share of responsibility, albeit in a differentiated way that takes into account their current level of development, economic growth, population and industrialisation. Europe has made a unilateral pledge to reduce its emissions by 2020 to 20% below 1990 levels. It also agrees to make further reductions if other countries are more forthcoming with their commitments.

Although there is consensus and co-operation at the multilateral level, some disputes may have soured the partnership. For example, at the end of 2009, in the run-up to the Copenhagen negotiations, developed countries (including the EU) suggested a 'common responsibility framework for mitigation' that would result in the demise of the Kyoto Protocol, and the loss of distinction between the commitments of developed and developing countries. African countries were adamant that the status quo should remain, and a two-track negotiating approach be adopted.<sup>14</sup> South Africa's Environment Minister Sonjica affirmed that 'we will not be pressurized into accepting a weak outcome that re-interprets the

<sup>13</sup> 'Africa EU Declaration on Climate Change'. [http://ec.europa.eu/development/center/repository/AFRICA%20EU%20DECL%20ON%20CC\(01%2012%2008\)\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/center/repository/AFRICA%20EU%20DECL%20ON%20CC(01%2012%2008)_en.pdf)

<sup>14</sup> Van der Merwe C, 'Hopes for ambitious climate agreement at Copenhagen fade', *Engineering News*, 10 November 2009

Convention and Bali Action Plan to the disadvantage of developing countries. We would rather work within the Africa Group to seek a suspension of the proceedings and additional negotiating time, with a negotiating mandate that reflects a two-track approach'.<sup>15</sup>

Apart from the EU–Africa partnership on climate change, other countries are seeking to engage with both continents on a number of thematic and political issues. Coalitions, whether formal or informal, are considered a practical way to achieve the goals of political groupings. The African Group, for example, has sought to forge a common position among its 53 member states in order to apply greater political pressure on countries of the industrialised North to make further legally binding mitigation commitments. The Group has successfully argued that contributions by developed countries to the Adaptation Fund should be in addition to existing development assistance, and that the Fund should be transparently governed, with equal board representation from the developing and developed world. It is essential that Africa speaks with one voice to ensure a co-ordinated approach to the urgent global adaptation issues, particularly in light of the upcoming UNFCCC meeting in South Africa in December 2011 – the first such meeting to be held on Africa soil. The African Group needs to develop a proactive strategy to deal with all aspects, and political will and ambitious leadership is obviously essential.

The BRICS alliance (Brazil, China, India and South Africa) also emerged as a powerful negotiating force at the Copenhagen talks in December 2009. The group sought to protect the interests of fast-developing nations responsible for a growing percentage of the world's emissions, and helped broker an agreement known as the Copenhagen Accord. This Accord shows the commitment of countries to reduce voluntarily their emissions, and to make their reduction efforts subject to international review.<sup>16</sup>

As the major polluter on the continent and the only country with mitigation obligations to meet, South Africa's role in the multilateral discussions cannot be ignored. South Africa has played an active role in the UNFCCC negotiations, initiating the concept of nationally appropriate mitigation actions that are measurable, reportable and verifiable. In January 2010, South Africa signed the Copenhagen Accord and pledged to cut its emissions to 34% below business-as-usual emissions by 2020 and to 42% by 2025.<sup>17</sup> This cut is conditional on financial and technical assistance, as well as technology transfer. In this light, the EU has pursued a bilateral partnership with South Africa that addresses areas of improved collaboration around climate change.

### ***Assisting Africa to adapt to climate change***

The other objective of the EU–Africa partnership on climate change is to support Africa's capacity to address climate change adaptation. As a means to this end, the EU Commission's launched the GCCA, which consists of a set of cross-sectoral

<sup>15</sup> Speech by Ms Buyelwa Sonjica, Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs, at the NGO national information and consultation session on climate change. Colloquium, Pretoria. Issued by the Department of Environmental Affairs. 10 November 2009. Source: Department of Environmental Affairs, RSA

<sup>16</sup> Friedman L, 'South Africa wants to cut emissions but lacks policies to match its rhetoric', *The New York Times*. 5 January 2010

<sup>17</sup> Chevallier, R. 'South Africa's dilemma: Reconciling Energy–Climate Challenges with Global Climate Responsibilities' in *Climate Change and Trade: the Challenges for Southern Africa*. Edited by Draper and Mbirimi. 2010

actions aimed at the sustainable management of natural resources. This Alliance is aimed mainly at the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), countries that are hardest hit by the adverse effects of climate change, least able to counter its impact.

From 2008–2010, around €100 million was made available for vulnerable countries from the EU budget and bilateral contributions from member states (including Sweden and the Czech Republic). An additional €40 million was contributed, as part of the 10th European Development Fund, to promote regional approaches in the ACP countries' grouping. By the end of 2010, the GCCA is expected to support activities in 20 of the most vulnerable countries. The African beneficiary countries that have been selected are Mozambique, Ethiopia, the Gambia and Sierra Leone. Each country will benefit from country-tailored support on climate change issues, coupled with an enhanced political dialogue with the EU. (See Table 1 for further details.)

In addition to financial assistance to vulnerable countries, the GCCA also aims to organise regional events to take stock of existing co-operation and increase technical assistance to such countries. In this regard, the Africa regional conference of the GCCA took place on 12 October 2010 in Addis Ababa, as a pre-event to the 7<sup>th</sup> African Development Forum (ADF).<sup>18</sup> The Forum, whose theme was 'Acting on Climate Change for Sustainable Development in Africa', provided a multi-stakeholder platform to discuss Africa's concerns and interests in preparation for the COP 16 in Mexico in December 2010.

**Table 1: African countries benefitting from GCCA support for adaptation in 2008–2009**

Country	Year	EC amount	Sector	Date signed	Duration
<b>Seychelles</b>	2009	€2 mil	Sustainable Dev, Energy and CDM	14 July 2009	3 years
<b>Mali</b>	2009	€5.7 mil	Mainstreaming, forestry and capacity building	12 July 2009	6.5 years
<b>Mauritius</b>	2009	€3 mil	Sustainable Dev, Mainstreaming	24 June 2009	5 years
<b>Rwanda</b>	2009	€4.6 mil	Land Use, Land Management	12 May 2009	4 years
<b>Senegal</b>	2009	€4 mil	Coastal Zone Protection (soil erosion)	To be finalised	3 years
<b>Tanzania</b>	2008	€2.2 mil	Eco-villages, agriculture and land use	28 Dec 2009	6 years
<b>Intra ACP EDF Project</b>		€8 million	Support for ClimDev (improved climate information)		
<b>Intra ACP EDF Project</b>		€4 mil to each REC	Support capacity building for COMESA and ECOWAS		

Source: EU website of Global Climate Change Alliance, 'Beneficiaries'. [http://www.gcca.eu/pages/41\\_2-GCCA-Beneficiaries.html](http://www.gcca.eu/pages/41_2-GCCA-Beneficiaries.html)

## Costs of adapting to climate change

Adapting effectively to climate change is costly and will require significant funding and assistance from all players in the bilateral and multilateral development community. To date, funding for adaptation has been insufficient, and the international community has earmarked virtually no new or additional funding for adaptation in sub-Saharan Africa.

<sup>18</sup> Global Climate Change Alliance, 'Regional Dialogue'. [http://www.gcca.eu/pages/22\\_2-Policy-Dialogues.html](http://www.gcca.eu/pages/22_2-Policy-Dialogues.html)

According to a 'guestimate' by the UNDP's Human Development Report, by 2015, poor countries may need as much as \$86 billion annually in additional financing, in order to adapt to the impacts of climate change. The UN report also states that in the same period 'at least \$44 billion will be required annually for the climate-proofing of development investments'. This adds to the financial and human burden on already-strained Southern African economies.<sup>19</sup>

Funding is also needed to improve systematic observation of climate variability and change, to assess the degree of impact, and to plan and implement climate change adaptation in different vulnerable sectors. The required assistance will vary according to country-specific vulnerability assessments. Funding is also needed for other research activities, awareness raising, capacity building and for practical activities, such as the climate-proofing of infrastructural projects and implementing national and regional mitigation and adaptation policies. Meteorological information, for example, is imperative, yet sub-Saharan Africa still has the lowest density of meteorological stations in the world.

