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# DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY IN THE BARCELONA PROCESS

PAST EXPERIENCES, FUTURE PROSPECTS

ROBERTO ALIBONI, ROSA BALFOUR,  
LAURA GUAZZONE, TOBIAS SCHUMACHER

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**BY ROBERTO ALIBONI, ROSA BALFOUR, LAURA GUAZZONE, TOBIAS SCHUMACHER**

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## Preface

This IAI Paper includes the proceedings of the closing seminar on the “Search for Common Ground in the Euro-Med Partnership” organized by the IAI-AEI Working Group within the 2001-03 EuroMeSCo cycle of activities supported by the EU Commission.

In 2001-03, the Working Group investigated the concept of security in the framework of the Barcelona process and a number of related key issues, such as democracy, human rights, security governance, the rule of law, ownership, and others, with a view to attaining a common language in the process.

The seminar focused on the question of democracy in the current experience of the Euro-Med Partnership and in the perspective of both the new EU neighbourhood policy and transatlantic relations.

The first panel took into consideration the broad question of the nexus between security and democracy set out as a principal mover of the Euro-Med process since its inception; it debated the lessons learned and where the process is expected to go from here.

The second panel also dealt with the future of the Barcelona process by considering, however, the new policy the EU is setting up under the label of “Neighbourhood”. This policy will include the members of the EMP in the same circle as a number of Eastern European countries. It remains to be seen what the impact on EMP countries will be. Democracy will, in any case, be an important benchmark in the new “neighbourhood” relations.

The third panel addressed a key question in the current debate between the West and the Arab-Muslim area after the occupation of Iraq: What debate is there on democracy in the Arab countries?

The fourth panel discussed the ways in which the EMP has contributed to promoting democracy in its own framework, the lessons learned and the prospects for the future.

The EMP experience in promoting democracy in the Southern Mediterranean is of significance for the future of the EU policy towards the Mediterranean as well as for the future of transatlantic cooperation towards the broader area of the Middle East and North Africa. The EMP and the US-led initiatives towards this broader area could prove helpful to one another. For this reason the seminar dealt with both the European and the transatlantic perspective.

# 1. Democracy and Security in the Mediterranean: Recent Policy Developments<sup>1</sup>

Rosa Balfour

## 1. Introduction

September 11, continuing war in Iraq, the proliferation and expansion of terrorist activities also to the Arab and Muslim countries, have helped capture a growing attention of the international community towards issues relating to the transformation of security challenges and the democratic deficit in the Mediterranean and Middle East. The question of democracy and human rights in the Arab and Muslim world suddenly became a subject matter of political speeches, even from unexpected quarters, and often tied to security concerns within the region as well as for the West, leading to a number of initiatives and declarations stemming from the EU, the US as well as the Arab world. It is worth asking whether they represent a departure from the current state of the art, and thus have the potential to contribute to reform, or whether they more modestly attempt to refashion existing policies towards the region. To what extent is this apparent shift towards a greater *political* understanding of the nexus between democracy and security translated into actual *policies*?

The starting point, however, must be to ask ourselves what the relationship between democracy and security in the Mediterranean is, if there is one, before moving onto discussing how these issues are dealt with in the Barcelona process in principle and in practice, arguing that there has been a gap between the framework and its practical application. I will then briefly examine the most recent developments in the fields of security and of democracy promotion and question whether these are going in the direction of tying security and democracy together. Despite the rhetoric, there appears to be an increasing decoupling of security and democracy accentuated by the ‘securitisation’ of international terrorism,<sup>2</sup> which has a negative impact on any efforts to promote democracy in Mediterranean countries and is in conflict with Barcelona’s ‘holistic’ set up.

## 2. Understanding the ties between democracy and security

Among the most prominent security concerns for all the governments in the Mediterranean are Islamic fundamentalism and, more dramatically since September 11, terrorist groups that are proliferating and acting in its name. The governing elites in the Southern Mediterranean have been using the fear of a rise in Islamic fundamentalism as a standard justification for the ‘democratic deficit’ in North Africa and the Middle East.

<sup>1</sup> This paper draws on Rosa Balfour, ‘Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue’, *Occasional Papers*, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, June 2004.

<sup>2</sup> Annette Jünemann, ‘Security Building in the Mediterranean after September 11’, in Annette Jünemann (eds.), *Euro-Mediterranean Relations after September 11. International, Regional and Domestic Dynamics*, London: Frank Cass, 2003, pp. 1-20.

Permanent states of emergency have been maintained and restrictions of freedom of expression and association have been pursued in the name of the fight against terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. The fear is that political liberalisation and free elections would lead to a transfer of power to non-democratic and anti-Western groups, thus undermining the stability of relations between the North and South of the Mediterranean. For these reasons, European governments have so far been very sensitive to this argument; indeed Islamic fundamentalism has often been used as a successful alibi for maintenance of the status quo.

But if one tries to look at the root causes of Islamic fundamentalism, it appears that it stems from disaffection with the governing elites and with their ability to perpetuate their hold on power, and from the lack of political integration and participation.<sup>3</sup> In other words, a vicious circle has been perpetuating itself in the Middle East and North Africa: the democratic deficit is one of the root causes of fundamentalism, the consequences of which are perceived as the main security concern; non-democratic governments stay in power justified by the fear of a rise in fundamentalism, but they maintain the democratic deficit that is amongst the causes of extremism.

This vicious circle illustrates one of the ways in which democracy and security are intertwined, providing a rationale in favour of EU policies that take into account this pattern of authoritarianism.

Tying the right to security of individuals and societies to the broader security framework was a theoretical innovation in the international practice of human rights promotion that developed in the European context under the aegis of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and its Helsinki Process. The EC/EU, during the 1990s took on board the CSCE notion of the 'human dimension' of security whereby 'full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the development of societies based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are prerequisites for progress in setting up the lasting order of peace, security, justice and cooperation'<sup>4</sup> a notion which can be found in many of the EU's external policies, from the stabilisation of the Balkans to conflict prevention.

The Barcelona process too rests on the principle that the most secure environment that states can produce is one based on democracy – the liberal principle that the EU itself embodies. It is also based on an understanding that the risks stemming from the Mediterranean region, such as the consequences of underdevelopment, social and demographic change, migration, fall in the category of 'soft security'. The methods of partnership building, multilateral cooperation, institutionalising relations, are considered as the best means to create a secure environment. The Euro-Med Partnership (EMP) process also attempts to embrace a vast number of issues, from development to economic reform, security and human rights. In other words, a 'comprehensive security' framework coupled with a 'global approach' in terms of policies have been amongst the key words of the Barcelona

<sup>3</sup> See for instance George Joffé, 'The Islamist Threat to Egypt', *The Middle East and North Africa*, London: Europa Publications, 1996, pp. 3-10; Michael Patrick Tkacik, 'Democratization and Islam: Towards the Creation of a User-Friendly Environment', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Spring 1999, pp. 136-162; Chartouni-Dubarry, 'Political Transition in the Middle East' and Gema Martin-Muñoz, 'Political Reform and Social Change in the Maghreb', in Álvaro Vasconcelos and George Joffé (eds.), *The Barcelona Process. Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community*, Special Issue of *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 96-130.

<sup>4</sup> Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Document of the Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 1990, downloadable from [www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/hd/cope90e.pdf](http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/hd/cope90e.pdf).

process. These concepts seemed to provide the most appropriate framework in which security and democracy can be treated as aspects of the same problem. In the Declaration's words, they represent the means through which the Mediterranean basin could be transformed into 'an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity' requiring, among other things, 'the strengthening of democracy and human rights'.<sup>5</sup>

Other recent EU documents suggest that democracy and human rights – alongside with development - were beginning to be taken more seriously even in the security and political domains because 'authoritarianism and poor economic and social performance favour political marginalisation and provide fuel for radical movements and violence'.<sup>6</sup> The 'European Security Strategy' too,<sup>7</sup> which is supposed to focus on the Mediterranean and the Middle East as one of its priority areas,<sup>8</sup> confirms the link between democracy and security, and the joint Commission-Council Secretariat paper on strengthening relations with the Arab world suggests that the combination of the top-down and bottom-up approaches need to be strengthened through a 'firm and frank' political dialogue and by identifying partners at different levels to build a dialogue with civil society.<sup>9</sup> Finally, the recent 'EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East confirms that the 'primary political concerns for the European Union involve good governance, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, gender, respect for the rights of minorities, cooperation on non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, conflict prevention and resolution, and economic development'.<sup>10</sup> This document confirms the EU's objectives in the Mediterranean basin and in the extended region 'east of Jordan' that reaches Yemen, Iraq and Iran, and tries to bring multiplying initiatives into a broad overall framework of objectives and intentions.

### 3. Words into deeds?

To what extent have the actual policies reflected this conception? Democracy promotion can be carried out by the EU in a number of ways. The EU has a modest budget to support and promote democracy and human rights and it does mostly by supporting NGOs. At the level of political dialogue with the states of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership on these issues, the EU's record has so far been pretty meagre: diplomacy criticising bad human rights and democracy practices is more often than not at odds with another EU foreign policy objective of building cooperative relations and maintaining engagement with partner government and with the fear that upsetting the status quo could lead to instability.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Euro-Mediterranean Conference, *Barcelona Declaration*, 27-28 November 1995.

<sup>6</sup> European Commission, *Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and Democratisation with Mediterranean Partners*, COM(2003)104 final, Brussels: 21 May 2003.

<sup>7</sup> Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*, Brussels: 12 December 2003.

