

dent too sympathetic to the foreign policy and security views of the United States in the wider Middle East. In other words, it was an initiative around which all the political forces in France could be rallied.

In sum, it is extensively agreed that the idea behind the Mediterranean Union project is based on a triple diagnosis made by President Sarkozy: the marginalization of the Mediterranean in the world economy; the inadequacies of the EU's Mediterranean policy, and the erosion of France's role as a geopolitical actor in the Mediterranean.⁵ And all seem to agree that the main value of Sarkozy's proposal is that it has contributed towards renewing debate about the geopolitical importance of the Mediterranean region.

How did the idea evolve over the last 15 months? In fact, it started out as a Union of the Mediterranean, or Mediterranean Union, only including the riparian countries and excluding the non-Mediterranean EU members. Then, in Rome, on December 20, 2007, the mini-summit between the heads of state and governments of France, Italy and Spain adopted the "Appel de Rome",³ in which the initiative was turned into a Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), excluding the possibility of their membership, but making room for some form of participation of the Commission and, eventually, of non-Mediterranean EU countries eager to play a role in the area. Thereafter, at the March 3, 2008 meeting in Hanover between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Sarkozy, it was decided that the EU members would not be divided into Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean, nor given different roles with respect to the Union for the Mediterranean. "It will be", in the words of Chancellor Merkel, "a project of the 27 member states of the [European] Union".⁴

Finally, in the European Council of March 13-14, 2008 held in Brussels, the initiative (which the "Appel de Rome" had apparently construed as a Franco-Spanish-Italian demarche) was brought to the attention of the other EU members as a common Franco-German endeavour, in view of the final decisions on content and shape that are to be taken in the Euro-Med summit that France will hold in Paris on July 13-14, 2008. Although the EU members took good note of the Franco-German initiative, it has not been officially approved.⁵ The Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels Council are very general and refer to the issue in extremely broad terms in a very brief annex, inviting "the Commission to present to the Council the necessary proposals for defining the modalities of what will be called 'Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean'".⁶

After this long sequence of events, the contours defining the relationship between the EU and the UfM have begun to emerge. Although the final result will only become clear when the July Paris summit is over, one can argue the following on the basis of what has unfolded so far:

(a) The UfM, as a union of sovereign states, cannot be an organic part of the EU. While the EMP is an EU policy to which the Southern Mediterranean Partners are closely associated, an inter-state UfM will remain outside the EU ambit;

(b) Apparently, the Brussels Council conceived of a way to enlarge the Barcelona Process so as to include the UfM under its umbrella, in addition to the EMP. In truth, so far the Barcelona Process has been technically synonymous with the EMP, although in a broad and discursive sense other processes, such as the 5 + 5 Group, the Forum for the Mediterranean and the Agadir Pact, could also be included within it. The March 13-14, 2008 Brussels Council could turn out to be a historic meeting, in that it has established the Barcelona Process as a diplomatic constellation of various different Euro-Mediterranean processes (the EMP, the UfM, the 5 + 5, etc.) that are in some way related to one another – together forming a kind of "greater" Barcelona Process;

(c) The EMP and the UfM will remain two distinctive endeavours, each with its own internal organisation. The majority of the same countries will most probably participate in the UfM, as well as the EMP, albeit in different capacities and roles. At the time of writing (mid-May 2008), it appears that on the Mediterranean side, it is not only the usual 10 countries that have been invited to participate in the UfM (i.e. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey), but now also Albania, Libya, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Mauritania and Monaco – i.e. a total of 17 that do not belong to the EU, bringing the total of prospective members up to 44. But membership in the EMP and UfM might become increasingly overlapped, seeing as there are now emerging some parallel proposals to enlarge the current membership of the EMP.

In the Brussels Council, the Commission was mandated by EU members to provide suggestions on the "modalities" whereby the UfM can remain under the umbrella of the Barcelona

³ "Appel de Rome pour l'Union pour la Méditerranée de la France, l'Italie et l'Espagne", December 20, 2007; in the web site of the Italian Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

⁴ From the French text of the "Conférence de presse conjointe de Mme Angela Merkel, Chancelier de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne et de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République", on the web site of the French Republic Presidency.

⁵ During the press conference on the night of March 13, President Sarkozy took it for granted "la décision de transformer le processus de Barcelone en Union pour la Méditerranée ... sur la base du papier franco-allemand"; however the European Council's Presidency Conclusions do not corroborate his view. See "Conférence de presse de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, lors du Conseil Européen de Bruxelles, Jeudi 13 mars 2008" on the French Republic Presidency web site.