Several dedicated multilateral financing mechanisms have been created, but delivery through these mechanisms has been limited. As part of the commitment made by developed countries in the Copenhagen Accord, the EU has committed €2.4 billion per year for 2010–2012 as fast-start funding (or €7.2 billion for three years), representing about 30% of the total budget.<sup>20</sup> The EU presented a preliminary funding report at the UN climate change talks in Bonn in June 2010, and will submit implementation reports in Mexico in December 2010, and thereafter on an annual basis. However, critics warn that this process has not been transparent enough and that it is not clear how the money will be raised and dispersed.<sup>21</sup> A distinction needs to be drawn between allocating funds for climate change adaptation, reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, technology transfer and mitigation measures.

More clarity is also needed by the EU to explain its fast-track financing commitments, particularly on what it means by 'new from when' and 'additional to what'? Developed countries seem to be pursuing their own definitions, without any agreement or common standard, which is clearly untenable. All parties need to establish a baseline against which 'new and additional' can be measured and tracked, and the same applies for the EU member states.

Developing countries feel strongly that developed countries have not met their financial commitments in the past and are still reluctant to pledge new and additional funding – over and above their commitment of 0.7% of their national income for foreign development assistance. In order to maintain trust, and reassure African countries of their support for tackling climate change, the EU must ensure that its funds are channelled speedily to developing countries.

Currently, intense discussions are taking place about the mechanisms through which this fast-track finance will be dispersed. The developed countries, including the EU, prefer money to be channelled through country-specific bilat-

19 UN Development Programme, *Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World*. Human Development Report, 2007/08. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp.18–19

20 Developed countries have pledged a commitment of \$30 billion to help developing countries reduce their carbon emissions and adapt to climate impacts by 2012, and \$100 billion by 2020.

21 Gore T, Oxfam's EU International Climate Change advisor, in a statement on 'EU report on climate change fast-track financing', 17 May 2010

eral agencies (such as the UK Department for International Development) and preferred multilateral channels, such as the World Bank or UNDP. In contrast, Africa and other developing countries have expressed a clear interest in utilising the UNFCCC mechanisms: the Adaptation Fund and/or the LDC Fund set up under the Kyoto Protocol<sup>22</sup>. It is worth mentioning that Spain and Germany have pledged their funding to the Adaptation Fund.

Prime Minister Meles (spokesperson for the Africa Group) re-emphasised in Copenhagen that development partners, which include the EU, its member states and its private firms, need to enhance donor communication and co-ordination, and pay more attention to the programme implementation and monitoring.<sup>23</sup>

### Getting started: Renewable energy projects on the ground

While a multilateral climate deal is far from being concluded, 'low-hanging fruit' and thematic, non-politicised issues can be addressed through informal coalitions and alliances. These issues include exchanging climate data and information, comparing practices and capacity-building experiences, and transferring technology and skills. Scaling up and mobilising private capital for renewable energy and energy-efficiency projects could initiate and maintain momentum in the JAES.

Since 2008, EU and North African countries have worked on joint proposals to harness large-scale renewable energy in the Mediterranean region. The Mediterranean Solar Plan aims to harness 20GW of solar energy by 2020, and its first phase has begun, with numerous small-scale renewable energy (solar and wind) pilot projects in the pipeline. The same is true for Olkaria Geothermal Power Plants in Kenya's Rift Valley. The European Investment Bank (EIB), the EU's long-term financing institution, has provided investment to Kenya's Generating Company (KenGen) to expand the Olkaria II Geothermal plant by 35MW – as part of a €260 million investment to aid the development of renewable energy projects in East Africa.<sup>24</sup> Over the last five years, the EIB has contributed more than €890 million to the East Africa region, with over 52% in the energy sector.

In terms of monitoring and climatic data collection, headway has been made within the JAES under other pillars of co-operation. The Global Monitoring for Environment and Security and Africa initiative is being pursued with strong support from the EU. This initiative aims to use space-based earth observation to support sustainable development, helping to manage the continent's environment and natural resources, and supporting crisis monitoring and humanitarian operations.

Progress has been made in other areas, notably the forestry sector, where improved reporting systems have been introduced to monitor deforestation in the Congo Basin. Innovative, performance-based mechanisms have been used to provide incentives for reducing emissions from deforestation.

<sup>22</sup> Speech by Saleemul Huq delivered on 30 May 2010 entitled 'Review of the status of climate change negotiations and anticipation of steps required to achieve a post 2012 climate regime'. <http://www.gcca.eu/user/Speech%20Saleem%20Huq.pdf>. Sheraton Hotel, Dhaka

<sup>23</sup> Declaration on Integrating Climate Change Adaptation into Development Co-operation. Adopted by Development & Environment Ministers of OECD Member Countries, 4 April 2006. Meeting of the OECD Development Assistance Committee and the Environment Policy Committee at Ministerial level. Paris

<sup>24</sup> 'EIB invests in Kenya's Olkaria geothermal plant expansion'. *NewNet*. 23 June 2010. <http://www.newenergyworldnetwork.com/renewable-energy-news/by-technology/geothermal/eib-invests-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-olkaria-geothermal-plant-expansion.html>.

## Conclusion

Although Africa's contribution to global historical and current emission levels is low, the continent remains the most vulnerable and the least able to cope with the drastic economic and development implications of climate variability.

This inverse relationship between the responsibility for climate change (historical and current emissions) and the vulnerability to its impacts, raises questions about climate justice, global equity and responsibilities. However, despite this, Africa will continue to experience the adverse impacts of climate variability, which threaten to destroy the foundations of African economies and the livelihoods of millions of people. As adapting to climate change is essential, the vulnerability of societies and natural systems must be assessed, and communities need to be helped to cope by adopting appropriate behaviours and strategies. Member states of the region, and development partners such as the EU, should recognise these vulnerabilities and impacts, and to use the information available to inform future high-level action and policy decisions. Policies to address climate change should not detract from, but seek to enhance, the continent's development agenda. Co-benefit models should be used as a way to address environmental sustainability and economic development simultaneously.

This interface between climate change and development is undisputed and highlighted by the EU's approach to Africa. The EU has made substantial progress in mainstreaming climate change into its development policies towards Africa and has also worked to climate-proof all its development programmes in the region. However, more effort can be made at the implementation or grassroots level in pilot or sectoral programmes.

To understand whether the JAES co-operation is indeed feasible, the EU and African countries need to reach consensus on various issues: the approach and priority given to development and poverty concerns; the role of and dependence on natural resources within national economic and industries; the main source of emissions; the level of ambition for response measures and policies, the level of engagement, education and outreach of domestic stakeholders (both public and private) and public opinion influence; and access to climate-related information. Exchanging data in informal coalition and ad hoc arrangements can effectively shed light on the impact of climate change on emerging countries' development aspirations, and provide a platform for interaction between policymakers within these countries.

## Policy recommendations going forward

### *Cross cutting policy recommendations*

- The challenges of climate change, and energy and water security, transcends the climate change partnership set out in the JAES. Climate change needs to be mainstreamed across all areas of EU-Africa planning and co-operation.
- Increased emphasis on the people-to-people approach of the partnership.

Pragmatic activities need to be conducted and enhanced to translate policy pillars into actual activities that mean something to the communities represented by JAES. Climate change adaptation projects (which are really about development co-operation) are easily achievable and can add tremendous value at grassroots level. This approach would further market and publicise the activities of the JAES.

### ***Thematic policy recommendations***

#### *Towards achieving short-term objectives*

- The EU has traditionally played a progressive role in the international climate negotiations, and can continue to play a supportive role for the vulnerable countries through the following specific actions:
  - a) Mobilising new, additional resources for adaptation financing, with greater transparency over the amount and the delivery mechanism, and more clarity on the sector focus of such funding. Quick implementation of this 'fast start' component of the Copenhagen Accord is important in order to maintain trust in the EU-Africa partnership.
  - b) Ensuring that additional funding focuses on those most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change – specifically poor countries (LDCs) and Small-Island Developing Countries (SIDs).
  - c) Channeling fast-track financing, as per the AU member states request, through an existing UN mechanism, such as the UNFCCC's Adaptation Fund or the LDC Fund of the Kyoto Protocol, and not through the bilateral development agencies. Countries can also follow the example made by Spain and Germany.
- Continue to support (financially, through capacity building efforts, training, and transfer of best practice) existing African initiatives (AMCEN and CAHOSCC) that focus on strengthening the resilience of African societies – particularly where communities depend on natural resources to sustain their livelihoods. In this regard, surveillance and monitoring, accurate climate information and data, and specialised technical assistance are very important.
- Support the AU position at Copenhagen and attempt to form a EU-Africa joint or common position towards Cancun and South Africa. The parties do not have to agree on everything but can form co-ordinated positions on broader areas regarding global responsibility to climate change, differentiated responsibility according to a country's capacity, two-degree threshold, increased adaptation financing etc..
- Continue to strengthen the capacity of the Climate Change Unit in the AU Commission.
- Continue to support the negotiating capacity of AU member states.