<sup>8</sup> The others being effective multilateralism at the UN level; the fight against terrorism; and a comprehensive policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina.

<sup>9</sup> Council Secretariat and European Commission, *Strengthening the EU's Partnership with the Arab World*, D (2003) 10318, Brussels: 4 December 2003.

<sup>10</sup> European Council, Final Report, *EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East*, Brussels: 17-18 June 2004.

<sup>11</sup> Rosa Balfour, 'Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue', *Occasional Papers*, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, June 2004. For a comprehensive analysis, see Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs (eds.), *European Union and Democracy Promotion: The Case of North Africa*. Special Issue of *Democratization* Vol. 9, No. 1, 2002.



By 2003 there was some recognition that turning a blind eye to human rights violations and supporting the authoritarian governments of the region was not helping the cause of regional security building. The European Commission's new proposal<sup>12</sup> reflects the impact of the influential UNDP Arab Human Development Report<sup>13</sup> which points out the salience of good government and human rights for development (challenging the Washington consensus inherent to the EMP whereby economic reform leads to political liberalisation). The Commission also wanted to say something different than the sterile debate raging at the time of the invasion of Iraq over 'democracy through bombs' and 'regime change'.

In tune with the new Neighbourhood policy,<sup>14</sup> the Commission suggested using the method of differentiation, based on Action Plans for each country, and focused on offering aid and incentives to those countries willing to engage in discussing democracy and human rights issues. Morocco and Jordan were two of the countries the Commission had in mind: the latter, in addition to funding from the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (which has amounted to 3 million from 1996 until today), has been allocated an extra 2 million from the MEDA programme fund for a human rights and democracy project.<sup>15</sup>

In the security field progress since the launch of the Barcelona Process in 1995 has been limited largely because of the problems of the Middle East Peace Process. When this started deteriorating from the autumn of 2000 onwards, the plan the EMP partners had been working on since 1996 of creating a regional Charter on Peace and Security through confidence and partnership building measures was abandoned, and it now awaits a resolution of the conflict in the Middle East. On the backdrop of these difficulties, in 2002 the EU chose to focus the security agenda on much narrower issues rather than on the broad scope of the Charter. Thus, the Valencia Action Plan launched European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) cooperation, which essentially is conceived as bridging the transparency gap on ESDP affairs between the two shores. At the Naples Euro Mediterranean Conference, civilian crisis management training and cooperation between civil protection authorities were identified as possible partnership building measures under the umbrella of ESDP cooperation.

This change, if perhaps necessary to make progress in the security basket, clearly represents a shift away from the 'soft' security conception with which Barcelona had started. One can argue that ESDP cooperation presents other advantages: it is a confidence building measure per se, and it represents a way out of the many problems that the security dialogue had been meeting. Nevertheless, if the EU is to support its 'holistic' concept of security, it should not neglect other areas of cooperation, focusing on soft security and partnership building.

If the security dialogue in the EMP has been narrowed to hard security issues, other soft security issues have been moved to the third basket with the regional programme in the field of justice, combating drugs, organised crime and terrorism and cooperation in the fields of

<sup>12</sup> European Commission, *Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and Democratisation with Mediterranean Partners*, COM(2003)104 final, Brussels: 21 May 2003.

<sup>13</sup> United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Arab Human Development Report 2002. Creating Opportunities for Future Generations*, New York: United Nations Publications, 2002.

<sup>14</sup> European Commission, *Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, COM(2003)104 final, Brussels: 11 March 2003.

<sup>15</sup> Information on [http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/med/bilateral/jordan\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/med/bilateral/jordan_en.htm).

migration and integration of migrants, in the belief that dialogue would become easier by depoliticising the expanding, but highly sensitive, Justice and Home Affairs dossier.<sup>16</sup> Other EU security developments are also occurring outside the Barcelona framework, such as the emerging Strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.<sup>17</sup> The Mediterranean, especially since Libya has decided to open up its sites for WMD inspection, could well be a candidate for this embryonic EU policy, as well as the Middle East and beyond, with Iran as a major test case.

Therefore, the EU member states have tried to inject a new lease of life into the ailing Barcelona Process. They have done so by singling out specific and circumscribed policy areas in which progress is more likely and possible. Out of necessity if not out of strategy, security issues have been narrowed down to ESDP cooperation to avoid addressing the long standing Middle East conflict in the framework of Barcelona. But this means that the root causes of insecurity are not being addressed in the EMP context.

In the case of democracy and human rights promotion, policies would be greatly strengthened if political dialogue at the diplomatic level went hand in hand with the grassroots objectives of European aid and support for civil society. This would require challenging the security alibi of fundamentalism.

Instead the EU has evidently made the choice of not alienating its Southern partners, especially in the light of their cooperation in the fight against terrorism. For example, the two working groups created within the regional framework during the second half of 2003 are to focus on non-controversial issues, such as the rights of children, wanted by the European partners, and racism and xenophobia, the theme selected by the Southern Mediterranean countries. The new method advocated by the New Neighbourhood Policy and the Human Rights and Democracy Communication of concentrating extra funding on those countries whose governments are willing to make some progress in reform might well ensure better spending and better results. The Commission also hopes that it could produce a positive demonstration effect in other countries. On the other hand it masks the fact that the EU, given its reluctance to resort to negative conditionality, does not have a strategy with regard to those countries that are not willing to cooperate on themes relating to political reform.

In short, human rights and democracy policies in the Mediterranean are caught somewhat in a paradox: the issues are now taken more seriously (after all a war was waged also in the name of these principles), but precisely because of their greater political significance, the EU remains as cautious as ever: cautious to differentiate itself from the US and not hurt Arab sensitivity; cautious to ensure that its policies do not upset its other priorities of cooperation with Arab governments. The shift towards emphasising the need for political reform as one of the means to address security challenges is limited to those countries whose governments are willing to cooperate on these themes. The increasing focus on single, albeit important, security initiatives (ESDP, non proliferation of WMD, the fight against terrorism) without necessarily or sufficiently tying them to the comprehensive framework of the Partnership is also in contrast with Barcelona's spirit. Finally, connecting the fight against terrorism to respect for democratic practices and human rights still seems too ambitious an objective.

<sup>16</sup> On developments in the third basket, see Richard Gillespie, 'Reshaping the Agenda? The Internal Politics of the Barcelona Process in the Aftermath of September 11', in Jünemann (ed.), op. cit., 2003, pp. 21-36.

<sup>17</sup> European Council, *EU Strategy against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Brussels: 12-13 December 2003.

It is worth briefly touching upon other initiatives of the past months, also because they serve the purpose of highlighting other aspects of the dilemmas that policies towards the Middle East and North Africa encounter. If the EU's 'gradualist'<sup>18</sup> approach leaves many points open to critique, the US's more vigorous approach to political reform is no less susceptible to criticism, if from different perspectives. Given the extension of war in Iraq and the ire this has caused in the Arab world, the Bush administration proposed a new 'partnership' with the broader Middle East and North Africa, in an attempt to provide a civilian arm to its military and security policy in the region. The first draft of the text, leaked to the Arab press, caused widespread criticism in the Arab and European world alike, not consulted in the process of designing the policy. Bush's 'democracy promotion' was overwhelmingly interpreted as 'regime change', interference in the internal affairs of other states, and as imposing Western values, underlining significant problems of US credibility.

It is likely that a number of factors, alongside the moderating hand of the other G-8 states, contributed to the drafting of a more acceptable final text, which was then endorsed at the June 2004 G-8 meeting at Sea Island, Georgia,<sup>19</sup> not least the debate generated during 2004 within the Arab and Muslim world on democracy, political reform and regional security, that has involved governments as well as civil society. In addition, the fact that the influential UNDP Report on human development in the Arab world was written by Arabs also helped foster the debate within the Muslim world, which could not write off concepts of freedom and citizen participation as Western exports. At the level of governments, the Sana'a and Tunis Declarations<sup>20</sup> are signs that the Arab governments, who have become targets of terrorism themselves, recognise that they share the challenges that Western policies are trying to address, though it remains to be seen whether the commitments expressed towards human rights will be translated into political reform.

Needless to say, the major differences over 'foreign occupation [and] imbalances in the international justice system',<sup>21</sup> of course, remain and constitute a fundamental problem of double standards of Western policy. Nonetheless, Arab contributions to the debate, which too highlight the relationship between security and political reform, ought to be taken more seriously. Indeed, all the recent declaration and statements stemming from the Arab and Muslim world insist on 'foreign occupation' as the crux of the matter: so long as the plight of the Palestinians and the invasion of Iraq continue, reform is unlikely. Conversely the West and Israel see the lack of Arab reform as one of the causes of enduring conflict.<sup>22</sup> It might be time to question, North and South of the Mediterranean, these two opposing views of regional security as well.

Parenthesis over, the debate triggered by the US proposal highlighted a foreign policy dilemma that was not solved by the watered down version adopted by the G-8: between

<sup>18</sup> Richard Youngs, 'Europe's Uncertain Pursuit of Middle East Reform', *Carnegie Papers* No. 45, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2004.

<sup>19</sup> G-8, Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa, G-8 Summit, Sea Island, Georgia, 9 June, [www.g8usa.gov/d\\_060904c.htm](http://www.g8usa.gov/d_060904c.htm)

<sup>20</sup> Sanaa Declaration on Democracy, Human Rights and the Role of the International Criminal Court, Sanaa, 10-12 January 2004, [www.al-bab-com/arab/docs/reform/sanaa2004.htm](http://www.al-bab-com/arab/docs/reform/sanaa2004.htm); and 16<sup>th</sup> Summit of the League of Arab States, Tunis Declaration, 22-23 May 2004, [www.saudembassy.net/2004News/Statements/StateDetail.asp?cIndex=421](http://www.saudembassy.net/2004News/Statements/StateDetail.asp?cIndex=421).