⁶ "Statement on 'Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean'" in the Annex 1 to the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council 13-14 March 2008, on the web site of the EU Presidency.

Process, in addition to the EMP; in other words, how the two entities can govern their reciprocal relations by implementing two different agendas with respect to the same objective (and how the EU will re-organise itself within the EMP framework);

(d) One should note that when the EU members gather in Paris, they (as well as the Southern Mediterranean partners) may agree, unanimously or not, upon setting up the UfM. If only part of the EU members agree, and the others nonetheless still accept the principle of the UfM as an EU action within the “greater” Barcelona Process, the result will be a reinforced cooperation. Indeed, were the UfM to constitute the source of a plurality of projects, it would appear more a cluster of reinforced cooperation actions, rather than a single action, or a kangaroo-like reinforced cooperation action. It may well happen that EU members that are not willing to be regular partners of the UfM, would nevertheless be willing to take part in one or more of its projects. No doubt, the EU will have to put its lawyers to work in order to make the UfM feasible as a reinforced cooperation and, more generally, to outline the right governance model for the new “greater” Barcelona constellation;

(e) New flexibilities in external relations between member states and the Commission have developed in the past years: ways and means of sharing responsibilities have emerged, as well as greater flexibility in members states’ options to participate in sub-regional cooperation schemes stretching across EU borders, as in the case of the Nordic Dimension and, to some extent, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation-BSEC. In its follow-up of the Brussels Council’s request to set out proposals, with a view to including the UfM in the Barcelona Process, the Commission could make use of such flexibilities.⁷ This perspective of flexibility may however end up severely limited by the inherently rigid nature of an inter-state union such as President Sarkozy wishes the UfM to be. The talks, which will take place between now and the July Paris summit, will obviously seek to strike a balance between flexibility and rigidity. As pointed out, the French UfM proposal shows an inclination towards evolution. It may well continue evolving.

(f) There still remain many unknowns at the time of writing. In particular, and notwithstanding points (b) and (c) above, it is not yet clear whether the idea is to create a sort of “G-8 of the Mediterranean”, as those French officials involved in negotiating a joint Declaration in July 2008 seem to have in mind and support; or whether the project will be organically related to the Barcelona Process and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. On the one hand, the agreements reached at the Brussels European Council seem to privilege the latter view. But on the other, the membership of the two processes is different, since 44 countries will be involved in the new UfM, more than the 39 involved in the EMP. It is also clear that this is not an EU-driven project as are the ENP and the EMP. The right of exclusive initiative given to the EU Commission, which is so typical both of the ENP and the EMP, is no longer there. Moreover, it is the new Council of the UfM (representing all the members of the Union, potentially numbering 44) that must decide every two years which projects are to be selected. Quite interestingly, the EU’s Council of Ministers seems to take a backseat here.

(g) If one is guided by the record of the ECJ and the EP in similar ventures, it is not at all clear what their view might be about such a decision-making structure. Suffice here to highlight the *pandemonium* raised by the ECJ in the early 1990s, when suggestions were made by EFTA countries towards creating the European Economic Area to have a joint EFTA-EC Court of Justice. A way out of the *conundrum* is to confine projects to areas that are not of the exclusive competence of the EU (first pillar). But then this would exclude any project dealing with trade and competition. Even for fields where there is at present shared competence between the EU and its Member States (e.g. in the domain of migration, trade in services, and agriculture), huge legal difficulties could be raised by the ECJ to the EU’s Council of Ministers before any project in these domains are to be adopted by the UfM.

(h) At present, the new slogan being used by French negotiators to sell the project to the other 43 potential members of the UfM is to present it as “A projects’ Union for a Union project” (“*une union de projets pour un projet d’Union*”). Nicolas Sarkozy has stressed that the private sector would (or should) take the lead in financing the projects, but that of course some financial public institutions would be called on to provide financial support and expertise (e.g. FEMIP). In passing, the project approach is nothing but new. This approach was tried during the Oslo Process when the so-called US-inspired MENA Business Conferences were organized in parallel in Casablanca, Amman and Doha. As we know, the idea amounted to nothing when the Oslo Process failed. Contrary to what President Sarkozy states, this is not the ECSC approach he so keenly mentions in his Press conferences. The latter, privileged by Jean Monnet, was anything but business-oriented. Jean Monnet believed in using strong supranational structures to bind sovereign countries together, thus preventing their bid for escape the moment they are confronted with a crisis. In turn,

⁷ Michael Emerson, “Making Sense of Sarkozy’s Union for the Mediterranean”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 155, March 2008.

this would preclude that private firms fear for their investments. Nothing of the sort is present in Sarkozy's approach, nor in the MENA Conferences' approach.