*Towards achieving long-term objectives*

- Establish an EU–Africa flagship project (possibly with a focus on renewable energy) that can help elevate the successful co-operation within the JAES and highlight progress on the ground. It is important to focus on a project that mutually benefits the EU and Africa, goes *beyond Africa* to address issues of global concern (as set out in the JAES), and addresses climate change concerns (actually reducing emissions), while simultaneously creating socio-economic benefits, promoting the transfer of technology and skills.
- Place more emphasis on the nexus between climate change and security in both regions.
- Continue to address climate change through the development prism of the JAES – the EU’s development planning and policies must be ‘climate proofed’ and take adaptation into account.
- Use Africa’s vulnerabilities and the expected impacts of climate change as guidelines for future policy directions and planning, to inform the basis of co-operation with international partners such as the EU.
- Include African-owned initiatives, as well as a variety of actors at all levels of society in the policymaking process.
- Dedicate more attention to progressive coalitions among vulnerable developing countries, other developing countries and developed countries to start addressing climate challenges. The GCCA initiative is a good example of such a progressive alliance. Take pro-active actions at the national level and share experience amongst the vulnerable developing countries. Go beyond adaptation and look at low carbon development. Even though the emissions of the vulnerable countries are very low, they should look at developing low carbon development pathways. The initiative of Maldives to become carbon neutral in 10 years is an excellent example.
- Have more South–South collaboration and share experiences across the vulnerable developing countries (perhaps with support from the EU). In the longer term, all countries (both developed and developing) must incorporate both mitigation (through low carbon development) and adaptation (through climate resilient development) as part of their business-as-usual development pathways.



## Beyond Development: political context analysis as a tool for a more effective EU-Africa Partnership

Jean-Christophe Hoste

# Climate Change

In this paper I would like to draw attention to the fact that climate change offers a new perspective on development basics and energy provision. Climate change is a global phenomenon that has particularly severe consequences for the African continent. It aggravates the fragility of existing situations of which it is not necessarily the cause. Furthermore I want to bring to the fore the importance of the African political context in which the EU-Africa partnership has to function. Understanding the political economy of African decision making will be crucial for a successful partnership in the future.

### Accumulation of climate change effects in Africa

Over the last decade, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has provided extensive scientific proof that there is almost certainly a substantial human contribution to the development and the evolution of climate change. But even if warming occurs worldwide, what makes the African continent different compared to other regions in the world, is the accumulation of different climate change effects.

First, scientific data suggest that Africa is warming up faster than the global average (Hulme, M, et al, 2001), as the following figure illustrates:




Figure: African annual mean temperature anomalies from 1900 to 2000.

Second, there is not a single continent wide "African Climate Change Effect." Africa is as diverse as it is big. Some areas of the continent will become drier, others wetter. For some it might mean prosperity due to an increase of rain and vegetation. For most other areas, however, it will mean dire adversity due to a decrease in rain. Since the climate variations do not abide by the formal frontiers of countries, this might also be a future cause for concern although exactly how this concern will materialise remains to be seen.

According to the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU)<sup>1</sup> current climate models do not allow us to make a reliable forecast about the average rainfall in the Sahel zone. The Sahel zone is a semi-arid strip of land that passes through Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Sudan. For the Western Sahara in particular the current models even produce contradictory results, as some say that there will be more rain while others predict desertification. There is consensus, however, about the high vulnerability of the Sahel region and the fact that climate change could amplify the fragile character of states in the region, owing to the susceptibility to socio-economic crises and violent conflicts within these countries.

The third matter to take into account is the agricultural sector, on which climate change has a very direct impact. The IPCC report published in 2007 highlighted that Africa is the most vulnerable continent to climate change because of weak capacity to adapt. In rural environments, adaptation strategies have been put in place to deal with the existing climatic variations. But this may not be enough to enable communities to cope with future climate change which could bring more frequent or more severe flooding or droughts and further temperature rises. Agricultural productivity is likely to decline, which will impact on food security. For Southern Africa in particular, it is likely that the simultaneous occurrence of desertification, salinisation and regional water scarcity will cause declining grain harvests and thus have a direct effect on food security.

For the Sahel and Southern Africa, overgrazing, deforestation and non-sustainable agriculture are vital issues to tackle because these are human induced climate vulnerabilities. These matters will only get worse if weak economic and political structures cannot address widespread poverty and social inequality. Tackling these fundamental problems constitute the building blocks for a sustainable recovery. Chevalier (2008/9) concludes that: "climate variability therefore threatens to destroy the foundations of African economies and the livelihoods of millions of people. For this reason it is necessary...to consider climate change in the context of socio-economic development, and ...to point out the interconnectedness between climate change and development in sub-Saharan Africa."<sup>2</sup>

The real catch for African countries is that those who will be hit hardest by the impact of climate change lack the capacity to deal with its consequences. Although climate change can have an impact on development, the lack of capacity to appropriately address these issues has nothing to do with climate change but brings us back to development basics such as poverty eradication, education, governance, conflict management, and local and regional cooperation.

### **Collaborative research: a way out of the energy and development nexus?**

Investing in collaborative research and development between developing and developed countries, and their respective institutions, is a necessary and durable manner to close the gap in developing economies between their need for energy and limiting their carbon emissions for the future. An example of this

<sup>1</sup> German Advisory Council on Global Change 2008. *Climate Change as a Security Risk*. Earthscan London and Sterling, 248pp.

<sup>2</sup> Chevalier, R (2008/9) Addressing Mitigation of and Adaptation to Climate Change in Sub-Saharan Africa While Meeting Development Goals. *South African Yearbook of International Affairs* 5 2008/9.

approach is the development of carbon capture and storage technology, which involves capturing carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) and storing it safely in geological structures. On 25<sup>th</sup> of November 2009 the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre announced that Norway and South Africa would collaborate on the development of carbon capture and storage capacity. Norway argues that a new climate regime under the Climate Change Convention must ensure that incentives are established to promote the dissemination of carbon capture and storage technology for the major emitters that do not have commitments at present. That is why Norway will support the Carbon Capture and Storage Centre that has recently been set up at the South African National Energy Research Institute.<sup>3</sup>

This research is all the more important because most African countries still depend heavily on fossil fuels for their primary electricity and have a difficult trade-off to make between energy security and the development of durable energy resources. A good example of this dilemma is the loan of \$ 3.75 billion that South Africa's Eskom secured from the World Bank on 9 April 2009. Of this sum, \$ 475 million was earmarked for the development of renewable power, such as wind and solar projects.<sup>4</sup> This loan was heavily contested precisely because of the small amount of cash that was destined for durable energy provision and is thereby a case in point of how difficult it is to implement climate-proof projects.

### Inclusion of climate change policy

To properly address the development basics and the energy dilemma mentioned above, climate change should be approached as a cross-cutting issue. As a consequence, climate change should be integrated into socio-economic development policy planning at national, regional and continental level. Adaptation measures should be mainstreamed across the board into the most important policy sectors. The fact that climate change can exacerbate threats that can have a major impact on life through a series of possible cascading events must be taken into account: desertification could trigger a vicious circle of degradation, migration and conflicts over territory. Migration in turn may increase conflicts in transit and destination areas. This in turn may significantly increase instability in weak or failing states by overstressing the already limited capacity of governments to respond effectively to the challenges they face.<sup>5</sup> The EU military operation EUFOR Chad is a good example of the cascading effect that climate change can have. The mission was confronted with what was called "unintended feedbacks". One of these unintended feedbacks from the conflict on the environment in Chad and Sudan was the change in the make-up of the population. There was an increase of urbanisation in Darfur and Eastern Chad due to the improved security. The increase of urbanisation attracted Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and refugees next to urban centres, which was problematic because it took away the best cultivable lands. In turn, this put food security under pressure due to a lack of arable land and water.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Jonas Gahr Støre, Norway, SA Need to Pool Climate Efforts 25 November 2009. <http://allafrica.com/stories/200911250214.html>

<sup>4</sup> World Bank backs loan for South Africa power station 9 April 2010.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8609179.stm>

<sup>5</sup> Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council HR/SG Javier Solana 14 March 2008.