<sup>21</sup> Sanaa Declaration, *op. cit.*

<sup>22</sup> Roberto Aliboni and Laura Guazzone, 'Democracy in the Arab Countries and the West', *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 2004, pp. 82-93.

engagement and coercion. Excluding military intervention, which so far seems to have produced neither democratisation nor security, past experiences show a mixed record. If the EU's emphasis on engagement – often at the expense of human rights activists locked up in jails – has not produced satisfactory results, neither have the few instances of diplomatic coercion, while at times they have made thorny diplomatic situations more complex,<sup>23</sup> thus undermining the initial objective.

There is no blueprint for human rights and democracy policies. There are shades of difference between engagement and coercion and the full range of tools to exercise positive and negative conditionality, on the basis of a careful understanding of local diversity, has yet to be put to test in the Mediterranean dimension. Double standards and blatant contradictions, however, damage EU policies and relations between the two shores, as they contribute towards creating mistrust rather than the trust that the EMP was supposed to build.

What is certain is that foreign intervention can have a modest impact only in the presence of internal favourable circumstances, as it requires local participation. 'Local ownership' is a new keyword in the policies promoting democracy in the Arab world. The US accepted European insistence on including the concept in the G-8 Partnership for Progress. The Alexandria Statement could well constitute a starting point, as it represents the synthesis of the work of a number of Arab NGOs, research institutes, civil society organisations and so on.<sup>24</sup> But much of the opposition to current regimes revolves around Islamist groups. The EU should thus move beyond its usual interlocutors and involve moderate Islamic organisations.<sup>25</sup> This would help break the ideological cleavage between nationalist and secularist forces and Islamic and Islamist movements in the Muslim world as well as challenge the perceived dichotomy between Islam and democracy, a dichotomy that has been manipulated in the West and in the Arab world and transformed into an alleged incompatibility. A green light to start accession negotiations with Turkey would certainly have a symbolical impact. This said, the new Neighbourhood policy does provide a greater role to decentralised cooperation, potentially paving the way for the participation of local governments in democracy promotion and participation strategies.

#### 4. Conclusion

The transformation of security in the Mediterranean basin has produced the positive effect of placing democracy and human rights closer to the heart of the post September 11 international debate, and has tied the problem of authoritarianism and the democratic deficit to regional and global security. This has led to many more calls for political reform, from the US, the EU, and Arab civil society. Governments in the region too have responded, and their emphasis on their view of the security complex needs to be understood if the West is serious in supporting political reform and in helping solve the Middle East conflict. Democratisation

<sup>23</sup> See Katerina Delacoura, *Engagement or Coercion? Weighing Western Human Rights Policies towards Turkey, Iran and Egypt*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2003.

<sup>24</sup> The conference was organised at the Bibliotheca Alexandrina in collaboration with the Arab Academy for Science and Technology, the Arab Business Council, the Arab Women's Organization, the Economic Research Forum, and the Arab Organization for Human Rights. Bibliotheca Alexandrina, Final Statement of 'Arab Reform Issues: Vision and Implementation', 11-12 March 2004: [www.arabreformforum.com/files/Alexandria\\_Document\\_En.pdf](http://www.arabreformforum.com/files/Alexandria_Document_En.pdf).

strategies are increasingly seen as long-term policies aiming at building a secure environment, representing a partial shift away from the policies that essentially aimed at keeping existing regimes in power, no matter their degree of authoritarianism, as an insurance policy against religious and political extremism.

But such change is only partial. The European Commission has been the most sensitive actor to the democracy argument, but its strategy is limited to encouraging those countries that are more willing to make progress. As such, this might well be the best way forward, but it leaves the EU without a policy when it comes to those countries that are most resistant to change and foreign interference. Secondly, there is no sign of the democracy rationale feeding into security policies – or of democratising security. Security policies do not seem influenced by the recognition of the need to support reform in Mediterranean societies. Instead of trying to understand Arab perceptions of regional security, EMP policies have been narrowed down to cooperation in the military sphere, which adds up to little more than building transparency in the nascent ESDP. Also, other security policies are being developed outside the Barcelona framework. Many of the post September 11 security policies seem oblivious if not in conflict with respect for human rights and democratic practices, especially as far as the fight against terrorism is concerned.<sup>26</sup> There are a few zeros of difference, for example, between the budgets for democracy and human rights and those for regional security policies and defence. Political and financial investment is needed if democracy promotion is to be taken seriously and contribute to building security, without forgetting the part of the equation that has not been treated in the present essay but is considered crucial by the Arab partners: economic and social development.

There are, however, risks in ‘securitising’ the democracy discourse. Even if democratisation is considered as a means for creating a secure environment, there is no guarantee that the two will not clash. Experience shows that the opposite is more likely. Therefore, even this approach risks relegating human rights and democracy to a subordinate position. The same fate would apply should the rationale in favour of tying security and democracy together become less compelling. If it is hard to imagine democracy promotion as a purely altruistic exercise, for it to be effective over time it should be based on its own rationale and justification rather than tied to short term interests.

<sup>25</sup> This point has been recently made by Aliboni and Guazzone, *op. cit.*, 2004 and Youngs, *op. cit.*, 2004.

<sup>26</sup> Jünemann, *op. cit.*, 2003.

## 2. Quo Vadis ‘Barcelona’? Reflecting on the Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership<sup>1</sup>

Tobias Schumacher

### 1. Introduction

In contrast to the widespread optimistic expectations that accompanied the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in November 1995, the first eight years of the ‘Barcelona process’ have proven to be a disappointment for those who had hoped that it might provide a viable strategic approach that would go beyond the EU’s long-standing concentration on trade and economic issues in the Euro-Mediterranean area. The first basket of the EMP, which concerns political and security cooperation, mainly due to its inherent conceptual flaws and the virtual demise of the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), has not made significant progress since its inception.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the second and the third baskets, which concern economic and financial cooperation, and social and cultural partnership respectively, have also produced rather ambivalent results, as both are marked by structural incompleteness, numerous imbalances and serious shortcomings.<sup>3</sup>

Considering this dismal balance sheet, the latest regional dynamics in the Middle East, and the somewhat insufficient awareness in the EU of the potential geopolitical implications for the EMP of Turkish EU membership, this paper argues that a general revision of the Barcelona Process is highly warranted if the EMP does not want to experience the same fate as its predecessors, the Renovated Mediterranean Policy and the *approche globale*.<sup>4</sup> This was acknowledged in principle by European Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten in a mid-term evaluation of the EMP’s first five years.<sup>5</sup> However, during the Euro-Mediterranean meeting in Naples on 2-3 December 2003, the foreign ministers of the participating countries failed once more to make any substantial progress. An attempt is made here to give an

<sup>1</sup> This paper is a shortened version of Tobias Schumacher, ‘Riding on the Winds of Change: The Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, *The International Spectator*, vol. 39, n° 2, 2004, pp. 89-102.

<sup>2</sup> For an overview of the development and the conceptual flaws of the first basket, see Tobias Schumacher, ‘From Barcelona to Valencia: The Limits of the EU’s Political and Security Partnership with the Southern Mediterranean Countries’, in Bo Huldts and Elisabeth Davidson and Mats Engman (eds) *Strategic Yearbook 2003. The Barcelona Process and Euro-Mediterranean Security*, Stockholm: Elanders, 2002, pp. 215-37.

<sup>3</sup> On the second basket, see for example Volker Nienhaus, ‘Promoting Development and Stability through a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone?’, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 4, no. 4, 1999, pp. 501-18 and Tobias Schumacher, *Survival of the Fittest: The First Five Years of Euro-Mediterranean Economic Relations*, Jean Monnet Working Paper, Florence: RSCAS Press, 2004.

<sup>4</sup> The Global Mediterranean Policy was initiated by the foreign ministers of the EC member states in November 1972 whereas the Renovated Mediterranean Policy, conceived as a replacement of the former, was adopted by the EC’s General Affairs Council in December 1990. Both policies were limited to trade preferences and financial assistance.

<sup>5</sup> See European Commission, *The Barcelona Process: Five years On: 1995-2000*, Brussels 2001.

overview of those areas where immediate progress is not only possible, but relatively easy to achieve and cost-effective. The first sections concentrate on the principle of differentiated cooperation, the transformation of the conditionality clauses and co-ownership. This is followed by a section that focuses on the EMP's potential future clustering in view of the possibility of Turkish EU membership. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the recently approved EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

## **2. Priority areas for future action**

### *2.1 Differentiated cooperation and positive conditionality*

Any discussion related to the revision of the Barcelona Process has to take two major developments into consideration: first, the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Minister's meeting in April 2002 in Valencia, where the 27 partners agreed to give their senior officials the task of working towards the establishment of an informal Euro-Med Working Group of like-minded countries that want to advance in certain cooperation sectors; second, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which outlines the EU's policies to its future neighbours in Eastern Europe and the Southern Mediterranean. Although the developments do not seem to be linked, they are in fact strongly interconnected with each other and are marked by one overarching, if somewhat implicit, theme that may be of crucial importance for the EMP's future course: the introduction of differentiated cooperation accompanied and consolidated by positive conditionality.