(i) There is then also the myth whereby the ECSC, which was a sectorial organization, preserved peace between France and Germany through a process of irrevocable interdependence and habit-creating socialization. But this took place after Germany had been totally defeated by the Allies and had no possibility of returning to an independent path. What is more, NATO is known to have been created not only to keep the Soviets out, but also to keep the Germans down. Finally, as indicated above, supranational institutions such as the High Authority were set up to control the re-industrialization of Germany from above. This is not to say that the economic interdependence and socialization brought about by the ECSC did not play a role in maintaining peace and stability, but all those elements just mentioned were also crucial. And it is these sorts of conditions that do not prevail in the Mediterranean, nor in Middle East.

(j) Prospective organizational and logistical hitches may revolve around the following questions: How will Mediterranean non-EU member countries choose their co-president? If no automatic rotation is instituted, will this not mean that the same countries (i.e. the least controversial) will always be chosen? Who will financially support a Secretariat of between 20 to 30 persons? Even if the Secretariat is composed of seconded officials from the Member States or from the Commission, as Commission experts expect, various other expenditures would remain to be covered. Furthermore, if a sense of "ownership" is so important, how is this possible without financial contributions from those Mediterranean countries involved in projects? If the Secretariat is to be based in an Arab country, such as Tunisia (as has been rumoured), with no peace agreement having been signed with Israel, how can the former guarantee the well-being and security of the Israeli members in the Secretariat? Finally, if the financial envelope devoted to the different EU Mediterranean agendas is not expected to be dramatically increased, what kind of reaction can be expected from those Mediterranean countries that have regularly benefited from MEDA, EMPI and FEMIP funds and are now being told that part of these sources of finance will be decreased in order to make room for possible regional projects, which on top of this, might not involve the country in question?

After this short introduction, which has tried to explain the options made available and the problems still unresolved, this Report will now try to provide an overview of the different views existing in the main zones of the Euro-Med area. We will start with the views of some European countries, to then be followed by the perspectives developing in the Southern Rim of the Mediterranean.

Because the observer's origin and the location from which he writes very much colours his views, we have opted to first have each author draw his own conclusions and recommendations. Then, in a short section that includes some final remarks, we have summed up some policy suggestions around which emerged broad consensus regarding their soundness.

But let us now get started...

Southern European Perspectives

by Roberto Aliboni

The Background

This section of the report is devoted to Southern European EU countries: their views on the Euro-Med perspective and their reactions to France's proposal. The French proposal has raised special interest in these countries, given that they feel themselves directly implicated as Mediterranean countries and potential members of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). The debate on both the future of the Euro-Med framework and the UfM initiative has been most intense in Spain and Italy. The UfM initiative has managed to raise interest in Slovenia, even if only because this country holds the EU Presidency in the first semester of 2008. It has also been debated in Greece and Malta, and much less so in Portugal. This report is essentially based on reactions from Spain and Italy.

In general, the Southern European EU countries are attracted by the UfM as a means to refocus EU interest on the Mediterranean; nevertheless they are concerned by its inherent antagonism with the EU "acquis" towards the area. This is why we will consider Southern European EU countries' responses to President Sarkozy's initiative and, more broadly speaking, the question of the Euro-Med's future, first in a "Mediterranean" perspective and subsequently in a "European" one. On the basis of these analyses, we will draw some conclusions and recommendations.

The Mediterranean Perspective

The Marseille ministerial conference of 2000 should still be seen as a turning point in the Barcelona Process. After four years of negotiations, the Partners admitted at this conference that they had been unable to establish a common ground. The Northern Partners had called upon the Southern countries, in particular the Arab Partners, to promote political reforms on the assumption that such reforms would strengthen long-term security in the area. This demand was, however, perceived by the Southern Partners as a threat to their domestic stability. Furthermore, the EMP, despite its declaratory policy in favour of a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, was unable to do anything substantial to address a conflict that the Southern Partners regard as a major threat to their security. In the Arab view, the EMP was intended to meet the EU's security requirements, while neglecting their own. This is why the Arabs considered the EMP unsuited for security cooperation and requested an EMP essentially aimed at co-development within the context of a broad diplomatic dialogue. In Marseille, the Partners proved unable to reconcile these opposing views, but nonetheless decided to retain the EMP as a broad framework for diplomatic dialogue and cooperation and to continue to work together in this partnership.

