Security
and Common Ground
in the Euro-Med Partnership

First Year Report

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EuroMeSCo Papers

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Security and Common Ground in the Euro-Med Partnership

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1. Introduction

During the six years that have elapsed since the signing of the Barcelona Declaration, the concept of security has proved central in the debate between the Northern and Southern Mediterranean Partners. To date, this debate has not yet generated a shared concept of security and has thus not allowed for the consolidation of that common conceptual ground so badly needed for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

The debate on security and common ground has taken place in a co-operative perspective, so that broad security or, as the Declaration says, "peace and stability" can be attained though cooperation. In trying to set up co-operation policies and institutions, however, it has become clear that the Partners have very different perceptions and requirements for security, so that co-operation within the Partnership has turned out to be less satisfactory than they and the Declaration had anticipated. Perceptions and visions have proved very different and, in some cases, almost opposed to one another. They range, in fact, from varying forms of comprehensive security co-operation (including military and non-military factors) to non-security co-operation (excluding security from the motivations and vision involved).

Because of such differences in security visions and perceptions, the Partners have not been able to identify a common ground to date nor to construct co-operation firmly upon it. Consequently, they were unable to sign the Euro-Mediterranean Charter on Peace and Stability – the common statement intended to spell out the rationale for their co-operation. Hence the importance of exploring the concept of security within the Euro-Med framework must continue so as to narrow the gaps between perceptions and goals and to make it possible to identify a common ground.

In its deliberations during 2001, the EuroMeSCo IAI-AEI Working Group on "The Euro-Med Charter: Searching for Common Ground" devoted its efforts to exploring concepts of security in order to identify some Euro-Med common ground. This Report is based on these deliberations, in particular on the seminar held in Tunis on 5-6 October and on the papers prepared by the members of the Group (see annex 1).

This Report, after an introduction (sec. 2) on the state of the debate in the Euro-Med Partnership (EMP) and the questions it raises for the Partners, presents three concepts relating to security – which are not necessarily mutually exclusive and discusses their significance for the Euro-Med context – comprehensive security (sec. 3); human security (sec. 4); and global security (sec. 5). In the final section (sec. 6), it draws conclusions and makes recommendations.

2. The question of security in the EMP: status and problems

At the November 2000 ministerial conference in Marseilles, after five year of talks between the Senior Officials of the participating countries, the EMP failed to adopt the Euro-Med Charter on Peace and Stability. There is no doubt that the possibility of reaching an even partial agreement on the draft was dashed by the crisis unleashed by the second Palestinian insurgency (*intifada*) at the end of September 2000. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the four years of talks on the Charter had nevertheless shed light on the fundamental disagreements that existed between the North and the South about the ways and means to achieve shared security and stability. Against the backdrop of a remarkable willingness to co-operate, two major disagreements had emerged from the Barcelona process.

One concerns the implementation of security co-operation according to the terms of the CSCE-style project sketched out in the first chapter of the Barcelona Declaration. After length talks, the ministers meeting in Malta agreed that that project was not feasible in the heterogeneous Euro-Med "security-complex"[1] and, in fact, moved from the idea of implementing Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), as a precursor of arms control and limitation, to Partnership-Building Measures (PBMs), as the basis for sharing a more comprehensive and essentially civilian concept of security. The real stumbling block was the unsolved conflict between Israelis and Arabs: no security co-operation is possible in the EMP unless the Middle East Peace Process is first concluded. The second disagreement does not depend on the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is about democracy, human rights and globalisation, regarded by European governments as building-blocks on the road to stability and by Arab (and to some extent the Turkish) governments as a recipe for interference and certain destabilisation.

While the Partners managed to get around the first area of disagreement by putting off the question of security co-operation in the context of the Declaration's first chapter, the second area has proven less amenable to compromise. Policy responses reflect differences. The North wants to conduct a proactive range of long-term policies aimed at fundamental political and economic reform in the Southern countries with a view to imposing systemic changes on their polities. The South, confronted with proactive Northern policy, conducts defensive policies intended to secure good political relations and socio-economic co-operation while avoiding interference and destabilisation. The South does not agree with the EU's systemic link between political and economic reform and the struggle to root out causes of instability and conflict. Most EMP Southern Partners maintain that the EU should help remove structural economic and social imbalances and leave Partners free to find their own way towards political stability and reform. In sum, for the sake of its security, the North tries to impose policies on the South which the latter perceives as factors of insecurity and domestic instability.