The Valencia decision and the European Neighbourhood Policy offer a chance to overcome the artificial notion of the Mediterranean area as a 'region' and one common space,<sup>6</sup> without formally abandoning or dissolving the EMP. Clearly, the idea of splitting up the Barcelona Process into a Euro-Maghreb and Euro-Mashreq Partnership would only be a repetition of the European policies of the early nineties which, because of the massive jealousies they created, actually led to today's all-encompassing EMP format. In contrast, the serious implementation of differentiated cooperation, and the transformation of the current negative conditionality into positive conditionality, would leave the general Barcelona *acquis* intact and would, thus, be acceptable to all members.

Differentiated cooperation and positive conditionality are two sides of the same coin. Differentiated cooperation has the potential to revitalise the multilateral dimension of EMP – now practically reduced to bilateral cooperation – by enabling like-minded Mediterranean partner countries (MPCs) and EU member states to advance in multilateral fields where unanimity has not been achievable. This, in turn, would reduce the veto option of non-cooperative players and, for good or for bad, imply the beginning of an EMP of concentric circles. It may be argued that this would also put an end to the Barcelona Process' inherent holism and all-inclusive design. But this fear is not justified as the current three-basket

<sup>6</sup> See Mark Heller, 'Reassessing Barcelona', in Fred Tanner (ed.) *The European Union as a Security Actor in the Mediterranean. ESPD, Soft Power and Peacemaking in Euro-Mediterranean Relations*, Zurich: ETH, 2001, p. 77. On the artificiality of the Mediterranean as a region, see Michelle Pace, 'Rethinking the Mediterranean. Reality and Re-presentation in the Creation of a 'Region'', in Finn Laursen (ed.) *Comparative Regional Integration: Theoretical Perspectives*, Arlington: Ashgate, forthcoming 2004.

structure would remain untouched and uncooperative players would still be given the chance to participate in all fields that are covered by the Barcelona Declaration and the association agreements. While some EMP members have an interest in advancing in certain policy areas – the initiation of the Agadir Process by the governments of Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan is a prime example in that respect<sup>7</sup>– other actors need to be encouraged first.

Given that the EMP, in real political terms, has not been conducive to sub-regional cooperation and political reforms in the Southern Mediterranean, positive conditionality can serve as a powerful tool with which to stimulate the laggards. Instead of half-heartedly threatening to suspend MEDA aid or withdraw trade preferences, the European Commission's proposition should be applied: 'In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including in aligning legislation with the *acquis*, the EU's neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU.'<sup>8</sup> Accordingly, rewards should only be granted to partners that do not comply with the Arab League's call for a boycott of Israel.

This leads directly to the issue of the EU's leverage in the Southern Mediterranean. In practice, during the last eight years the EU's power to exert pressure on the MPCs has been rather limited. Political reasons and internal divisions have prevented the EU from strictly applying the negative conditionality clauses. Moreover, a suspension of the association agreements' trade dimension would have resulted in a considerable loss of export revenues and cheap energy imports. By applying positive conditionality and opting to reward progressive and reform-willing MPCs with a stake in the EU's internal market and a further step-by-step integration into its four freedoms, the EU could free itself of that dilemma.

This would also improve the EU's credibility in some parts of the Middle East and prevent it from being accused of acting like a neo-colonial power. It is particularly in this light that an increasing number of MPCs seem to have become proponents of positive conditionality. However, in order to be able to offer preferential treatment and concrete benefits linked to the progress made by MPCs, the EU will have to develop clear benchmarks. The Action Plans seem to be a first step in that direction and, at the same time, may be viewed as an acknowledgement that 'one-size-fits-all' solutions are no longer successful.

## 2.2 Co-ownership, co-financing and visibility

This is the context in which the EU would have the perfect opportunity to activate the principle of co-ownership. Instead of confronting MPCs with unilaterally adopted action plans that are drafted by the European Commission or European consultants who generally lack the pertinent holistic knowledge of the individual partner countries and the regional environment, the EU should turn towards the Southern Mediterranean and hire local experts and involve them in both the drawing up and the final formulation of these targets and benchmarks.

<sup>7</sup> On 8 May 2001 the governments of Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan decided to initiate the so-called Agadir Process. The Agadir agreement was signed on 25 February 2004 and stipulates the dismantling of all tariff and non-tariff barriers and the creation of a Mediterranean Free Trade Area. The agreement is open to all MPCs that have concluded association agreements with the EU.

<sup>8</sup> European Commission, *Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, COM(2003) 104 final/11.3.2003, p. 4. See also the report entitled 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', presented by Javier Solana at the European Council in Thessaloniki on 20 June 2003.



While the MPCs have for the last eight years demanded that this be considered, and foreign ministers have repeatedly acknowledged its importance,<sup>9</sup> the governments of the fifteen EU member states still remain divided over the issue. Yet, such a step would not only symbolise a true partnership building measure, but it could also enhance the efficacy of the EU's cooperation policy in the Southern Mediterranean.

Further demands, such as giving Mediterranean partner countries a stronger say in the EMP-related decision-making process, should not be ruled out *per se* either. Interestingly, this was implicitly acknowledged by Commission President Romano Prodi who, in a speech delivered at the Tempus MEDA regional conference in Alexandria on 13 October 2003, stated that the EU has 'chosen to put the emphasis on cooperation, not just on security'. According to Prodi 'that rules out any one-sided, Eurocentric approach and it calls for multilateralism and persuasion, not coercion or unilateralism'.<sup>10</sup> Arguably, the creation of a permanent Euro-Med secretariat, an issue that has been on the agenda since 1995, could remedy the matter to a certain extent. However, the creation of such a secretariat has repeatedly been rejected by some EU member states. As an alternative – albeit less innovative – option, the EU might think about allowing the MPCs to observe the European Commission's EMP-related works. Clearly, this would fall short of granting co-decision (as is demanded by the MPCs), but it would represent a trust-enforcing measure, and a first step towards greater transparency in EU policymaking.

Another measure that can further the implementation of what Romano Prodi has recently called a 'Euro-Mediterranean Partnership on an equal footing',<sup>11</sup> is the expansion of the co-financing principle. While this will probably be applied for the first time in the case of the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures and Civilizations, there is no reason why it could not be transferred to other policies which lie outside the realm of development assistance. As inter-cultural understanding becomes increasingly important, potential beneficiaries of such co-funding should be the existing cooperation programmes in the third basket, and also the Euro-Mediterranean dimension of the Tempus programme.<sup>12</sup>

Finally, the practical implementation of cultural and social action programmes, like many other Euro-Mediterranean cooperation schemes, has consistently been hampered by uncooperative, inflexible and mostly unjustified visa restrictions set by EU member states. Therefore, the EMP partners, but first and foremost the EU governments, should consider the much-debated adoption of a 'Barcelona visa'.<sup>13</sup> It does not make sense to develop and finance

<sup>9</sup> See 'Presidency Conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Naples, 2-3 December 2003)', in *Euromed Report*, no. 71, 5 December 2003.

<sup>10</sup> Romano Prodi, 'Sharing Stability and Prosperity', speech delivered at the Tempus MEDA regional conference at the Bibliotheca Alexandrina on 13 October 2003.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> First created in 1990 to help Central and Eastern European countries restructure their higher education systems, the extension of the Tempus programme to MPCs was agreed on 27 June 2002 by the EU Council of Ministers. With a euro 43 million allocation for the duration of the National Indicative Programmes 2002-2004, Tempus carries out joint Euro-Mediterranean projects, and provides Individual Mobility Grants.

<sup>13</sup> This idea was originally developed by EuroMeSCo and the European Parliament. On the practice of granting visas in the Euro-Mediterranean area, see Catherine Withol de Wenden, *La Politique de Visas Dans L' Espace Euro-Méditerranéen*, EuroMeSCo papers, no. 10.

Euro-Mediterranean cooperation projects and then deny Arab participants the necessary visa, irrespective of whether they are young people, students, businessmen or academics (involved in EMP-related networks). This also applies to Euro-Mediterranean cooperation projects in which delegations from the European Commission have been involved. Although their successful implementation relies on the full participation of all partners, various EU member states' embassies in some MPCs have sometimes refused to grant the necessary visas. Therefore, a common visa regime or at least closer coordination between EU authorities in the field of the 'controlled' movement of people, would help enforce the original partnership principle and allay growing concerns about practical limitations on Euro-Mediterranean transnational cooperation.

### 2.3 Transforming 'Barcelona': the Euro-Middle East Partnership

Notwithstanding the implementation of these reforms, the EMP will be faced with a major challenge in the not too distant future. If the European Council in December 2004 grants Turkey a date to take up accession negotiations, Turkey will become a member of the EU probably sometime between 2010 and 2015.<sup>14</sup> As a consequence, the EU's geographic scope will fall just short of the Middle East, with Syria, Iran and Iraq the EU's new neighbours in a region marked by instability and violent conflict. This development has two implications. First, against the backdrop of the EU membership of two former EMP members, Malta and Cyprus, as of 1 May 2004, Turkey's accession to the EU will result in a severe imbalance in the EMP's geopolitical dimension and will leave Israel as the only non-Arab Mediterranean partner country with eight Arab partners. In light of the virtual demise of the Middle East Peace Process, this will further undermine Israel's chances of becoming involved in the EMP's multilateral track. Second, being exposed to a new neighbourhood in the Middle East will make it impossible for the EU to limit itself to a mere political dialogue and trade agreement with Iran, and to continue to treat war-torn Iraq simply as a recipient of reconstruction aid, thereby leaving the country in the power sphere of the occupying powers.