Since the turn of the century, the EMP has been affected by three strategic changes, namely: (a) the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, and the ensuing global war on terrorism launched by the US administration; (b) the enlargement of the EU into Eastern Europe in 2004; (c) the increase in immigration towards the EU from the Mediterranean shores and of migrants travelling across the Mediterranean from more distant areas.

With the latest enlargement, the EU decided to pursue one single policy towards all its neighbours, whether in the east or the south – the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This decision largely amputated the second pillar of the Barcelona Process and has focused the Commission's efforts on the ENP. Consequently, there have been a number of changes in the EMP profile: the relative weight of the political dialogue within the Partnership has become far more significant; the role of EU governments has become more important than that of the Commission, the regional dimension has substantially weakened to the advantage of bilateral relations; important economic goals, such as the free trade area, remain part of the EMP, but their implementation depends to a large extent on the ENP as well; the network of Association Agreements are *de facto* more functional to the ENP than the EMP. Despite the assumption that the EMP and the ENP will be complementary and mutually supportive, the EMP looks seriously diminished and somehow depleted. Today, the EMP is essentially an intergovernmental forum. Ironically, it focuses on the field – political and security dialogue – in which it proved least effective and cohesive. As a result, the early EMP agenda lost itself and something new is urgently needed.

Then again, terrorism and immigration have brought about a shift in the EU's broad security vision with respect to the Mediterranean. The EU response has been a strong securitization of these two issues and, more broadly speaking, of other soft security factors.⁸ Despite the progress made in the implementation of the common EU space of freedom, justice and security, terrorism and immigration remain mostly in the hands of European governments, which have quite different visions and policies with respect to the two issues, especially immigration and related questions (citizenship, asylum, etc.). The only orientation they share is the need to keep issues as domestically sensitive as immigration and terrorism under their sovereignty. As a result, while governments take terrorism and immigration into

8 Sarah Collinson, "Security or Securitisation? Migration and the Pursuit of Freedom, Security and Justice in the Euro-Mediterranean Area", EuroMeSCo e-news, No. 19, November 2007, www.euromesco.net

consideration as part of the EMP agenda, it is definitely not within the EMP framework that they make or implement their decisions. As such, with respect to issues of vital interest to the Mediterranean, such as terrorism and immigration, the EMP hardly plays a significant role today. All in all, the ENP touches upon a number of varied and important questions, but not the key ones. This is particularly embarrassing with respect to immigration, which at the end of the day is the most serious issue in current Euro-Med relations.

The marginalisation of the EMP has been met with different responses in Europe. The most conventional response, coming from a good number of EU governments, is that despite its limits – and as serious as these may be – a shared Euro-Med framework is an irreplaceable and indispensable instrument of foreign policy, international governance and broad security. Other responses, in contrast, express strong dissatisfaction with this situation and emphasise the need to go beyond the EMP if Europe is to tackle the real challenges facing the Mediterranean and the EU after the strategic changes of the last decade. Suggestions include the Euro-Mediterranean Union (EMU) advocated by Spain and the UfM put forward by France. Let's consider these different responses.

The first, widespread response is that the conditions to establish a common ground in the Euro-Med space are objectively weak and that this reality can hardly be changed for the time being. In this perspective, the initial expectations for the EMP will have to be downgraded: the political and security dimension cannot go beyond the present results of good socialization. Thanks to this socialization, the EMP – so the argument goes – is in any case a valuable asset. Fruitful cooperation is possible on a case-by-case basis. For this school of thought, the Anna Lindh Foundation and the institution of the Euro-Med Parliamentary Assembly are good achievements, attesting to the value and capabilities of the EMP as a conduit for EU cooperation with its Southern neighbours. In this view, it is worth trying to improve and reinvent the EMP without seeking any qualitative changes.

By contrast, another school of thought maintains that the EMP's institutional setting has to be decidedly upgraded so as to reinforce the Southern partners' sense of ownership with respect to the organisation. In 2006 and 2007, the Senior Officials discussed a number of non-papers proposing reforms for the EMP's organisational setting, such as a rotating North-South presidency, a strengthened secretariat and other measures (suggestions resurfacing regularly from previous efforts made in the same direction).⁹ While the Officials proved unable to reach an agreement, it is worth highlighting they were not aiming to transform the EMP from an EU policy associating external partners into an organisation of peers. They were not seeking to upgrade its institutional and political substance; they merely wanted to make the EMP more efficient. Therefore, the reforms considered by the Officials were, at the end of the day, more in keeping with the previous school of thought. In contrast, the response of genuinely working towards an upgrade of the EMP, so as to turn it into a coalition of peers, is the one championed by Spain.