Any attempt to establish a common security ground must address this basic contradiction and find ways of reconciling the two stances. In this perspective, it must be noted that the lengthy talks on the Charter, although inconclusive, have significantly helped to narrow this area of contradiction, perhaps more significantly than the Partners realise. Significant moves towards sharing a security concept can be found in the Stuttgart "Guidelines" (1999), where the military component of security was put off indefinitely, and in the Malta declaration (1997), where the Middle East conflict was recognised as a common security factor. The most important move, however, was made in the 1998 Palermo declaration which underlined the essentially civilian character of EMP co-operation

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[1] In the sense this concept has been developed in the theory of international relations: Ole Wœver, Barry Buzan, "An Inter-Regional Analysis: NATO's New Strategic Concept and the Theory of Security Complexes", in S. Behrendt, C.-P. Hanelt (eds.), *Bound to Cooperate - Europe and the Middle East*, Bertelsman Foundation Publishers, Gütersloh, 2000, pp. 55-106. See also EuroMesco, Working Group on Political and Security Co-operation, Working Group on Arms Control, Confidence-Building and Conflict Prevention, *Joint Report*, Roberto Aliboni, Abdel Monem Said Aly and co-operative Álvaro Vasconcelos, April 1997.

and the use of PBMs. This declaration can be considered to be the first solid building-block of what could become a Euro-Med common ground.

Against this background, the Group considered the three concepts of security to test them as possible contributions to a Euro-Med security common ground.

3. Comprehensive security

During the Cold War era, a narrow, reductionist concept of security prevailed. It sought to prevent conflicts between the two superpowers and their allies. Generally, it concerned security between states and was applied mostly in the field of military security. It also concerned countries outside the superpower bloc. In general, the security status of these outside countries was not allowed to be disturbed, for external as well as internal reasons, because this might have threatened the whole system. In sum, during the Cold War, the issue was above all that of maintaining the status quo, guaranteeing the security and stability of states by essentially taking care of military security.

The end of the Cold War also put an end to this state of affairs. The world order started to change. Changes, however, did not take place in a peaceful environment. Different kinds of wars and violent conflicts emerged, such as Gulf War at the beginning of 1990s and the wars in the Balkans. The internal wars in Rwanda, Zaire and Indonesia, as well as in the Philippines, are also examples of conflicts that accompanied the transformations in the world order.

Because of their conflict potential, the changes after the Cold War have been a breeding ground for different kinds of organised crime networks and international mafias whose activities include money laundering, drugs and narcotics trafficking, illegal sale of arms and terrorism. These are the new security threats.

The evolution described above and these new forms of security threat have also had an impact on the theoretical debate on security, security policies and security concepts. Increasingly, the concept of *comprehensive security* (or enlarged security) has found its way into the contemporary research debate. It is also clear that the concepts concerning military security, in particular have incorporated new elements but, in parallel to these military approaches, new security concepts, actions, functions and actors have also emerged.

The terrorist attacks in the USA in September 2001 were the latest indication that contemporary security threats are no longer just wars between states. A significant part of international community soon realise that this kind of threat can be countered only by systematic and long-term action programmes on a very large scale.

Terrorism is a manifestation of much more profound problems in the various societies involved and in the international community than just an independent, detached phenomenon with only its own internal logic. Efforts to eradicate or reduce terrorism require an understanding of its root causes and require the political will to intervene to eliminate those injustices which provide it with a breeding ground. Indeed, what has just been said about terrorism applies to almost all the new threats – at least the man-made ones. They are linked by causes which, in many cases, are the same.

In this situation, we need to develop our understanding of these new threats and formulate more comprehensive definitions of security. During the last few years, new theoretical frameworks such as *security community*, *security complex* and *security architecture* have widened our understanding of security issues. It is increasingly recognised that security is not a definitive state achieved by society but a process which moves forwards – and sometimes backwards – and thus needs constant attention and care.

New threats and security risks – Most of the so-called new security threats are not new at all. It is only perception of them which has developed in the last few decades, in addition to the fact that the trend towards globalisation makes spillovers and other consequences of security threats more intrusive and palpable. In our global village, in many cases because of the development of communications – both physical and virtual – as well as the expansion of social and economic

relations, many catastrophes and problems which used to be local are now perceived as security risks on a much larger scale.