<sup>6</sup> Hoste, J-C 2009. Observatoire de l'Afrique conference report climate change & security 20 January 2009. <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/09/afr/090326-Climate-Change-Security-CFReport.pdf>

This example reinforces the idea of the cascading effect that multilayered conflicts can have. It also illustrates the paramount importance of in-depth knowledge of the local and regional socio-economic and political context. Climate change will only aggravate these circumstances if this state of affairs remains unaddressed and if coping mechanisms fail to be implemented.

### Implications of African political economy for climate change

The importance of understanding the political economy of the African decision-making processes will be crucial for a successful EU–Africa Partnership in the future. In late 2009, the climate change negotiations in Copenhagen were an illustration of this underestimated factor of influence.<sup>7</sup>

Despite the shared challenges thrown up by climate change, countries acted and reacted to the climate change negotiations primarily from the perspective of their national interests. It would be naive to expect African countries to be driven by anything other than an agenda of domestic needs, notwithstanding the fact that they expect these needs to be catered for by the developed world due to their historical responsibility. Although this domestic agenda is a political reality for each African country, there is very little African analysis on the caveats of their own (common) position. The analysis carried out most frequently does not overcome the dichotomy of the developing and the developed nations. Furthermore, very little attention is paid to the influence of political economy on climate change and the development agenda.

### South Africa's position in the climate change negotiations

The first example I would like to elaborate on is South Africa's position at the climate change negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009. South Africa's environment Minister Sonjica stated that the result of the negotiations was unacceptable. But South Africa decided to stay in order to influence the process from within, and not carry out a walkout as had been discussed among African leaders.<sup>8</sup>

South Africa had other motives in addition to the ones mentioned above by its Minister for the Environment.

First, South Africa is seen as a major power in Africa and an anchor state in the Southern African region.<sup>9</sup> It signed this deal to secure economic growth and energy provision. Since South Africa is responsible for 39% of the emissions in Sub-Saharan Africa and is one of the top 12 carbon emitter's worldwide it needs to strike a delicate balance between mitigation efforts and economic growth.<sup>10</sup> An effective climate change policy in South Africa, that is no impediment to economic growth, needs a fundamental reorganisation of energy production

<sup>7</sup> Hoste, J-C 2010. Where was united Africa in the climate change negotiations? *Africa Policy Brief* N°2. <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/10/afr/2010-feb-Afr.P.Brief-Hoste-climate-change.pdf>

<sup>8</sup> South Africa blasts Copenhagen failure, Associated Press, 22 December 2009.

<sup>9</sup> Niemack A. The Challenges of Carbon Mitigation and Implications for South Africa in the post-2012 Context, in *South African Yearbook of International Affairs*. 2008/2009. Jan Smuts House Johannesburg: SAIIA, 2009.

<sup>10</sup> Chevalier R. Addressing Mitigation of and Adaptation to Climate Change in Sub-Saharan Africa While Meeting Development Goals in *South African Yearbook of International Affairs*. 2008/2009. Jan Smuts House Johannesburg: SAIIA, 2009.

and consumption patterns to become less reliant on coal as its primary energy source.<sup>11</sup>

Second, South Africa wants to secure continued international investment and was a prominent member of the African delegations that were invited to the China and South Korea summits. Although relations with China are not always straightforward because China has a firm grip on economic development in Southern Africa, it relies heavily on South Africa's non-fuel minerals like platinum and manganese.

Third, President Jacob Zuma put South Africa in the international spotlight as a member of the newly formed BRIC group, a gathering of four emerging economies along with China, India and Brazil. The latter three are emerging economic powers that wield considerable influence unilaterally and South Africa benefits from being part of this heavyweight collective that bolsters its global influence. An illustration of South Africa's use of this international stature for internal politics is the "January 8" statement of the African National Congress (ANC)<sup>12</sup>. In the declaration the ANC reiterates that South Africa, together with its counterparts in the developing world, contributed to the progress made at the Climate Change Summit held in Copenhagen.

### Environment policy in the Horn of Africa: the political economy of the Nile River water management

The second example I would like to draw attention to is an illustration of how intertwined the measures to be taken in terms of agriculture and water management are with the political context in the case of the Nile basin. An equitable management of the Nile Basin's water in which almost 40% of Africa's population is living would be beneficial for all parties. If there was more cooperation between riparian states it would be mutually beneficial even for Egypt that is afraid it will be cut off from a sufficient water supply and is even willing to go to war over it.<sup>13</sup> If dams were built upstream by Ethiopia it would actually save water and provide more water for all the riparian states. It would reduce the annual Nile floods and be a solution to the problems of salinisation and evaporation.<sup>14</sup> Politically, however, the issue is very sensitive because several parties are afraid of losing influence and face in any new agreement that is reached.

The Nile Basin consists of 10 riparian states: Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Nile basin has two major sources, the White Nile originating in Burundi flowing into Lake Victoria and the Blue Nile originating from Lake Tana in Ethiopia, which together form one drainage system.<sup>15</sup> The dynamics between the riparian states around lake Victoria Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, Rwanda

11 Masters L. *The Road to Copenhagen: Climate Change, Energy and South Africa's Foreign Policy* SAIIA Occasional Paper, No.47, October 2009.

12 This statement marks the party's founding on January 8, 1912 and spells out the ANC priorities for 2010. It is one of the most important statements preceding President Zuma's State of the Union at the beginning of February.

13 Hassan H. A. & Al Rasheedy A. *The Nile River and Egyptian Foreign Policy Interests* *African Sociological Review* 11, 1, p. 25–37.

14 Tadesse, D. 2009. *Review of early experiences, current challenges and opportunities among the Nile Basin riparian states in Climate change and transboundary water resources conflicts in Africa* Workshop Report 29–30 September 2009, p 12.

15 Adar K.G. 2007. *Kenya's Foreign Policy and Geopolitical Interests: The Case of the Nile River Basin.* *African Sociological Review* 11, 1, p. 63–80.

and Burundi are fundamentally different from the dynamics of the riparian states of the blue Nile Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt, although there are connections.<sup>16</sup> In our example we will focus on the political dynamics of the disagreements concerning the use of the Blue Nile water between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia.<sup>17</sup>

The disagreements as regards the Nile Basin have been ongoing for years. Each of the parties has tried to convince its opponent of the validity of its argument by referring to international law.<sup>18</sup> The net result is that the major parties in this dossier, Egypt and Sudan on the one hand, refer to their historical rights, while Ethiopia on the other hand refers to an equitable use of the Nile water, and neither party changed their position until recently.

### ***Political economy of the Nile: Egypt and Sudan***

#### *The 1959 Water Agreement or regime change for Sudan*

Up to now Egypt and Sudan have been the biggest beneficiaries of the Nile Waters due to the water treaties of 1929 and 1959.<sup>19</sup> Today they both receive the lion's share of the water, 55.5 and 18.5 billion cubic metres respectively, assuming that 10 billion cubic metres evaporates. Despite these facts and although Egypt and Sudan are seen as one party in these negotiations, their relationship is more complex.

The 1929 Water Agreement prioritised Egypt's "natural and historical" rights as the British officials defined it, which automatically rendered the rights of Sudan secondary to Egypt. Sudan was put in the position of a symbolic, unequal and passive partner in the agreement. It was considered as Egypt's backyard.<sup>20</sup> Egypt developed irrigation schemes throughout Sudan and other riparian states that were under British rule. In 1956 Sudan became independent, which led to the need for a new water agreement between Egypt and Sudan. Egypt wanted the new agreement to follow the 1929 accord, but the newly independent Sudan government led by Prime Minister Abdalla Khalil did not want to sign such an agreement. They considered it unfair and wanted a revision of Sudan's rights. The 1958 change of government in Sudan from a democratic government to a military regime led by General Ibrahim Aboud was considered "a brainchild of the Egyptian government that had become concerned about the democratically elected Sudanese Government"<sup>21</sup> The complicity of the Egyptian government became clear when the new military regime not only recognised the legality of the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement but also signed the 1959 Waters Agreement, allowing Egypt to build the Sudd el Aali and the Aswan Dam. Sudan from its side

16 Adar K.G. 2007. *The Interface between National Interest and Regional Stability: The Nile River and the Riparian States African Sociological Review* 11, 1, p. 4-9.