In 2007, Spain suggested transforming the EMP into a Euro-Mediterranean Union. The Spanish Foreign Minister, Miguel Angel Moratinos, outlined the proposal in a speech made at the University of Malta on May 4th. His ideas were subsequently presented, in a slightly extended fashion, in an article appearing in *El País*.¹⁰ It envisages a Euro-Mediterranean Council of Ministers, composed of the heads of state and governments; the convening of inter-ministerial meetings of Foreign Affairs or Sectoral Ministers, every time this be required for the implementation of the EMU's agenda; a Committee of permanent national representatives and a Commission with secretarial tasks (made up of officials from both sides of the Mediterranean); and a reinforced Parliamentary Assembly. In his article, Moratinos adds that the Union would be instrumental to *integrating* relations between the two shores of the Mediterranean, particularly in assuring people greater freedom of movement in the area, something neither the EMP nor the EU is able or willing to do today. It is worth noting that what matters most in this Spanish initiative is not so much its institutional configuration, but rather the proposed integration of the European and the Southern Mediterranean area with the objective of allowing people free circulation. This response is an attempt to overcome the European self-deceiving idea that economies can be integrated while people are kept separate.

The third response identified is the UfM. Like the EMU, the major concern of the UfM is to assure Southern Mediterranean ownership. For this purpose, it proposes a G-8 summit-like structure headed by an EU/non-EU co-presidency. This would involve a biennial meeting of heads of state, alongside government and ministerial meetings that would be prepared and followed-up by a light secretariat formed by EU/non-EU personnel.¹¹ The UfM would not implement policies, a role performed by the EU, or get involved in too many fields, like the "holistic" EMP attempts to, but would instead pursue specific projects in key areas, such as energy, education, training for immigrants, etc.¹² While the UfM was initially in-

9 Dorothee Schmid, "Optimiser le processus de Barcelone", EU-Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Papers No. 36, July 2002.

10 "Del Proceso de Barcelona a la Unión Euromediterránea", August 2, 2007.

11 The structure illustrated here is the one outlined in the confidential Franco-German note circulated in the European Council of March 13-14, 2008.

tended as a structure quite apart from the EU and its EMP, in its most recent configuration, it seems that this initiative will be integrated into the EU alongside the EMP.

Whether integrated or not in the Barcelona Process and the EU, the UfM stems from a substantively different perspective than the EMP. Apparently, there is some convergence between the UfM and the EMU, seeing as both aim to institutionally upgrade Euro-Med relations and thus supersede the ENP experience. But they are also quite different, in that they are based on distinct strategic visions. The EMU is based on a long-term objective of integration across the Mediterranean. In this sense, as was aptly noted by Jean-Robert Henry,¹³ its pivotal feature is the upholding of people's freedom to move within the Union's space, as of tomorrow, starting with a policy of openness towards immigration, as of today. The UfM, on the other hand, reflects President Sarkozy's political platform and in this sense, is inspired, among other factors, by a broad sense of confrontation with the Muslim world, beginning with Turkey. Apart from the rhetoric of Mediterranean solidarity and common heritage associated with the UfM, it has a technocratic and business-oriented agenda. According to this agenda, immigration is anything but a crisis to manage. Here the final aim is control, rather than freedom of movement¹⁴. Furthermore, while the EMU proposal is clearly founded in EU values and its experience of freedom, international integration and social cohesion, and while it tries to expand the area of communitarian power with respect to national power, both the UfM and today's intergovernmental EMP are outcomes of the ongoing process of European re-nationalization.¹⁵ In this process of re-nationalization, President Sarkozy plays a role that goes well beyond Euro-Med relations. As for other EU governments, they could be more "European" as far as the EU is concerned, but when it comes to immigration and terrorism in the EMP, they advocate an approach that is as re-nationalized as that of France.

In conclusion, three approaches can be discerned in Southern European EU countries:

(a) A conservative project aimed at preserving the EMP as a collective diplomatic framework, although subsidiary to increasingly national policies, especially as regards securitized issues such as immigration and terrorism – as they have developed in the last decade;

(b) An innovative (though ideologically conservative) project to establish a strongly inter-governmental UfM, in which the Commission, while not excluded, is offered only a limited role, and where participating governments would be allowed greater freedom when negotiating key projects and issues, without the burden of EU principles (or values);

(c) A third, also innovative, project that is institutionally similar to the second (two parallel Unions), but politically and ideologically very different: the EMU would adopt the EMP agenda and effectively advance it, by taking advantage of its platform of strongly reinforced ownership. In the long term, the EMU aims at integrating the EU with the Southern Mediterranean. In his article, Spain's Foreign Minister says "The moment has come to put a stop to this process and build up an effective geopolitical space by establishing the Euro-Mediterranean Union".