Wars between states used to be the most important traditional security risk, no less than civil wars and other forms of violence inside countries. Nowadays natural tragedies such as earthquakes and environmental catastrophes have become much more of a security threat than before, when the awareness of them remained limited within smaller areas.

Economic development and competition over resources, for instance water, is also increasingly perceived as a security threat. Almost anything that can be considered an economic factor denying the majority of a population a decent life on the basis of on widely accepted standards can translate into a security risk. The same holds in the social, ethnic and cultural fields, if individuals — especially members of minorities — feel that their identities are not sufficiently respected.

Political and power struggles have often generated violent conflicts. Today, issues related to human rights and the lack of democracy may become intolerable when the socio-economic bases of a society deteriorate and lead to open conflict. In general, non-military threats seem to be increasing and may bring about violent crisis and, as a consequence, cause military threats.

Today's security threats can be classified *grosso modo* into three categories: First, there are those which threaten the existence of states in terms their political structures and territorial integrity. Secondly, there are those threats which endanger the well-being of entire societies and communities; even though they may not present the risk of immediate or short-term violent conflict, they can destabilise society and thus lead to violent conflict in the long-term. Thirdly, there are those threats which threaten everyday life and personal security of individual citizens.

The first category includes all examples of classical military threat, as well as natural catastrophes and economic, social and political disasters depending on their size and significance. Examples are illegal arms dealings, money laundering, terrorism and the trafficking of narcotics – a case in point is Colombia. In the second category, examples include all kinds of natural and environmental catastrophes and organised crime when they significantly lessen general public security in a given society. The third category, concerning individuals, may be limited to causing social discomfort in a society, but in the long run, if generalised, it could turn into a second-category problem and cause different kinds of social violence and threats.

In sum, at the theoretical level, the concept of comprehensive security covers all the security risks which can develop into open and violent conflict domestically or between states.

Comprehensive Security – The concept of comprehensive security is best understood by defining it in terms of the following three dimensions. Security is assured in a comprehensive way when:

Firstly, there is an assurance that no security threat can develop into violent conflict between states or inside societies;

Secondly, all the areas, fields and sectors can develop in such a way that societies and communities do not feel their existence threatened in matters which they feel essential to their ordinary security – apart from immediate or short-term threats of violent conflict. These areas can concern natural catastrophes, economic instability or political and cultural identity;

Thirdly, there are possibilities for the local communities and individuals to have a secure and risk-free life and existence. This is often called *human security*.

Comprehensive security, especially in relation to the second and third dimensions, can also be defined by dividing it into two categories. First, it can be regarded as a process which ensures that there are no threats to the different human *communities* or, more realistically, that they are under control. Secondly, it can be regarded as a process in which the *individuals* and the essential factors of their everyday life are not threatened or, again, are under control.

Human security is sometimes also referred to as *basic security*. This means securing basic social, cultural (civilisational) and economic rights for citizens and other individuals.[2] The introduction of basic security has an important impact on power relations within society and allows for new views on international human rights. In some ways, this goes beyond international human rights and includes components of social solidarity and responsibility.

The debate on basic security and the concepts of comprehensive security revolves around general and even universal values and their implementation in policy responses. In fact responses to the challenges mentioned above call for the development of new approaches and tools. There are two types of responses: first, those which respond to general wishes concerning the economic, social, cultural and political (democratic) conditions of society, and, second a response which is more precise and concerns realistic and practical approaches to immediate responses to concrete security risks. The security community has developed a set of specific tools for dealing with this second dimension. Among the most well established are *conflict resolution*, *conflict prevention*, *preventive diplomacy, post-conflict rehabilitation*. The fundamental question is one of justice, which provides basic security and is a positive constructive force in society and – especially in an international environment – responds to international legality, with particular reference to UN resolutions, on which any common ground must be based.

In recent years, the concept of *non-military crisis management* has found its way into the security debate. This kind of crisis management responds to two requirements. The first is the management of crises which are not military. This also involves problems of normal life in exceptional situations. The second involves the management of military and violent crises by non-military means. It is now understood that, increasingly frequently, even military crises require non-military, political solutions.