Therefore, in order to confront this challenge pro-actively and to overcome its highly fragmented and rather incoherent interrelations with the countries of the Middle Eastern region, the EU will have to consider redefining the EMP's geographic scope and transforming it into a more inclusive and flexible Euro-Middle East Partnership (EMEP), as suggested elsewhere in more detail.<sup>15</sup> That would not mean abandoning the Barcelona *acquis* with its three-basket structure. Instead, it would mean redesigning it into an intergovernmental framework with the EMP at its centre and, following the logic of differentiated cooperation, allowing for the construction of several bi- and/or multilateral inter-, intra- and sub-regional

<sup>14</sup> On the probability of Turkish EU membership, see the European Commission's '2003 Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession' published on 5 November 2003. A discussion of the effects of a possible Turkish EU membership on the EMP can be found in Tobias Schumacher, 'Dance in – Walk out: Turkey, EU Membership and the Future of the Barcelona Process', in Ahmed Evin and Nathalie Tocci (eds.) *Towards Accession Negotiations: Turkey's Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges Ahead*, Florence: RSCAS Press, forthcoming 2004.

<sup>15</sup> See Felix Neugart and Tobias Schumacher, 'Thinking about the EU's Future Neighbourhood Policy in the Middle East: From the Barcelona Process to a Euro-Middle East Partnership', in Christian-Peter Hanelt, Giacomo Luciani and Felix Neugart (eds.) *Regime Change in Iraq*, Florence: RSCAS Press, 2004.

cooperation clusters around it. Consequently, the EMEP's inner core would comprise the EU member states, the remaining ten MPCs, Libya, and Iraq.<sup>16</sup>

Whereas this core group would be entitled to participate in all three upgraded cooperation baskets, the outer ring of participating countries, that is the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and, for the time being, Yemen and Iran, would only be involved in those areas where inter- and intra-regional cooperation is needed most: inter-regional trade, transportation and infrastructure development, as well as civil society cooperation. With respect to the former, a Euro-Middle East Free Trade Area (EMEFTA), based on existing agreements, the Mediterranean Arab Free Trade Area (MAFTA) and the Greater Arab Free Trade Area project (GAFTA) can be envisaged, as this could lead to economic interdependence and thus economies of scale, and a reintegration of Iraq into regional and inter-regional economic structures.

As (inter-)regional trade is dependant on a functioning and effective transportation infrastructure, the EMEP must focus on that sector, and enlarge the already-envisaged Euro-Mediterranean transportation system into a Euro-Middle East transportation network that focuses particularly on the South-South component. This would strengthen the physical links between and among MPC and EMEP countries. At the same time, their inclusion into existing, decentralised, EMP civil society cooperation projects, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Youth Action Programme (EMYAP) can, according to a progress report by the European Commission, generate learning effects, true confidence-building, and the acquisition of intercultural competences.<sup>17</sup> It could also contribute to an expansion of the much underdeveloped transnational intra-Arab civil society cooperation.

### **3. Conclusions**

Whereas the EMEP proposal would have been considered illusory by many observers only a short while ago, it no longer sounds so unrealistic.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and the Middle East both approved in the 17-18 June European Council indicate that both the European Commission and the Council of Ministers have realized that EU policies towards the countries of the Middle East only stand a chance of success if they

<sup>16</sup> Given the current security situation in Iraq, it could also be argued that Iraq's inclusion is far-fetched and unrealistic. However, it must not be overlooked that Iraq had and still has close economic and cultural ties with the countries of the Mashreq/Eastern Mediterranean region. See Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, Cambridge: CAP, 2000. As the creation of the EMEP would clearly strengthen Euro-Arab relations, Israel must be granted an enhanced bilateral association status. This would not mean that the EU would treat Israel outside its regional context, since the latter would still be invited to participate in those areas of the EMEP where progress can be achieved without a preceding political solution in the Middle East. On Israel's European perspective, see Raffaella Del Sarto and Alfred Tovias 'Caught between Europe and the Orient: Israel and the EMP', *The International Spectator*, vol. 36, no. 4, 2001, pp. 61-75.

<sup>17</sup> The EMYAP became operational in 1999. Its official objective is 'to facilitate the integration of young people into social and professional life and stimulate the democratisation of the civil society of the Mediterranean partners.' See Euro-Mediterranean Information Note: Euro-Mediterranean Youth Action Programme, April 1999.

are conceived in a coherent and coordinated way and based on complementary strategic objectives.

The Strategic Partnership follows the logic of the proposed EMEP. Moreover, in contrast to the 'Wider Europe' communication, which was drafted exclusively by the European Commission and provoked strong reservations on the part of some EU member states to the extent of the MPCs' approximation to the EU *acquis*,<sup>18</sup> the Strategic Partnership has a much broader base. Not only have fourteen of the fifteen EU members submitted formal strategy papers during the last months, thereby underlining their strong interest in this Partnership, but the European Commission and almost all Council bodies working in the field of external relations were involved in the elaboration of the Strategy. More importantly, the need to consult with potential partners was stressed by the authors of the interim report and so the Troika has been conferring with its interlocutors in Middle East countries over the feasibility and the content of such a Partnership.

The inclusion of ten new members into the Council decision-making process and, thus, the increase in potential (pro-American) veto-players may dilute or obstruct future plans for a more ambitious EU role in the Middle East. Nonetheless, it is still too early to anticipate the impact of the Strategy. Caution should prevail with regard to the implementation of differentiated cooperation and the principle of co-ownership. The Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministers meeting in Naples proved unmistakably that the EU and its partners in the South still do not share a common understanding of the steps needed to make bi- and multilateral relations more effective and viable.

With the adoption of the Partnership Strategy, the enlarged EU may be able to signal to both its Arab partners and the US that it has its own agenda for dealing with the post-Saddam Middle East. Whether it will be able to implement this agenda, however, depends largely on two major factors: First, the member states' willingness to reform substantially the EU's existing frameworks for relations with its Southern periphery, and their ability to overcome the EU's dualism of intergovernmental and supranational elements of governance that has impeded EU policies towards the countries of the region throughout the last thirty years. Second, and equally important is the EU's ability to develop a clear and precise nexus that links the Strategic Partnership Initiative with the objectives and mechanisms of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

<sup>18</sup> This was already the case during the session of the General Affairs Council on 15 June 2003, only three months after 'Wider Europe' was presented to the Council.

### **3. Remarks on Arab Debates about Democracy**

*Laura Guazzone*

#### **1. Introduction**

The Arab debate on democracy continues to rage - sometimes aggressively, at other times defensively. Here, I try to characterize its main features and make a few remarks about its political implications. In talking about the present, however, we should not forget that this debate is by no means a new feature of Arab political life, ushered in by post September 11 developments. Quite to the contrary, today's debate about democracy is an evolutionary stage of a history full of modern political ideologies and practices: this history matters a lot and should not be ignored.<sup>1</sup>

The present debate takes place at two levels: on the one hand there is a general and seemingly generic region-wide debate about democracy in the Arab World. On the other hand, there are specific debates about issues on the political agenda of the individual countries (such as the debate about the revision of the constitution in Egypt, the status of Syrian troops in Lebanon or universal suffrage in Kuwait). The connection between these two levels of debate is not always articulated, given the many constraints on the openness of political debate due to persistent authoritarianism in all Arab countries. For instance, it is common to find opinion pieces apparently dealing with distant situations or with general concepts, such as transparency or accountability, but in fact subtly referring to precise national issues.

Here, I concentrate my remarks only on the first level -the general pan-Arab debate on democracy - although it is the connection of this debate with political reform at home, not abstract principles, that really matters to ordinary Arab citizens and to all those concerned with the future of democracy in the Arab countries.

#### **2. Main threads and underlying trends**

The first and fundamental remark is that for the first time democracy is the subject of debate throughout the Arab world. In the past, the principles of liberal democracy had only been discussed by the elites and partially practiced in a few countries like Egypt between the two world wars. Today, recent surveys and other manifestations of opinion show that a majority of Arab citizens considers democracy a desirable public and private good. This widespread Arab consensus on democracy as a positive value is good news, but the consensus does not extend to either the definition of democracy or the ways to achieve it in the Arab world. The present vibrant Arab debate on democracy is in fact about its meaning and the processes of democratisation.

<sup>1</sup> For an introduction to Arab contemporary political history see Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*, London: Routledge, 2000; on the history of the debate about democracy see Massimo Campanini, 'Intelletuali arabi tra nazionalismo, democrazia e Islam' in Federica Bicchi, Laura Guazzone, Daniela Pioppi (eds.), *La questione della democrazia nel mondo arabo*, Monza: Polimetrica, 2004.

The main positions in the present debate follow three main approaches depending on the political orientation of their proponents:<sup>2</sup>

*The liberal democratic approach*, which would like to establish Western-style democratic republics or constitutional regimes and therefore advocates the political reforms needed to enlarge and guarantee human, civil and political rights. Those sharing this approach are a vocal, but much restricted elite of intellectuals and professionals, well represented by the signatories of the so-called Alexandria Declaration and other pro-democracy manifestos.<sup>3</sup>

*The moderate Islamist approach*, which would like to establish a democratic Islamic state where human, civil and political rights will be guaranteed within the much debated requirements of the Islamic law. Pro-democracy Islamists are a small and fragile minority within the Islamist camp, squeezed as they are between the opposing critiques of secular and religious hardliners. In the 1990s, moderate Islamists lost influence, but they are now regaining ground after the failure of the radicals and have openly advocated democracy in their own manifesto 'The Muslim Brotherhood Reform Initiative'.<sup>4</sup>

Finally there is the *modernization approach*, which equates democracy with good governance and therefore does not advocate any structural change in the political systems, but only limited top-down reforms to increase the overall political and economic efficiency of the existing systems. Not surprisingly, those subscribing to this approach are supporters and often members of the incumbent regimes. As Hawthorne notes, when they dare to talk about democracy (not just reform, political openness, transparency or the like) 'they portray it as a system that already exists in the Arab world and only needs some procedural improvements.'<sup>5</sup>

This overview of Arab approaches to democracy can be complemented by another, possibly more impressionistic classification stressing overarching attitudes. Following this characterization we find a first group that refuses the debate in its present form on two main grounds:

*Talking about democracy is an imposed commodity.* People sharing this view argue that US attempts to export and market democracy in the Arab world have transformed it into an imposed commodity, whereas it should be produced locally: 'No-one here is against reform and democracy; but who believes that America wants these things for the sake of the freedom and blossoming of the peoples of the region? In the absence of credibility and trust it is hard to take things at face value. This is because the diplomatic language emanating from the State

<sup>2</sup> This description follows the classification used in Amy Hawthorne, *Political Reform In The Arab World: A New Ferment?* Carnegie Papers, Number 52, October 2004, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 5-7.