The European Perspective

All these approaches are now in competition within the Euro-Med arena. After the European Council's recent decisions in Brussels, it seems as though the approach based on a "continuation cum improvements" of the EMP is now the weakest of the possible options. The competition is thus between the UfM and the EMU proposals. Although the former would appear to be the winning approach, it may well be that the UfM will in further negotiations become imbued by elements of the EMU.

As was just outlined, there are significant differences between the UfM and the EMU from the Mediterranean perspective, but differences are also in evidence from the European perspective. Let us now look at the latter.

The EMU approach is ideologically and politically linked to the EU.¹⁶ This is not the case with the UfM approach. President Sarkozy's proposal, in its earlier formulations, was not only critical towards the EMP, but also politically hostile to EU primacy in the Mediterranean. French officials have sometimes spoken of complementarities between the UfM and the EMP.¹⁷ More often than not, though, they have pointed out that the UfM is something quite different from the Barcelona Process.¹⁸ As a matter of fact, what the UfM project suggests is that Sarkozy's France would like to leave the EMP to its fate, not wasting any more time in trying to reform or reinvigorate it, and use the UfM initiative as a means to assert France's leadership in the Mediterranean.

¹² A concept similar to the UfM (apparently contributing to its cultural background) is the "Community of the Mediterranean World" put forward in the works of Jean-Louis Guigou – a community which, following his line of thinking, would be distinct from and complementary to the EU. The rationale of this community is based on a doctrine asserting the superiority of North-South integration in the different hemispheres (which he calls "quartiers d'orange"), one being Europe, the Mediterranean and Africa. See: Jean-Louis Guigou, "La reconnexion des nord et des sud: l'émergence de la région Méditerranéenne (ou la théorie des 'quartiers d'oranges')", *Géoéconomie*, No. 42, 2007, pp. 55-60; Pierre Beckouche, Jean-Louis Guigou, *Méditerranée: d'un Euromed en panne à une région industrielle Nord-Sud*, *Horizons Stratégiques*, Centre d'analyse stratégique, No 3, January 2007.

¹³ "La Méditerranée de Nicolas Sarkozy", *La Croix*, October 9, 2007, and "Méditerranée: le malentendu", *Libération*, July 9, 2007. Henry points out that an integrationist proposal of sorts has been put forward by Dominique Strauss-Khan, who today "prefers to talk about a reconstitution of the Roman Empire"; in fact, the integrative logic would sooner or later bring about a common citizenship, as in the late Roman Empire.

Against this backdrop, in France itself,¹⁹ as well as elsewhere in Southern Europe, the French initiative has been appreciated from the beginning for its call in favour of the Mediterranean. Yet it also immediately generated a feeling that it had to be “tamed”, in other words “Europeanized”. As pointed out, European diplomatic efforts have actually worked in this direction – in particular, that achieved by Italy and Spain with the Declaration of Rome, as well as the German-France agreement reached in Hanover – resulting in a compromise whereby the UfM will be put under the umbrella of the Barcelona Process as a common EU endeavour. How this will be precisely developed depends on the talks that will take place in the coming months and the work carried out by the Commission. One point is already clear, however: independent of any other features, the new initiative will be a Union with the Mediterranean countries, in which all the EU members or at least a part of them will participate. Yet although the UfM may look like the winning approach, the project may well become hybridised by elements of the EMU during future negotiations. In any case, we will hereinafter speak of a UfM/EMU initiative. While awaiting further developments, we will now very briefly speculate on ways in which the UfM/EMU can be related to the EU in its Euro-Mediterranean sphere.

The intersection of the UfM/EMU with the EU involves, first of all, institutional and economic dimensions. To begin with, the economic point of view: any kind of new initiative, whether lying inside or outside the EU, makes sense only if it adds something different to the Euro-Med policies of economic integration already operating in the EMP and ENP, in other words, only if it offers ideas and instruments to overcome the limits of the long-standing EU policies that were intended to integrate the Mediterranean neighbours.

The broad limit of the Euro-Med “acquis” in this respect is that, while EU policies can help the Southern Mediterranean countries liberalise their economies, they are unable to jump-start development. What has to be added, from the economic point of view, is the necessary action of dynamic factors. Now, the ideas aired under the French plan for a UfM seem headed in this direction, and may prove able to do so. Indeed, a number of well-selected projects in key sectors, such as education and energy, efficiently developed by agencies without too many bureaucratic and political hindrances, and engaging the private sector could be pivotal in providing the dynamic factors that are presently amiss in the Euro-Med equation. (The same is true for the institution of a Mediterranean Development Bank, inspired by the model of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD): an initiative that could be developed even independently of the UfM).