17 Kendie D. 1999. Hydro-politics of the Blue Nile River. *Northeast African Studies* 6.1-2, p.141-169

18 Kindiki K. 2009. Water and food security in the Nile River Basin – Legislative, policy and institutional arrangements for cooperation in Climate change and transboundary water resources conflicts in Africa Workshop Report 29-30 September 2009, p 29-38.

19 Lumumba, P.L.O. 2007. The Interpretation of the 1929 Treaty and its Legal Relevance and Implications for the Stability of the Region. *African Sociological Review* 11, 1, p. 10-24.

Deng, B.K. 2007. Cooperation between Egypt and Sudan over the Nile River Waters: The Challenges of Duality. *African Sociological Review* 11, 1, p. 38-62.

20 Deng, B.K. 2007. Cooperation between Egypt and Sudan over the Nile River Waters: The Challenges of Duality. *African Sociological Review* 11, 1, p. 44.

21 Idem, p. 45.

would build the Roseires Dam on the Blue Nile.<sup>22</sup> Egypt developed a strategy of interference and even destabilisation in Sudan to make sure that its rights to the Nile waters remained unaffected.

*The Hala'ib triangle and access to the Red Sea*

Another illustration of the ambivalent relation between Egypt and Sudan is the issue of the Hala'ib triangle which touches upon the second pillar of Egyptian Foreign Policy: access to the Red Sea. The Hala'ib triangle on Egypt's south-eastern border with Sudan has been the subject of a border dispute between Egypt and Sudan in relation to access to the Red Sea and oil. In 1899 the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement for Sudan set the border between Egypt and Sudan at the 22nd degree of latitude. However, in 1902, for administrative convenience, Britain drew a separate "administrative boundary" under which a triangle of land north of the parallel was placed under Sudanese administration because it was more easily reached from Sudan. This was an "administrative" rather than a sovereign boundary. In 1958 Egyptian President Nasser sent troops into the disputed region. The reason behind this move was Nasser's resentment of the Umma Party's policies and his desire to teach Prime Minister Khalil a lesson. Abdalla Khalil rejected Nasser's notion of pan-Arab unity, as well as his notion of "positive neutrality" and supported the Eisenhower Doctrine and made the Sudan allies with the United States. Matters deteriorated as troops massed on both sides of the border, at which point Khalil warned Nasser that he would complain to the Security Council.

Finally, Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub (Mahgoub), then Sudan's minister of foreign affairs, convinced Nasser to defuse the conflict by warning Egypt's president that the Hala'ib issue would unite all of Sudan against Egypt and Nasser withdrew his troops.<sup>23</sup>

In 1978 Texas Eastern discovered small quantities of crude oil in the region. The American company obtained a concession in the Red Sea region, which included Hala'ib, under Numayri's military rule. The Egyptian government warned Texas Eastern that its concession included Egyptian territory north of latitude 22 and thus it required Egyptian approval if it wanted to pursue its search in that region. A crisis was only averted by an agreement between Presidents Numayri and Anwar as-Sadat, in which they permitted Texas Eastern to pursue its search throughout the concession area on the condition that should oil be discovered north of latitude 22, Egypt would get its share.<sup>24</sup> No commercial quantities of natural gas or oil were found.

Egypt protested again, when in January 1992, Sudan granted a Canadian company oil exploration rights in the waters off the Hala'ib triangle. Negotiations began, and the Canadian company pulled out of the deal until sovereignty was settled. Egyptian border troops now occupy positions in the Hala'ib triangle. Egypt insists that the presence of its forces in the disputed region is natural,

<sup>22</sup> Idem, p. 50.

<sup>23</sup> Warburg, G. 1994. Hot Spot: Egypt and Sudan Wrangle over Halayib. Middle East Quarterly 1,1 <http://www.meforum.org/218/hot-spot-egypt-and-sudan-wrangle-over-halayib>

<sup>24</sup> Idem

since it is Egyptian territory. Sudanese statements suggest that Egyptian forces have penetrated slightly beyond the 22nd parallel, the internationally recognised boundary which Egypt claims.<sup>25</sup> On 9 December 2009 the Sudanese presidential assistant Musa Mohamed Ahmed publicly stated, after being stopped by the Egyptian military, that he was visiting the area to support the troops in the triangle. This was the first time that a Sudanese official had acknowledged the fact that the Sudanese military was present in the Hala'ib triangle.<sup>26</sup>

#### *The 1994 assassination attempt on Egyptian President Mubarak*

The 1994 assassination attempt on Egyptian President Mubarak during the OAU Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, further deteriorated the relations between Egypt and Sudan. Egyptian Muslim Fundamentalist groups were behind the attempt on his life, in collaboration with Sudanese security forces supported by the National Islamic Front (NIF). Their leader Dr. Hassan El Turabi admitted to master-minding the coup and stated that a number of these security elements had to be eliminated to bury evidence of the involvement of the Sudanese government.<sup>27</sup> Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia all accuse Sudan of training and arming Islamic extremists from their countries in an attempt to subvert their existing governments.<sup>28</sup>

The mutual attempts to undertake destabilisation strategies between Egypt and Sudan are an illustration of the complexity and fragility of the political playing field of the Nile basin in which they are perceived as partners. These examples of mutual subversion understate the importance of understanding the political economy of these constantly evolving relations and the implications for the region of the Horn of Africa.

#### ***Political economy of the Nile: Egypt and Ethiopia***

In this section I shall argue why there is a fundamental shift in the relationship between Egypt and Ethiopia that might prove fundamental for the future power relations in the Horn of Africa.

#### *From destabilisation to cooperation*

Historically Egypt's foreign policy has been shaped by the hydro-politics of the Nile and the access to the Red Sea. The Blue Nile is of crucial importance to Egypt because it is the source of more than 85% of the River Nile's water. In line with Egypt's policy towards Sudan, Egypt asserted that it should be strong enough either to dominate Ethiopia, or to create the conditions to prevent the latter from building dams on the Blue Nile. In addition to that Egypt occupied

<sup>25</sup> Dunn, M.C. 1993. Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia Accuse Sudan, as Halaib Dispute Flares Up Washington Report on Middle East Affairs p. 33 <http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/0293/9302033.htm>

<sup>26</sup> Egypt bars Sudanese official from entering disputed border region: report Sudan Tribune 10 December 2009. <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article33415>

<sup>27</sup> Deng, B.K. 2007. Cooperation between Egypt and Sudan over the Nile River Waters: The Challenges of Duality. *African Sociological Review* 11, 1, p. 53.

<sup>28</sup> Dunn, M.C. 1993. Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia Accuse Sudan, as Halaib Dispute Flares Up Washington Report on Middle East Affairs p. 33 <http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/0293/9302033.htm>



certain parts of what was to become Eritrea as proof of historical legitimacy, and has instigated the Arab League, as early as 1945, to declare its intention to put Eritrea under the Trusteeship of the Arab nations. Egypt also played a crucial role in the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea by providing access to education at the Al Azar University in Cairo for Eritrean students, opening training camps near Alexandria. As a result, the political strife that Egypt instigated forced Ethiopia to divert scarce resources from development into security and defence.<sup>29</sup>

For Egyptian President Gamal Nasser this strategy even had a personal side to it. He had contacts with the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie when he was stationed in Sudan from 1938 to 1941 as an Egyptian army officer. After Gamal Nasser took power in 1952, he extended several official invitations to Haile Selassie to visit Egypt. The Emperor repeatedly declined his offers cordially. In December 1956 the tone changed and the Emperor instructed his ambassador to the Sudan, Melesse Andom, to discuss these invitations in the framework of Nasser's further ambitions on Nile Valley unity with the President.<sup>30</sup> Melesse Andom did not mince words:

"You claim to be an Arab and to lead the Arab world, but you interfere in the affairs of your Arab neighbours, and have tried to cause trouble for the Governments of Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, and the Sudan. We Ethiopians do not belong to your world, although like you we drink of the water of the Nile. You have military objectives. We do not know exactly what they may be, but we have no confidence in the strength of your armed forces."<sup>31</sup>

After this indirect confrontation with Emperor Selassie, President Nasser appears to have begun his effort to undermine and to destabilise Ethiopia. Egypt has never publicly admitted that one of its foreign policy objectives was and continues to be the destabilisation of Ethiopia.<sup>32</sup>

This policy might have shifted because Egypt had to adapt to the political realities in the Horn. Egypt remains a key state in the Horn of Africa and in the Middle East, but its regional influence is declining despite its impressive diplomatic network and strong rhetoric.<sup>33</sup> Egypt's African neighbours are becoming an increasing concern: the future of Sudan has become uncertain with the upcoming referendum in the South and Somalia has been a continuous issue on the international agenda. Ethiopia might become one of Egypt's preferred partners in the region, despite fundamental differences between the two countries regarding the management of the Blue Nile.