<sup>3</sup> The March 2004 Alexandria Document on Reform Issues in the Arab World, Alexandria (Egypt), 14 March 2004 is available at [www.bibalex.gov.eg](http://www.bibalex.gov.eg). Other pro-democracy manifestos are the 'Sanaa Declaration on Democracy, Human Rights and the Role of the International Criminal Court', Sanaa, 10-12 January 2004, [www.al-bab-com/arab/docs/reform/sanaa2004.htm](http://www.al-bab-com/arab/docs/reform/sanaa2004.htm); 'The Beirut declaration on Reform', 22 March 2004; 'The Doha Declaration on Democracy and Reform', Doha, 4 June 2004; 'Priorities and Mechanisms for Reform in the Arab World', Cairo, 7 July 2004.

<sup>4</sup> The declaration was issued in March 2004 and is available (in Arabic) at <http://www.afaqarabia.com/asp/Article.asp>.

<sup>5</sup> Hawthorne, op. cit., 2004, p. 7.

Department is one thing, while the practical behaviour of the neo-conservatives who control the Defence Department is something else.<sup>6</sup>

*Talking about democracy is a luxury.* People sharing this view regard discussion of democracy as a luxury (if not a decoy) that diverts attention away from other, more urgent political issues – notably Iraq and Palestine. Most of these people do not overlook the importance of democracy, they just see it as occupying a lower place on their list of political priorities: ‘The Palestinian territories are ablaze as a result of Israel’s savage measures... Tension has also reached a pitch in Iraq where there seems not an ounce of hope... If the proponents of this plan [the Greater Middle East Initiative] had shown the tiniest bit of common sense they would have waited for the tension to ease before presenting it. For we have the right to say to them: cooperate with us in resolving the acute problems in the region because we do not have the peace of mind that we need to assess your plans.’<sup>7</sup>

Those who refuse the present debate do not consider democracy the prime political priority for the Arabs. Instead, the remaining groups in the debate accept democracy as *the* political priority and agree that Arab countries must democratise in order to achieve social renewal, economic development and better relations with the international community. Yet they share no consensus on the specific contents of democracy or on processes of democratisation: ‘When I look at the issue [of democratisation] I find I am certain about what not to do. At the same time I am confused about what should be done.’<sup>8</sup>

There are in fact three underlying attitudes towards democratisation that partially blur the classification based on political affiliation described above, they can be characterised as follows:

*The ‘slow down, we’re not ready’ attitude,* people in this group maintain that ‘we are not ready’ for democracy and advocate a slow movement towards democracy, provided it conforms to ‘our culture and society’. On the one hand, this attitude prioritises authenticity, referring either to communitarian-ethnic (i.e. nationalist) or to Islamic/Islamist concepts of democracy; on the other hand, it postulates a very gradualist and long-term process of democratisation. Conservative islamists and nationalists alike can share this attitude.

*The ‘go fast, we need a technical fix’ attitude* or, as it was dubbed some years ago, ‘the democracy without democrats’ approach.<sup>9</sup> ‘While we were out breeding dictatorships in the Arab world, wasting our resources on war machines in order to fight each other, the developed world was fostering democracy and respect of human rights. While we were out teaching our children archaic slogans, the world was teaching its children science and technology. I am worried about the future - the future of the Arab world... With weak democratic systems and generally poor governance at every level, we do not seem to be addressing the real social and economic problems likely to erupt.’<sup>10</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Jordanian columnist Fahd al-Fanik, ‘Grossman Preaches Democracy’, *al-Ray*, 16 March 2004.

<sup>7</sup> Fuad Zakariya (Egyptian thinker and advocate of secularism), ‘Candid Observations On The US’s Greater Middle East Plan’, *al-Ahram*, 18 April 2004.

<sup>8</sup> Fahmi Huwaidi (Egyptian Islamist writer), ‘The Hardest Question Is: What To Do?’, *al-Ahram*, 27 May 2003.

<sup>9</sup> Ghassan Salamé (ed.), *Democracy Without Democrats?*, London-New York: I. B. Tauris -St. Martin’s Press, 2004.

<sup>10</sup> Ibrahim S. Dabdoub, ‘The Way Forward Starts With Leaving The Archaic Behind’, *Daily Star*, 23 September 2003.

This is often the attitude of technocrats (the author quoted above is CEO of the National Bank of Kuwait), but progressive nationalists and leftists can also share it. The best-known representatives of this attitude are possibly the Arab contributors to the much-debated UN Arab Human Development Reports 2002 and 2004.

The ‘*what sort of democracy do we want and how do we get it?*’ attitude which is shared by a minority of liberal-minded intellectuals in opposition and government circles, who try to address the core problems of political contents and political processes, although in a moderate and somehow indirect way. A few examples from the Egyptian arena can help characterise this position: ‘It is not impossible to establish stable and lasting democracy without waiting years by achieving a state of common consensus between the various political groups, sects and social classes, involving compromise - especially with those whose manifestoes exceed the bounds of democracy - in order to attain a *modus vivendi* among them all.... This public consensus needs to be underpinned by some kind of legislation - the best way being by means of a democratic constitution built on the fundamental rights and freedoms, rising above expressions of tribal or religious loyalty or local interests to guarantee that it is not violated by any political or social powers.’<sup>11</sup>

Hala Mustafa is Editor-in-Chief of *Democracy Review* at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies and member of the Supreme Council for Policy Planning of the NDP ruling party. Her position is in line with the classical tenets of democratisation theory. However, seen in the framework of the ongoing Egyptian debate on constitutional revision, her emphasis on the role of constitutional guarantees hints at an opening towards some of the requests of the legal opposition.

Other intellectuals in this group are rightly preoccupied with finding an indigenous cultural underpinning in support of democracy able to avoid the trappings and political alignments associated with either the Islamic or nationalistic concepts of democracy. This is the direction that the well-known Egyptian sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim – a respected moderate independent recently at the centre of a judiciary case – seems to have taken when he wrote an article entitled ‘Reviving Middle Eastern Liberalism’: ‘When we founded the Ibn Khaldun Center [...] we had the Liberal Age<sup>12</sup> very much in mind. We saw ourselves not as builders from scratch, but as revivers of a great (but not perfect) tradition that had existed not only in our country but also in Syria, Iraq, Iran, Morocco, and elsewhere. We were and we remain determined that this liberal tradition ... will not be forgotten. [...] Instead of the ‘paralysis by analysis’ that comes from cataloguing all the familiar reasons why our peoples will ‘never’ be ready for democracy, we choose to remind ourselves of the liberal options that were once open and can be open again.’<sup>13</sup>

### 3. Concluding remarks

Seen from the perspective of political development, the present Arab debates about democracy and democratisation are no doubt important steps in the process of ‘interiorisation’

<sup>11</sup> Hala Mustafa, ‘It Is Not The Responsibility Of The US Alone’, *al-Ahram*, 6 May 2003.

<sup>12</sup> The reference is to Albert Hourani’s book *The Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962.

<sup>13</sup> Saad Eddin Ibrahim, ‘Reviving Middle Eastern Liberalism’, *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 14, n. 4 October 2003.



of democratic principles and values in Arab political culture and ideologies. However, this cultural process is a necessary, but largely insufficient condition for democratization as long as it remains restricted to the elites and is not coupled to political activism. As Marina Ottaway rightly notes ‘what is lacking is a supply of broad-based political organizations pushing for democracy’.<sup>14</sup>

The apparent contradiction between the existence of a widespread consensus on democracy, qualified as it may be, weak political activism and lack of real democratisation seems to surprise most observers of the Arab world. More in general, political change in the Arab world seems to have reached an impasse in which, without enlarged political participation, incumbent regimes are unable to push their modernizing agendas – based on top-down political and economic liberalization – any further, while opposition forces are unable to produce enough internal political pressures to engender a crisis of authoritarianism. This political impasse is mirrored in the impasse of political analysts of the Arab world, who see the lack of democratisation and the reality of modernized authoritarianism, but are unable to provide a satisfactory theoretical and empirical explanation for this state of affairs, based on an alternative framework of analysis going beyond the inadequacies of the prevailing theories of democratisation.

As I have argued elsewhere,<sup>15</sup> the problem – both political and analytical – lies in the fact that the main agendas for Arab democratisation are based on a procedural concept of democracy which does not appeal to the interests of the masses and is easily manipulated by incumbent regimes because it does not question neo-patrimonialism, the basic structure of power in which Arab authoritarianism is rooted.