Furthermore, if, thanks to its upgraded political and institutional format, the UfM/EMU were actually capable of increasing the sense of ownership of the Southern partners and, ultimately, provide the coalition with the common ground that the EMP so hopelessly sought in the past, the UfM/EMU might eventually offer solutions to the crucial question of immigration and the freedom of movement in the Euro-Med area. This would introduce a most significant and decisive dynamic factor into the picture. As we know, the spirit and the objectives of the UfM and the EMU are quite different. Any hybridisation would most probably pick up more from the latter than the former.

When it comes to the institutional dimension, we can envisage two different scenarios, depending on whether unanimous EU agreement on instituting a UfM/EMU is achieved or whether this agreement is limited to only some members. The Reiffers Report has quite clearly explained that this option is feasible and workable. In both cases, however, the EU will have to solve the problem of establishing coordination between its own Euro-Mediterranean programme and the UfM/EMU, as well as the action eventual members will take in the latter framework. In other words, it is obvious that the apparently emerging “greater” Barcelona Process will have to establish an institutional setting that allows for a proper division of labour between the dynamic role the UfM/EMU is expected to play, on one hand, and the “acquis” of past Euro-Med relations, on the other. The present governance of the EMP may easily be affected. The ENP may also not remain unaffected.

It is very likely that the Commission will be a member of the UfM/EMU. This would facilitate the overall governance of the “greater” Barcelona Process, yet one should keep in mind that the UfM/EMU will have its own secretariat. As such, the Commission’s role in the UfM/EMU will hardly be the same as the role it currently plays in the EMP. The presence of the Commission is important as regards financing. In this respect, the UfM/EMU is expected to raise funds for its own projects. However, the UfM/EMU could prove eligible for ENPI (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument) and other EU funds presently devoted to “regional cooperation”. No doubt, the Commission will make up its own mind about whether or not to finance the UfM/EMU projects and to what extent this will occur. Whether the UfM/EMU is eligible for EU funding for its projects is a political problem, seeing as it

14 During his electoral campaign, Mr. Sarkozy spoke of “immigration choisie” (selected immigration), following a paradigm widely advocated amongst the European right.

15 See the essay by José Ignacio Torreblanca, Sarkozy’s foreign policy: where do European interests and values stand?, FRIDE Commentary, Madrid, February 2008, who is afraid that the Treaty of Lisbon, another offspring of the European trend towards re-nationalization, may involve the risk “that the European Union (like the Mediterranean Union) might become a ‘union of projects’ rather than a ‘project of unity’”.

16 The details of its possible implementation have recently been set out in a research report by Gonzalo Escribano and Alejandro Lorca, *La Unión Mediterránea: una unión en busca de proyecto*, Real Instituto Elcano, Working Paper No. 13, Madrid, 3 March, 2008.

17 “Les relations euro-méditerranéennes aujourd’hui”, interview with François Gouyette, Ambassador in charge of the Euro-Mediterranean process, conducted by Catherine Véglio, *Confrontations Europe*, January-March 2008, pp. 15-17.

18 Henri Guaino, political advisor to President Sarkozy, points out: “the UfM is neither against Barcelona nor for it, it has a different kind of focus on it”, quoted in Dorothee Schmid, “La nueva paradoja francesa”, *El País*, July 15, 2007.

19 The Rapport Reiffers was a pioneer in declaring the need to make the UfM complementary to the EU. Had President Sarkozy followed the Rapport Reiffers’ suggestions, European diplomacy would have avoided wasting so much time and the political shocks suffered by the EU. See: Institut de la Méditerranée, *Rapport du Groupe d’experts réuni par l’Institut de la Méditerranée sur le projet d’Union Méditerranéenne*, Marseilles, October 2007 (Rapport Reiffers).

may throw the present financial equilibrium within the EU into question. In fact, Eastern and Northern countries will have to be assured that this new Mediterranean undertaking is not detracting funds from them or their interests. While the decision to make the UfM a common EU project has put an end to concerns about EU cohesion, misperceptions about financing could reintroduce such concerns. In this sense, defined and balanced rules on this point will be very important.

Conclusions and Recommendations

With the Europeanization of the French UfM initiative, most of the concerns originally raised have been eliminated. Nevertheless, the need to set out a clear pattern of governance in relations between the UfM/EMU, as well as those between the EU/EMP (and ENP), remains vital, especially if any resurfacing of these concerns is to be prevented. This is particularly true as regards financing issues.