After the third Ethiopian-Egyptian joint Ministerial meeting from 26 to 29 March 2010, Egypt and Ethiopia signed a Memorandum of Understanding. The Ethiopian Foreign Affairs Minister Seyoum Mesfin and his Egyptian counterpart Ahmed Aboul Gheit stressed the importance of the economic relationship between the two countries and they reinforced the image of each other's regional leader-

<sup>29</sup> Kendie D. 1999. *Hydro-politics of the Blue Nile River*. *Northeast African Studies* 6.1-2, p.141-169

<sup>30</sup> Idem p. 153-154.

<sup>31</sup> Erlich, H. 1994. *Ethiopia and the Middle East*, Lynne Rienner Press: Boulder.

<sup>32</sup> Interviews with diplomatic sources on 19 October 2010.

<sup>33</sup> Idem.

ship in the Horn of Africa. They stated the desire to develop their relations beyond the issue of the Nile River and stressed the immediate need for focused and concrete action by the international community to support the TFG and its institutions. According to Egypt and Ethiopia, the Djibouti Peace Process is the only viable option to bring lasting peace, security and stability in Somalia. They also expressed their commitment to continue to support the efforts of the Sudanese parties in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the important role of Ethiopia in its implementation through its presidency of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development.<sup>34</sup>

On 14 May 2010 Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda signed a new Nile Treaty to replace the Water Agreement of 1959 between Egypt and Sudan that excluded the other riparian states. The basis for the new agreement is the equitable use of the Nile waters without prejudicing other riparian states. The upstream countries want to be able to implement irrigation and hydropower projects in consultation with Egypt and Sudan, but without Cairo being entitled to exercise the veto power it was given by the 1929 colonial-era treaty with Britain.<sup>35</sup> The new deal would need at least six signatories to come into force. Kenya has indicated it would be coming on board soon.<sup>36</sup> DRC and Burundi may soon follow suit, but Egypt and Sudan have so far refused to give up the previous arrangement which gave them the lion's share of the river's flow.<sup>37</sup> Burundi is taking its time to sign the agreement because it might be able to bring the dithering parties together. It was not able to attend the signing in Entebbe due to its election obligations. Egypt is using its diplomatic network to the fullest to try to prevent Burundi from signing the new treaty. The DRC remains absent from the discussions.<sup>38</sup>

It is noteworthy that Egypt's public rhetoric has toned down. Although it condemned the signing of the new treaty and fights it, Egypt's Minister for Legal Affairs Mufid Shehab was quoted by state media as saying "We do not want to view it as a destructive act, but we view it as a mistaken action and we should stop it."<sup>39</sup> This statement is a long way from the threats of war made in the past and although Egypt's informal language in diplomatic circles remains bullish, it cannot adopt the hegemonic role it once did in relation to these countries.

On 7 July 2010 Egypt and Ethiopia had a meeting on the Cooperative Framework Agreement of the Nile Basin Initiative and both countries reaffirmed, just like in their statement of the 30 March 2010, that they would strengthen their ties despite their differences over the Nile. Both parties stated that "This is a work in progress and we are hoping that we would continue negotiation to bridge the gap that exists in different capitals... because it is possible to achieve a win-win scenario."<sup>40</sup>

34 Ethiopia, Egypt signs diverse cooperation agreements ENA 30 March 2010 <http://www.ethiopian-news.com/ethiopia-egypt-sign-diverse-cooperation-agreements/>

35 Ethiopia, Egypt vow to strengthen ties despite Nile differences 9 July 2010 <http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article35608>

36 Four African countries sign new Nile treaty AFP 14 May 2010 [http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/AleqM5jGGOTBz\\_8m8-Udatx2YtFswhpBTQ](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/AleqM5jGGOTBz_8m8-Udatx2YtFswhpBTQ)

37 Egypt, Sudan won't be forced to sign Nile treaty: officials AFP 27 June 2010 [http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/AleqM5jgR0oQRil\\_pJMHYBTjia4x60ih6g](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/AleqM5jgR0oQRil_pJMHYBTjia4x60ih6g)

38 Interviews with diplomatic sources on 28 September and 19 October 2010.

39 Four African countries sign new Nile treaty AFP 14 May 2010 [http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/AleqM5jGGOTBz\\_8m8-Udatx2YtFswhpBTQ](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/AleqM5jGGOTBz_8m8-Udatx2YtFswhpBTQ)

40 Ethiopia, Egypt vow to strengthen ties despite Nile differences 9 July 2010 <http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article35608>

The win–win scenario in the power relations between Egypt and Ethiopia might be as follows: the 7 July meeting between Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abou Al–Gheit and Minister of International Cooperation Faiza Abou Al–Naga on the Nile Basin Initiative came shortly after Meles Zenawi's re–election on the 23 May. That was not a coincidence. The Ethiopian Prime Minister's party – Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) – won and confirmed his position as the strong man in Ethiopia and the region.<sup>41</sup> This was despite the fact that EU observers said that the elections fell short of international standards.<sup>42</sup> Egypt is strengthening its ties with Ethiopia because it fears the evolution on its borders in Sudan and Somalia and needs a stable partner in the region. The second reason for the growing entente between Egypt and Ethiopia is the upcoming parliamentary and Presidential elections in Egypt. Egypt will need regional support, while Ethiopia has just survived a heavily contested election result. Therefore, at this point in time both countries might have found their win–win scenario.

An analysis of the relations between three of the ten countries of the Nile Basin Initiative is sufficient to clearly show that if a structural solution for the management of the waters of the Nile basin is to be found – and the influence of climate change makes this even more pressing – any proposal put forward will have to deal with the constantly evolving political relations between the riparian states.

## Conclusions

- There is a need for more in–depth analysis of the decision–making processes to uncover the drivers and dynamics within the African Union and African regional institutions. Especially since there are potential differences of interest between oil–producing countries, different (sub–) regions, middle–income countries, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs), Least Developed Countries (LDCs). What are the factors of consensus and divergence in the African institutional decision–making processes?
- This analysis of the African institutional decision–making processes could be beneficial for the EU–Africa Partnership's common agenda activities to help them guide the enhancement capacities of African negotiators.
- Policy makers and the donor community should be aware of the possibility of political (ab)use of climate change by political elites to avoid their responsibilities on issues such as: good governance, poverty eradication and capacity building.
- If the relationship between the EU and Africa is to change, these political realities must be taken into account across all policy areas.
- Future development cooperation should take the political economy of their partner countries into account to be more efficient and effective.

<sup>41</sup> Meles Zenawi's party 'heads for Ethiopia election win' BBC News 24 May 2010 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10150894>

<sup>42</sup> EU observers say Ethiopia election 'falls short' BBC News 25 May 2010 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10153216>



## An EARN Proposal on the Joint Africa–EU Strategy and the Future of Africa–EU Relations<sup>1</sup>

# Agenda for Action

### 1. The Joint Africa–EU Strategy: What has been achieved and what next?

The 3rd Summit of African and EU Heads of State and Government organised in Tripoli (Libya, 29–30 November 2010) provides an opportunity to assess progress with the Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES) since the last Summit in 2007. The JAES remains an **innovative framework for a more comprehensive and deeper partnership** between Africa and the EU, but only if each of the parties is clear about the set of priorities that should guide their process of engagement in the partnership. It can then provide a unique perspective to overcome the traditional donor–recipient relationship and to reinforce political dialogue at a continental level on all thematic areas of common interest to Africa and Europe.