<sup>14</sup> Marina S. Ottaway, *Democracy and Constituencies in the Arab World*, July 2004, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 3.

<sup>15</sup> Bicchi, Guazzone, Pioppi, op. cit., 2004.

## **4. The Debate on Promoting Democracy: Lessons Learned and Future Challenges**

*Roberto Aliboni*

In June 2004 the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and the issue of democracy were at the forefront of the international stage. Indeed, the issue was on the Sea Island 9 June G-8 agenda, under the heading of the US-initiated 'Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa' (formerly 'Greater Middle East Initiative'), as well as on that of the Brussels 17-18 June European Council. The latter approved the final versions of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and the Middle East. In both these policies the issue of democracy is prominent.

While the geographic scope of the initiatives by the US (the Broader Middle East) and EU (North Africa and the Near East, i.e. the Mediterranean area) may differ, the focus is nevertheless on the necessity to promote democracy. The Western countries, although not always in tune with one another, are strongly committed to the perceived need to promote democracy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) area.

It must be pointed out that this commitment to promoting democracy has just gone through a very controversial stage because of the US-led Coalition's intervention in Iraq with the aim, among others, to replace the totalitarian Ba'athist regime with a democratic one. This kind of coercive democracy promotion is rather unusual in Western post-Second World War thinking. Rather, it resembles the thinking prevailing in the post-First World War mandates period. With the elections of January 2005, this country's domestic situation will hopefully move towards normalisation.

It is very likely that the idea of using coercive regime changes to give birth to democratic polities will quietly disappear from Western-MENA relations and democracy promotion policies will reacquire a peaceful and co-operative nature. However, for the time being, 'regime change' has become a part of the lessons learned in the last few years. What are these lessons in the field of democracy promotion - be it cooperative or coercive? This is a question the West has to answer if it wants to be able to understand coming challenges at the very time when - with the June 2004 decisions - Western commitments to promote democracy has been renewed and perhaps strengthened.

Democracy promotion is all but a new idea or policy. It stems, first, from Wilsonian democratic interventionism. Then, it has been strongly promoted and supported by the rise of neo-liberal theories attempting to supersede more traditional realistic thinking in international relations. After the Second World War and the defeat of European and Japanese totalitarianism, neo-liberal thinking contributed to and received from the new multilateral trends in international relations and Western Europe's integration further impulses. These impulses turned into a number of policy approaches and measures intended to promote democracy in international relations.

During the Cold War, the West was less engaged in expanding democracy elsewhere than in defending existing Western democracies. In this sense, the Conference on Security and

Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was rather modest in promoting democracy; it worked to some degree in human rights application in the Soviet Union and, above all, the Eastern European countries. The idea of an expansion of democracy took on full importance with the collapse of Communism. Two concerns emerged: (a) in the broader international sphere, a concern for stabilisation in view of the eruption of numerous ethnic, religious and national conflicts, especially in the area of the former Soviet empire; (b) in the lesser European sphere, a concern to prevent such conflicts from seizing, involving and destroying the democratic regime painfully and brilliantly built up in Western Europe during the Cold War.

Both concerns led to Western and European policies aimed at including the countries returning from the Communist collapse by promoting democratic regimes in their domestic arenas. Promoting democracy was regarded not only as a moral duty but also as a security strategy. Thus, in the last ten-fifteen years, democracy promotion essentially involved the West itself (a wider West, now including Russia) and seemed to be a combination of idealism and security. However, this combination very quickly became important beyond Western borders as well, so democracy promotion started to expand beyond the West.

The Europeans were quick to build on their integrationist post-Second World War experience to set out a doctrine pinpointing the broad and universal benefits of democracy. This doctrine stresses the inherent correlation between democracy, on one hand, and peace and economic development, on the other. On the other hand, economic co-operation and integration strengthen countries' interest in peaceful relations. Democracy directs governments and institutions towards a dominant concern for the civil, political and human rights of citizens over and above the interests of nations. Thus, war becomes unlikely or obsolete and tensions are negotiated. At the European Council of Copenhagen, in December 1993, the European Union (EU) member states pointed out that democracy, respect for human rights and minorities, and the rule of law constitute their identity and at the same time the platform of their foreign policy. So, democracy promotion, from the internal sea of the West and Europe, set sail for more distant shores. This platform informs the EU policy of enlargement towards the European East, the war in the Balkans, the relations with Africa South of Sahara, Latin America and Asia. In particular, it shapes the EU approach towards the Mediterranean and, broadly speaking, the Middle East. Ultimately, in 1995 it brought about the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).

In the EMP framework, there are at least two important lessons to be learned that I would like to talk about briefly in this paper. The first lesson is the incompatibility of the EU and Arab governments' interests with respect to political reform. The second regards European misconceptions about political Islam and, more in general, the actors actually playing on the MENA stage.

To illustrate the incompatibility just referred to, we have to go back to the birth of the Barcelona process. The Barcelona Declaration was initiated by the Europeans essentially with a view to promoting political reform in the Arab countries and, as a consequence, peaceful and more secure relations in the region. It was the Mediterranean application of the European doctrine about the expected beneficial impact of democracy on international security, and the consequent necessity to promote it, particularly in the EU neighbourhood.

In the very extensive talks subsequent to the inception of the Barcelona process in November 1995, the political reforms aimed at by the Declaration practically vanished. In fact, the Arab diplomats very aptly made clear that, for the sake of the principle whereby in a regional security arrangement all the members have to enjoy the same level of security, European demands for political reform in the Arab countries with a view to assuring their

interest in regional long-term security and stability had to be balanced by Arab demands for security and stability in their domestic arena. The undercutting argument was that the political reform intended to assure European security could put the stability of Arab regimes at risk. The EMP partners, so the argument ran, had to act according to a principle of comprehensive or equal security so as to reconcile different security requirements in the region.

The EMP partners started negotiating in this perspective with a view to setting out a Charter stating principles and instruments to assure a reciprocal 'comprehensive' security. However, they failed to come to a solution. In fact, between the second semester of 1996, when the Senior Officials started talks on the Charter, and 2000, when the *intifada Al-Aqsa* erupted after the failure of Camp David II, the gap between the Euro-Med parties kept widening until the Foreign Ministers decided at the Marseilles ministerial conference to put the Charter talks on hold indefinitely. The breaking off of negotiations could have seemed to be a consequence of the Palestinian uprising and the strong Israeli reaction (or overreaction) to it. In reality, both merely provided an opportunity to discontinue a process of negotiations whose objectives were entirely unacceptable to and largely dreaded by Arab governments, even more so in the context of a peace process that was collapsing.

Thus, the first lesson to be learned from the Barcelona process is ambivalent. One interpretation could be that platforms of co-operation between Western and Arab countries cannot work because it is too difficult to reconcile their respective concepts of security. A second interpretation is that reconciling Western or European security requirements with Arab ones may not be easy, yet the partners have to keep on negotiating and talking to find limited compromises and dialogue formats which in the long run might generate momentum and give way to working agreements on both reforms and security. For the time being, the second interpretation is the driving force behind EU policies towards the Mediterranean, as recently rearranged in the framework of the so-called European Neighbourhood Policy. In this policy, in fact, the aim of reform is still prominent, yet it is pursued by more flexible and differentiated policies than was the case with the earlier Barcelona agenda.

The second lesson to be learned from the EMP process concerns Europe's (and the West's) poor and inarticulate understanding of the Islamic revival in the Arab and - more broadly speaking - Muslim countries. The movement of Islamic reform stems from the questions raised by the Arab-Muslim decline at the end of the 19th century in the face of Western economic, political and colonial expansion. The reform is a *jihad*. It is intended to enable Muslims to find their own responses to modernity and change by drawing on the correct reinterpretation of their authentic religious and cultural roots. From this large reform movement a violent and extremist minority has evolved, particularly since the end of the 1960s. From the 1980s onward, the war in Afghanistan triggered the further radicalisation that has brought about the present transnational stream of terrorism. Old and new extremists represent a minority, however, with respect to a majority of people who are not against the West and are ready to consider the challenges posed by modernity and inter-cultural relations, albeit on the condition that the West refrains from interfering and claiming its superiority under the mantle of universalism.

The West has largely ignored this state of affairs in the past, and even today remains partly unaware of it and substantially fails to realise the way things stand with respect to the Islamic reform movement. When the extremist wings of the Islamic reform movement emerged with their violence against the established secular and nationalist governments - for instance with the assassination of President Sadat - the Western countries were struck by a unilateral perception of political Islam. They saw the extremists and ignored the Islamic political mainstream of moderate reformers.

As a consequence of this misperception, the West has worked its way into an uneasy dilemma that, more often than not, remains unsolved even today. On one hand, the West and, in particular, the EU – within the framework of the EMP – insists that political reforms be implemented. On the other hand, it is inhibited in seriously claiming or pushing for such reforms out of fear of radical Islamism. As a result, despite Western commitment to democracy promotion, political reforms are just not promoted. It is well known that, when the Islamic Salvation Front was likely to win the 1991-92 electoral process in Algeria, Edward Djeredjan, then American Under-secretary of State, put the dilemma succinctly into words: ‘one man, one vote, one time’. And the military *coup d'état* was swallowed as the lesser evil. Subsequently, the EU grew very critical of the Algerian military regime. Still, because of the above dilemma, it has never implemented conditionality on economic aid against the Algerian government - nor any other Mediterranean Arab government.