Besides these technical actions, which are essentially the prerogative of government, more comprehensive strategic approaches are needed to address the causes of new (and old) conflicts and security threats, and to prevent their reoccurrence. This requires a comprehensive understanding of social, economic and cultural justice as a development process pursued through common efforts by all civilisations. It is an attempt to answer the general and universal challenges of the first category and demands long-term and structural crisis management.

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[2] See Pekka Hallberg, "Kotiseutu ja hyvä elämä", *Hiidenkivi*, No. 5, 2001, p. 11-12. Mr. Hallberg is the President of the *High Court of Administration* in Finland. "Basic security" has been in fact introduced in Finland with the "Basic Rights Reform" in 1995 and then in the 2000 Constitution.

4. Human security in a structural conflict prevention perspective

In recent years, the EU has increasingly emphasised conflict prevention in its external relations. As a part of this policy, the development of long-term conflict prevention is given particular importance[3]. This policy is directed towards achieving socio-economic and political change in the long term so that the very roots of conflict can be eliminated. The basic concept underlying the EU approach to conflict prevention is "structural stability", a concept already worked out by the Commission in 1996 and taken up by the OECD Development Aid Committee in 1997. The Commission says that "Characteristics of structural stability are sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures and healthy environmental and social conditions, with the capacity to manage change without resort to conflict"[4].

As is well known, the implementation of long-term structural reforms, be they of an economic or a political nature, may initiate conflicts and crises in the short-term or as, in any case, the reform is being implemented. In the EMP, this issue is not new, although it is presented in broader terms. In any case, the use of conflict prevention to pursue structural stability through a process of reform would stir the kind of short-term instability and crisis Southern countries fear. This would only emphasise the contrast between proactive EU policy aiming at deep reforms in the South, and reactive defence by Southern countries against what they see, rightly or wrongly, as a factor for destabilisation. Consequently, the EMP would, once again, be prevented from addressing this basic contradiction and looking for common ground.

The use of the concept of human security may offer a way out of this predicament. In fact, the need to solve the contradiction between long-term change and adverse short-term effects deriving from it are at the core of this concept. Structural stability is pursued by introducing sweeping political and economic reforms. As we know, as gradually as these reforms may be introduced, they bring about "crisis-like disruptions"[5] which affect, either economically, socially or politically, the welfare and the security of groups and individuals. Long-term policies of economic development or political change unavoidably generate areas of vulnerability affecting individuals or groups. These short-term instabilities and tensions have to be managed in order to provide security to the human beings involved ("human security") and, in the end, to prevent long-term processes from being derailed.

Human security is today an official foreign policy pursued by a set of countries as a result of the initiative undertaken by Canada and Norway (the "Lysøen process"). In the framework of this policy, a number of across-the-board "vulnerabilities" have been identified, such as "landmines" and "child-soldiers". Some of these areas of vulnerability have already been included in broad EU policies of conflict prevention. What is suggested here is that the concept of human security should be explicitly included in the EMP, so that the emergence of vulnerabilities relating to specific countries and reform processes can be monitored and countered by *ad hoc* measures.

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[3] *Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention*, COM (2001)211 fin., Brussels 11 April 2001.
[4] *Ibidem*, p. 10.
[5] Astri Suhrke, "Human Security and the Interests of States", *Security Dialogue*, vol. 30, No. 3, September 1999, pp. 265-276. A conceptual critique of human security is provided by Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?", *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2, Fall 2001, pp. 87-102.

5. Global security

Including the "human security" concept in the Euro-Med Charter would help to manage, though not to solve, the difference between Northern and Southern perceptions of stability in the EMP. On the one hand, there are instabilities triggered, in particular, by processes of political reform which do not consider "human" security but only the security and stability of political regimes. It is true that incumbent regimes may be made vulnerable through reform. Whether they have to be protected from change, however, entails a political rather than a humanitarian evaluation or, if the indirect human repercussions of such a change are taken into account, a complex political-humanitarian evaluation.