Three years is clearly too short a period to assess the results of this ambitious framework and to ensure full ownership by the various stakeholders in both Africa and Europe. It is recognised that dialogue and cooperation have improved in key areas such as Peace and Security and in some relatively new areas such as Climate Change, Energy and Science, Information Society and Space. This enhanced dialogue has been realised through more regular Commission-to-Commission meetings, Troika Ministerial and technical experts meetings, while the establishment of a strong EU Delegation to the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa has helped to intensify discussions between both Unions. The AU is increasingly taking up its continental mandate, which is also reflected in the progress on pan-African architectures on Peace and Security and on Governance.

However, much remains to be done. On the African side, the AU Commission mandate is too restricted to lead a supranational agenda, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) too little involved in shaping continental policy positions, non-state actors not enough consulted, and AU Member States decisions still very weakly, if at all, taken in light of common continental interests. On the EU side, Member States involvement remains weak; common interests sometimes unclear; and EU's negotiating attitude and agenda setting is often perceived by many African partners as led by a greedy and patronising attitude rather than a real commitment to a partnership of equals and to jointly working together on matters of common concern.

As independent analysis by members of the Europe–Africa Policy Research Network (EARN) and invited experts point out, **the partnership risks becoming estranged from its political content**. There is a tendency to adopt rather technocratic approaches to some of the contentious political issues between Africa and the EU. While it cannot be denied that more interaction through consultation and exchange has taken place, Europe and Africa have not addressed sufficiently or frankly divergences of views on major aspects of the partnership. In this context it is rather surprising that the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), a major contentious issue in the relationship between Europe and Africa in the last few years, has not been formally integrated into the JAES. Europe and Africa have also adopted different positions on climate change such as at the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, and major differences exist on other crucial issues such as migration, peace and security, governance and human rights and EU–Africa cooperation in other global fora.

<sup>1</sup> Elaborated jointly by IEEI, ECDPM and SAIIA, respectively chair and co-chairs of EARN and responsible for the EARN Working Group on Global Issues.

Failure to address sensitive issues and to confront the inevitable differences of perspective and diverse interests risks undermining the political relevance of the JAES. What is needed right now is a solid political economy analysis that would allow for a **closer understanding of the drivers and dynamics** of European and African partners' concrete interests and a **constructive, open debate at the highest political level** in both continents on credible compromises on all those issues that are of common concern.

It is against this background that EARN proposes an Agenda for Action for the future of EU–Africa relations, based on the collective analysis and discussions between African and European policy researchers during the last EARN meeting in Praia (Cape Verde), officially recognised as a side event to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Africa–EU Summit. It is hoped that the EARN recommendations will now be taken into consideration in the discussions during the upcoming Africa–EU Summit, and in the follow-up of the Summit and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Action Plan of the Joint Africa–EU strategy.

## 2. Crosscutting challenges to change the culture of the partnership

EARN strongly recommends the following steps to revitalise the JAES:

- **Expand the dialogue** by including the contentious issues between both parties on the agenda. This implies amongst others that EPAs, which have been the most controversial issue between both continents in the past decade, should be an integral part of the dialogue.
- **Improve the dialogue** by ensuring that it is a dialogue of political equals and that contentious issues are not discussed only at a lower technocratic level (e.g. migration), but at the highest political level too. This implies a higher level Ministerial political dialogue on specific thematic issues on the basis of well prepared agendas and with equitable outcomes that reflect the spirit of partnership between Africa and Europe.
- **Improve the analysis of the political economy**, the various interests at stake and the drivers who can move the process on both continents.
- **Move beyond development aid** as the focus of the relationship. This can be done by mainstreaming crosscutting issues like climate change adaptation, energy sustainability and migration that are traditionally excluded from the EU's development approach to Africa. It also requires extending the political dialogue to EU member-states and non-development cooperation departments in the European Commission (e.g. justice and home affairs, environment and energy) so as to ensure that the partnership overcomes the traditional donor-recipient dichotomy and becomes effectively more oriented towards working jointly through common concerns.
- **Reinforce the political dialogue** between the EU and Africa on issues of common interest **in multilateral fora** by focusing on a better understanding of what drives their respective positions. That would facilitate building common ground or identifying specific issues where consensus and a joint positioning is possible, and thus help move the debate forward.
- **Clarify** unambiguously the relationship and **complementarity** between the JAES, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, and the Union for the Mediterranean – this requires action from both European and African actors.
- **Increase the levels of participation and ownership** of other African and European stake-

holders (e.g. national governments and parliaments, RECs, economic and social actors, civil society, media, research community, etc) by providing more incentives and opportunities to engage in the JAES process. If the JAES Action Plan is more directly linked to the development plans and respective interests of African and European countries and regions, it can promote greater participation and sense of ‘ownership’ of the process. However, it is unlikely that the Action Plan can capture such interests without more actively incorporating and encouraging the participation of key actors outside the pan–African and European institutional actors and structures.

- **Address the asymmetry in the partnership** by strengthening legitimate and capable African institutions at pan–African and regional levels, and by focused capacity building initiatives. Cooperating as equal partners in a strategic relationship is only possible if persistent capacity gaps are recognised and addressed up–front.
- **Ensure joint responsibility for mobilising and for adapting the necessary financial means** to realise the JAES’ ambitious objectives, i.e.: African partners mobilising more of their own resources; the EU rationalising its various financial instruments, each with its different regulations, dealing with Africa (e.g. European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, European Development Fund). However, both parties should avoid the relationship becoming focused only on issues of financial instruments and volume of resources.
- The best **communication** strategy for the partnership will be it delivering concrete results that in themselves gather attention. Yet some investment in an active communication and information strategy on the JAES through the involvement of media and other stakeholders in both continents could be beneficial. Such a strategy will bear better results if the above–mentioned crosscutting challenges are adequately addressed.

### 3. Policy oriented recommendations in key thematic areas of the JAES

EARN also makes the following specific recommendations on some thematic issues in the JAES: (1) Peace and Security, (2) Global Governance, (3) Trade and Regional Integration, and (4) Climate Change.

#### 3.1 Peace and Security

- **Engage in an open dialogue at national, regional and continental level**, as appropriate, on European and African security interests, priorities and expectations, and acknowledge differences where they exist. A clear understanding of those differences, including in approaches to security, may allow for an identification of shared security threats and approaches that combine African and European ways and means, and constitute a more solid basis to build an effective dialogue and partnership within and between Africa and Europe.
- **Confirm the value of each other’s contribution** to address their respective security priorities. That may also benefit dialogue and cooperation with other multilateral actors (e.g. UN, NATO, AFRICOM), including for the support of the African Peace and Security Architecture.
- **Improve coordination and harmonisation of national positions on both sides** to ensure more coherent and effective EU–Africa cooperation. On the EU side, the European External Action Service, once operational, and the EU delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa can play a constructive role in co–ordinating European common defence and security policy positions

and initiatives, and could provide a more robust platform to follow up on objectives already articulated in the peace and security partnership.

- **Jointly ensure predictable and sustainable funding for African peace operations**, including from African sources. Look to unblock the issue of sustainable funding through assessed UN contributions by having engagement at the highest political level.
- **Look beyond African peace and security issues**. If the peace and security partnership between the EU and Africa is meant to encompass global security concerns, its focus should not be limited to African security problems alone.

### 3.2 Global Governance

- Devote greater effort to **unpacking and openly discussing principles, values and fundamental action points for a more representative international governance system** that all key players within Africa, Europe and beyond can agree to.
- **Work towards internal coherence of positions in multilateral fora** as Europe and Africa (including agreement on collective representation).
- **Explore practical ways in which Africa and the EU can better coordinate and converge positions**. Namely, the upcoming G20 meeting in Seoul in November and the Cancun Summit on climate change in December are opportunities for Africa and the EU to both consolidate their internal positions as a group, and identify areas of consensus. For that purpose and as a confidence building measure, the EU should liaise with South Africa and the Committee of Ten on their positions on African issues before the Seoul G20 Summit.
- The EU could push for **reform of the International Finance Institutions** (IMF and World Bank) and use its stronger leverage and presence in the G-20 (where the EU and Member States have a quarter of the seats) to support Africa's proposals.