Thus, the second important lesson to be learned is that Western and European governments are paralysed in their aspiration to promote democracy in the Arab-Muslim world by their belief that there is no alternative to Islamic radicals and extremists. Quite the contrary, there is a large religious movement of reform that could constitute an alternative to present governments, although it has reservations - but not prejudicial hostility - towards Europe and the West. In sum, the West believes it is supporting regime stability against religious radicals. In fact, the support it provides is directed equally against the liberal and democratic religious alternative it continues to ignore.

A third important lesson is less sophisticated than the two previous ones and more topical. It does not concern the EU experience with its EMP initiative but the initiatives undertaken by the current US administration: the war on Iraq, the pressure exerted on the Palestinian National Authority to undertake a ‘little’ regime change, and the agendas for co-operation with Arab and Muslim countries, in particular the Greater Middle East Initiative (subsequently transformed into the Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa endorsed by the G-8 at Sea Island on 9 June 2004). The lesson is that democracy cannot be promoted by coercion. Nor can it be promoted by unilateral agendas, as enlightened as they may be. Coercion and unilateralism, rather than supporting democrats and liberals in the Arab and Muslim countries, be they secular or religious, engender alliances against intrusion between the different political actors (including the regimes) and, at the end of the day, turn out to be more supportive of those who oppose reform than those who foster it.

To a large extent, this lesson does not require elaboration. The meaning is rather plain. An important aspect, however, deserves further comment. In fact, apart from the obvious contradiction in trying to promote democracy by using force, even where force is not employed democracy cannot be imposed by any kind of unilateral action or thinking.

The reference here is not to the indignant reactions of most MENA governments to the draft of the Greater Middle East Initiative. That draft, like other co-operative agendas initiated by Western or European governments, was proposing not imposing solutions. In general, these forums set up political and diplomatic dialogues in which solutions and proposals are debated and eventually endorsed. Their ability to coerce - for instance, by applying conditionality schemes – has proven very limited and almost non-existent.

The problem is not with these forums in themselves, but with the value-laden concept of democracy that the West has in mind as a blueprint for everybody else. The Western concept of democracy is a complex one. Democracy must be understood as a regime that is partly exportable and partly indigenous. The institutions meant to protect citizens from arbitrary acts

and offences and to allow them free choice on a constitutional basis are the exportable component of democracy, whereas the substance of these choices has to remain fully in the hands of local citizens and should not be affected or imposed by outside powers. So, for example, Iraqi citizens should have been free to choose a legal order predicated on the *sharia* as the first source of law, even though we dislike it in the West (and probably rightly so). On the contrary, the co-operative agendas put forward by the West are – more or less inadvertently – based on a detailed and comprehensive definition of democracy. They thereby impose solutions or values that do not necessarily pertain to the concept of democracy. Or at least, this is the impression their interlocutors get.

Consequently, the important lesson to retain here is that democracy in international relations needs to be a limited and functional concept. It should be limited to promoting the institutions needed to attain consensus in addressing social issues. It should not concern the substance of the issues themselves.

If we now take into consideration these main lessons of the events of the last ten years or so, we may have a better understanding of the challenges that lie ahead for the West and its policies of democracy promotion.

First, the West should carry out policies of democracy promotion primarily aimed at setting up constitutional mechanisms to guarantee citizens freedom of choice and security *vis-à-vis* domestic coercion. The substance of choices, their contents and significance ought definitely to be left up to them. The youngest Western democracies that emerged in Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal) set up, first, their democratic constitutional systems and only subsequently and gradually processed within their context a number of social issues and values (divorce, abortion, the role of women, etc.) which brought them closer to the standard concept of democracy of the West. For this reason, Western policies to promote democracy in the MENA area should aim first of all at promoting institutions, the rule of law and good governance, leaving it up to the people of the region to mature their own forms and layers of democracy.

This prescription is requiring less of a change in the existing platforms of co-operation than in the broad attitudes and expectations of Western governments and public opinions. The West, while asking immigrants for full respect of its own cultures and rules (keeping aloof of multiculturalist delusions), should be more relaxed and tolerant with respect to developments in the MENA countries. While it should remain adamant on the point of political constitutional reforms, it should largely disengage on all other issues.

Second, the West has to find its way out of the false dilemma between existing regimes and radical Islamists. Western countries must be aware that there is an alternative to this dilemma constituted by coalitions of secular and, most of all, religious liberals. The fear of a radical take-over has been and continues to be an interference in the political autonomy of the Arab-Muslim countries; it paralyzes Western policy and, ironically, acts as an obstacle to the West's very aspiration of promoting democratic change in the MENA countries. As a matter of fact, democracy promotion policies should focus on how to strengthen and support liberals, so as to enable them to do the job by themselves.

It is very likely that religious-secular coalitions, were they to come to power, would not immediately undertake reform of a number of social aspects which, rightly or wrongly, are perceived by the West as qualifying a full-fledged democracy, or would not do it very soon. Yet, these coalitions will have a basically liberal orientation. As such, they would establish the political and institutional mechanisms which, sooner or later, would allow the national community to debate issues and make its choice in a democratic perspective. Over time,

Western and Muslim societies would remain culturally distinctive, yet they would become very close from the point of view of their democratic political regimes.

Third and finally, any policy of democracy promotion needs to reassure all Muslim actors – regimes as well as the opposition – by strengthening international legality and reinforcing multilateral institutions. This means essentially two things: first, that the use of force should be kept out of promoting democracy; second, that Western double standards in international policies should be eliminated as much as possible, so as to bestow more credibility and effectiveness on Western democracy promotion policies in the eyes of both liberal and democratic Muslims.

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## Appendix 1

### Activities of the IAI project on Transatlantic Perspectives on Relations across the Mediterranean border

#### 1. Seminar on “Setting up a nucleus of NATO Mediterranean Dialogue Academic Institutions”, Rome July 7, 2001

##### Papers

Roberto Aliboni, *Think Tanks As A Cooperative Factor In Nato's Mediterranean Dialogue*

Jean-François Daguzan, *Le rôle des institutions académiques dans le renforcement de la coopération en matière de sécurité autour de la Méditerranée*

Carlo Masala, *Western-Mediterranean Security Relations: Issues And Challenges*

Daniela Pioppi, Report on the Seminar “Setting up a nucleus of NATO Mediterranean Dialogue Academic Institutions”, Rome, July 7th, 2001

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## **2. International Conference on “Governing Stability Across the Mediterranean Sea: a Transatlantic Perspective”, Rome 21-23 March 2002**

### **Papers**

Roberto Aliboni, *Between Dialogue and Partnership: What North-South Relationship Across the Mediterranean?* [published as “Upgrading Political Responses in the Mediterranean”, *The International Spectator*, Rome, Vol. XXXVII, No 2, April-June 2002, pp. 103-112.]

Béchrir Chourou, *Islamism: Roots and Prospects*

Álvaro de Vasconcelos, *Ten points on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership* [published as “Seven Points on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, *The International Spectator*, Rome, Vol. XXXVII, No 2, April-June 2002, pp. 113-120.]

Michael D. Intriligator, *Globalization of the World Economy: Potential Benefits and Costs and a Net Assessment*

Ian O. Lesser, *Coalition Dynamics In The War Against Terrorism* [published as “Coalition Dynamics In The War Against Terrorism”, *The International Spectator*, Rome, Vol. XXXVII, No 2, April-June 2002, pp. 43-50.]

Maria Cristina Paciello, Conference on “After September 11<sup>th</sup>, Governing Stability Across the Mediterranean Sea: a Transatlantic Perspective”, Rome, 21-23 March 2002, A Conference Report

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### **3. International workshop on “Trans-Atlantic and Trans-Mediterranean Relations: Perceptions in the Aftermath of September 11<sup>th</sup>” - Rome, October 1<sup>st</sup>, 2002**

#### **Papers**

Roberto Aliboni, *After September 11th: Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East in a Transatlantic Perspective.*  
Mohammed Khair Eiedat, *Aftermath of 11<sup>th</sup> of September: An Arab Perspective.*  
Mark A. Heller, *After September 11<sup>th</sup>.*  
F. Stephen Larrabee, *The Impact of September 11 on U.S. Policy in the Middle East and Transatlantic Relations*

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**4. Tasks for transatlantic cooperation: Peace-, institution-, and nation-building in the Mediterranean and the Middle East - Rome, 4-5 July 2003**

**Papers**

Roberto Aliboni & Laura Guazzone, *Promoting Political Reform in the Middle East and the Mediterranean*

Jarat Chopra, *Third Party Intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*

Mohammed Dajani, *The Palestinian Reform*

Tim Niblock, *Reconstruction and Economic Development in the Mediterranean and Middle East in a Transatlantic Perspective*

Marina Ottaway, *Nation-building in the Greater Middle East*

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## **5. Democracy and Security in the Barcelona Process. Past Experiences, Future Prospects, Rome on 7-8 May 2004**

### **Papers**

Roberto Aliboni, *The Debate on Promoting Democracy: Lessons Learned and Future Challenges*

Rosa Balfour, *Democracy and Security in the Mediterranean: Recent Policy Developments*

Laura Guazzone, *Remarks on Arab Debates about Democracy*

Tobias Schumacher, *Quo Vadis "Barcellona"? Reflecting on the Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*

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## **6. Published in the IAI Paper Series:**

### **a. "Security Across the Mediterranean. Challenges and Cooperative Approaches After September 11"**

#### *Content:*

F. Stephen Larrabee, *The Impact of September 11 on U.S. Policy in the Middle East and Transatlantic Relations*

Mohammed Khair Eiedat, *Aftermath of 11<sup>th</sup> of September: An Arab Perspective*

Ian O. Lesser, *Coalition Dynamics In The War Against Terrorism*

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