Things appear even more uncertain and complex from the Mediterranean perspective. Here, EU members' opinions seem to diverge. Some, such as Northern EU countries, are happy with the EMP as it is. Others, such as Spain and France, believe that the EMP project has been exhausted and, for this reason, want to undertake an institutional upgrade. Clearly, Northern and Southern EU countries have different views on the relevance of the Mediterranean: the former are happy with Euro-Med taking a back-seat on the agenda, whereas the latter seek a higher profile.

Both the UfM and the EMU aim at upgrading EU-Mediterranean relations and capacities, however, the substance and finalities of their respective agendas are quite different: the EMU is committed to the long-term integration of the two shores and focuses on the freedom of movement of people within a progressively unified Euro-Med space; the UfM, on the other hand, is business-oriented and considers immigration as functional to this orientation. It calls for a well-regulated but not necessarily integrated area of mobility.

All the approaches here outlined are united by a distinctive preference for dealing with Mediterranean relations in a primarily inter-governmental framework. While the EMP has objectively become more inter-governmental than it used to be, due to securitization and the amputation entailed by the ENP, both the UfM and the EMU are clear manifestations of the belief that an inter-governmental coalition would be more effective in finding a common Euro-Med ground than the EMP has been able to do. Whether or not this is true remains to be seen.

The fact that the new inter-governmental framework could work better than the EMP may stem more from the lack of intention to promote political reforms, than from the framework's upgraded institutional content (ownership). This because, at the end of the day, the struggle to promote reform and human rights in the Southern Mediterranean has been the real stumbling block of the Barcelona Process. The EMP has abandoned this struggle (which was then partly taken up by ENP Action Plans); the EMU does not contemplate abandoning it, however, it deceives itself in believing that an inter-governmental Union will be more active in pursuing reforms than the EMP has been (especially when there seems to be a negative correlation between fostering Southern Mediterranean ownership and implementing reforms in the region); the UfM, realistically or cynically, has simply removed reform from the picture. It may be that it proves the winning approach for this very reason, and that governments, having overcome their problems with EU cohesion, will begin to look upon it favourably.

Having considered the arguments above, the following recommendations seem to be in order:

1. From the angle of EU cohesion, as well as the effectiveness of the UfM/EMU agenda, a project involving all 27 EU member states would be better than any reinforced cooperation;
2. A well balanced and clear governance pattern to manage relations between the various entities of the "greater" Barcelona Process constellation, in particular the UfM/EMU and the EMP, is essential both to foster the Euro-Mediterranean agenda and to avoid discontinuities in / risks for EU cohesion – financing of respective projects looms as an especially vulnerable point;
3. The overwhelmingly inter-governmental character being adopted by the Barcelona Process constellation should be attenuated and corrected by promoting

greater involvement of the Commission and civil societies, including the Parliamentary Assembly;

4. The reshuffling of the “greater” Barcelona Process should not fail to take immigration into due consideration. As previously mentioned, the UfM is considering projects devoted to improving the quality of immigrants (training, education) and the social conditions of immigration. Yet while these projects are welcome, in the UfM they will be inserted into a policy framework of control and limitation of immigration. This tendency to exclude has to be attenuated, if not altogether altered, keeping in step with the broad trend towards openness that is instead promoted by the EMU scheme. In any case, whether working with a UfM- or an EMU-like framework, one should not forget that EU immigration policy will always reflect each EU members’ will and ability to make significant progress in the space of justice, freedom and security and to become more cohesive. All in all, whatever the future shape of the “greater” Barcelona Process constellation, immigration will remain the most important issue, and the ability to deal with this matter will depend less on the Barcelona Process itself than on EU policy integration in immigration and related fields (asylum, citizenship, etc.);
5. Lastly, the EU should recover its interest in reforms and respect for human rights. Regardless of past failures and exaggerations, the EU cannot renounce this dimension lest it regress to a mere inter-state undertaking no longer able to reflect EU values. The UfM does not encompass political reform or human rights within its target issues, and, in a sense, is the offspring of an era of disappointment with the concrete possibility of promoting reform. Consequently, efforts to establish new and more effective policy fostering political reform should not be undertaken in the UfM framework, but elsewhere in the emerging wider Barcelona Process: either in the EMP or ENP. In any case, neither of these policies should be neglected in favour of the intergovernmental and business-oriented mood that seems to be prevailing in the broad context of Euro-Med relations.