### 3.3 Trade and Regional Integration

- Use the JAES to **expose and address incoherencies in European and African approaches to regional integration, trade and development**. The Partnership on Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure (TRII) should be given the chance to help clarify the links and complementarity between bilateral trade agreements, existing processes at sub-regional level – including the EPAs and the Union for the Mediterranean – and the activities carried out at the continental level within the JAES framework. The JAES could facilitate meetings across regions to exchange views on progress in EPA negotiations and in other regional processes, on best practice in assessment needs and on identification of regional complementarities.
- The 2nd Action Plan of the JAES should include a clear commitment to **better integrate the EPA agenda** with the development plans and the regional integration processes in Africa, recognising and respecting the diversity of situations and interests across African countries. A first step would be to conduct an objective assessment about what kind of EPA can most effectively support regional integration and development objectives of specific countries and regions, and which EPA provisions risk undermining them. That also implies African countries are clear about their development strategy and level of ambition for their regional integration agenda.



- **Re-programme and align the different EU resources with the objectives of the JAES.** The mid-term reviews of the European Development Fund (EDF) and European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument provide an opportunity to do so, if jointly agreed by the EU EDF Committee and the ACP Committee of Ambassadors.

### 3.4 Climate Change

- **Mainstream climate change adaptation** into policy thinking and planning through all pillars of the JAES in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Action Plan, and particularly into development policies. That could be best done through climate change adaptation projects at grassroots level, which are really about development cooperation, and thus bring the impact of the JAES closer to the people.
- **Co-ordinate positions** on broader areas such as global responsibility for climate change, differentiated responsibility according to a country's capacity, the 2° C threshold, increased adaptation financing, etc. That would lay the basis for a possible joint position at the December 2010 Climate Change Summit in Cancun and/or the 2011 Conference of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in South Africa.
- **Mobilise new additional resources for adaptation financing**, primarily for those countries most vulnerable to the impact of climate change, and improve transparency over the amount, the delivery mechanism, and the sector focus of such funding in line with the Copenhagen agreement. Channelling such funding through an existing UN mechanism (e.g. the UNFCCC Adaptation Fund or the Least Developed Countries Fund of the Kyoto Protocol) could help address and respond to some of these concerns.
- **Support the development of institutional, negotiating and technical capacities in Africa on climate change** (e.g. surveillance and monitoring, accurate climate data and information, etc) and encourage existing initiatives (e.g. AMCEN, CAHOSCC) that focus on strengthening the resilience of African societies, particularly those dependent on natural resources for their livelihood.
- **Promote more collaboration between developing countries** and sharing of experiences on climate change mitigation and adaptation through existing policy frameworks (e.g. JAES, Cotonou agreement) among Least Developed Countries, small islands states and other vulnerable developing countries, including how to integrate this critical dimension for resilience into development plans.



**ACRONYMS**

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States	GCCA	Global Climate Change Alliance
AFRICOM	United States Africa Command	GDP	Gross Domestic Product
AfT	Aid for Trade	GSP	Generalised System of Preferences
AMCEN	African Ministerial Conference on Environment	HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi	HR	EU's High Representative
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan	IBSA	India, Brazil, South Africa
AMISEC	African Union Mission in the Comoros	ICC	International Criminal Court
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia	IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
ANC	African National Congress	IMF	International Monetary Fund
APSA	African peace and security architecture	IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ASF	African Standby Force	JAES	Joint Africa–EU Strategy
ASG	Assistant Secretary–General	JEG	Joint Expert Group
AU	African Union	LDC	Least Developed Countries
AUC	Africa Union Commission	MDG	Millennium Development Goals
BRICS	Brazil, China, India and South Africa	MEDA	Mediterranean Economic Development Area
CAHOSCC	Conference of African Heads of States and Government on Climate Change	MICOPAX	Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic
CET	Common External Tariff	MIP	Minimum Integration Programme
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System	NAM	Non–Aligned Movement
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy	NAPA	National Adaptation Programme for Action
COPS	EU Political & Security Committee	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
CPA	Cotonou Partnership Agreement	NEPAD	New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development
CSO	Civil Society Organisation	NGO	Non–Governmental Organisation
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration	ODA	Official Development Assistance
DGDEV	Directorate–General for Development, European Commission	OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo	PCRD	Post–Conflict Reconstruction and Development
EAC	East African Community	PRC	Permanent Representative Council (Africa)
EBA	Everything But Arms	PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
EC	European Commission	PSC	Peace and Security Council (African Union)
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States	REC	Regional Economic Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	SADC	Southern African Development Community
EDF	European Development Fund	SIDS	Small Island Developing States
EEAS	European External Action Service	SSR	Security Sector Reform
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy	TRII	Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument	UN	United Nations
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement	UNAMID	African Union – United Nations Mission in Darfur
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front	UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
ESA	Eastern and Southern Africa	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy	UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
EUFOR	European Union Force	UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
FOMUC	Multinational Force in the Central African Republic	UNOAU	United Nations Office to the African Union
FTA	Free Trade Area	UNSC	United Nations Security Council
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade	US	United States
		WB	World Bank
		WBGU	German Advisory Council on Global Change
		WTO	World Trade Organisation

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## ABOUT EARN

**EARN** is the acronym for *Europe–Africa Policy Research Network*. It is a non-governmental initiative from a group of African and European Institutes, Centres and Networks aiming to contribute to the *EU–Africa Political Dialogue*. It was launched in Lisbon, at the eve of the 2<sup>nd</sup> European Union–Africa Summit of Heads of State and Government and its governance bodies decided in Brussels on April 2008.

The *vision* of the network is of an effective political dialogue between Europe and Africa to help increase relations, to face common challenges and to foster peaceful and sustainable development in both continents. Its *mission* is to contribute to these goals by strengthening Euro–African partnerships among non-governmental actors, through networking, joint activities and development of knowledge and institutional capacities. *Objectives* are set around political dialogue on common concerns which arise from bilateral relations as well as from global or local challenges on various fields.

The *membership criteria* defines EARN as a group of European and African non-governmental organisations, with intellectual and operational independence, coming from a broad range of fields – academic, development, humanitarian, political, security – in order to allow diverse perspectives based on updated and accurate information. It also calls for track expertise and active participation on activities, and members are asked to pay for its own expenses of involvement on network activities.

The *added value* of EARN results not only from its goals, composition and outputs, but also from its focus and approach. *Focus* is on challenges that affect both continents, in order to increase reciprocal awareness of realities and to foster debate on common concerns and possible answers, avoiding donor–recipient or recipient–donor attitudes. *Approach* is policy-oriented in order to inform the public opinion and the decision-makers on analysis and proposals from non-governmental actors. The approach is also on building working partnerships of African and European institutions.

The *governance* of the network is headed by a *steering committee* of 9 members, chaired by the Lisbon Institute for Strategic and International Studies, (IEEI) and co-chaired by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) and the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). A *coordination team* gives support to the network. Some *Working Groups* were already established: global issues; peace & security; governance; trade & regional integration; poverty reduction & development. EARN is interested in a number of Partnership Actions envisaged in the Joint Africa–EU Strategy and Plan of Action. However, its activities will also cut across various fields of common interest, allowing for more global and non-sector based approaches.

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Africa and Europe have committed themselves, at the II EU–Africa Summit in 2007, to build a **new strategic political partnership** for the future, overcoming the traditional donor–recipient relationship and addressing issues of common concern that would go “beyond development” and “beyond Africa”. The challenges to global development are currently complex and multidimensional, including security and conflict issues, climate change, food security challenges, energy sustainability, migration issues, reforming global governance structures, amongst others. Are these challenges being effectively addressed by the EU–Africa dialogue? What are the main achievements and difficulties ahead in implementing the Joint Africa–EU Strategy? What is the added–value and what are the opportunities for Europe and Africa in the context of global interdependence and the emergence of new governance and aid players?

**The Europe–Africa Policy Research Network (EARN)** is a network of African and European Policy Research Institutes, aiming to contribute to the EU–Africa Policy Dialogue. EARN intends to bring added value on pooling and fostering policy research capacities, dialogue, information and partnership between European and African nongovernmental research institutions on issues relating to EU–Africa relations.

For more information on EARN see:

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