On the other hand, the attainment of structural stability may be prevented not only by the lack of democracy but also by unsolved conflicts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli conflicts. The EU's rhetoric tends to assert, rather expeditiously, that the achievement of regional economic co-operation and integration will bring about peaceful conditions. It is clear, however, that the lack of peaceful conditions may prevent regional economic and political co-operation from taking place. As a matter of fact, this is the reality in the Middle East and, consequently, in the EMP. This means that political reform, apart from the obstacles that may be generated by the inherent dynamics of reform, may be hampered by exogenous factors.

Hesitations about political reform in the Southern Mediterranean are largely due to the radicalisation of domestic political processes caused by unsolved regional conflicts. Unsolved conflicts strengthen religious and nationalist opposition to secular and moderate regimes and their co-operation with the West. To some extent, these exogenous factors weaken or prevent attempts by the regimes to introduce reforms. In these circumstances, reforms may bring about instability or even destabilisation.

Given these situations, the EU and its members face a dilemma that is not new and is inherent in all international strategies of change and stabilisation – the dilemma between the risk of increasing instability and that of "financing dictators" (to use an expression which was popular in the US in a similar political predicament). Finding the right balance between the two extremes is not an easy task. There is no recipe to deal with this dilemma. It calls for uninterrupted guidance and painful short-term political choices. An important question here is whether these choices have to be made unilaterally by the EU or whether they should be part of the political process of the EMP, in particular of its political dialogue.

In the talks on the Charter, a principle that could help steer North-South co-operation with respect to the challenges just mentioned, has been identified: the principle of "global security". The French ambassador in the EMP Senior Officials Committee pointed out "la nécessité d'une approche globale de la stabilité considerée dans ses aspects non seulement externes mais aussi internes (lesquels incluent aussi bien le facteur du développement que les principes du respect de l'Etat de droit et de la proscription de toutes les formes de violence, y compris bien sûr celle du terrorisme)" – a reference to religious extremism[6]. In the perspective of this Report, global security would mean that the pursuance of long-term structural stability by the North must not be at the expense of Southern domestic stability, nor the other way round.

This principle should be included in the Charter beside that of human security. The vulnerabilities it would unveil, however, have a subjective rather than an objective character. In fact, its application is different from that of the human security principle, which allows for the identification of objective categories of vulnerabilities (children, refugees, etc.). The application of the "subjective" global security principle means that the relevant questions must be taken into consideration by

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[6] J.-P. Courtois, *Elements de l'intervention de J.-P. Courtois sur le projet de Charte de Paix et de Stabilité*, Séminaire de Wilton Park sur le Dialogue Euro-Méditerranéen, 19-22 Octobre 1998, p. 4.

EMP institutions and that decisions must be made only by consensus. The relevant point here is not the procedure, which is obvious, but the explicit agreement of the Partners to adopt the principle and to abide by it.

6. Conclusions and recommendations

The Group considered three concepts of security with a view to finding, expanding and consolidating a Euro-Med common ground: comprehensive, human, and global security.

The analysis of the concept of comprehensive security presented above sheds vivid light on the essential role that human rights, democracy and the rule of law play as the rationale behind this concept. However, because of the differences between North and South over human rights and democracy, comprehensive security cannot constitute a common ground today. At the same time, it is the fact that the Partners agreed on a set of partial but significant components of a comprehensive security concept; in particular the importance to be given to civilian and human aspects when dealing with security should not be overlooked. Consequently, as far as comprehensive security is concerned, the Euro-Med Partners are currently divided over the role that human rights and democracy play in the concept but are united by the emphasis they wish to put on non-military components of security.

To be more precise, what divides North and South in the Euro-Med framework is security itself. Democracy, with its respect for human rights and law, is the cornerstone of EU security and, at the same time, its very concept of security. By promoting democracy in neighbouring countries and internationally, the EU is also promoting the conditions for international co-operation and conflict prevention and, ultimately, its own security. Thus, the promotion of democracy and human rights in the EMP responds to a supreme EU security requirement. It is in this sense, that many Southern Partners argue that the Partners are divided by security and advocate the exclusion of security from the Euro-Med process so as to exclude democracy and create a common ground based on developmental issues alone.

This exclusion cannot, however, be accepted by the EU, not only because of its objective interest in stability and security in its Southern approaches, but also because the development of a foreign and security policy is an essential building-block in its identity. Consequently, existing divisions cannot be eliminated by a non-security approach. This does not, however, jeopardise the existing factors of unity, for in fact these divisions do not exclude the importance of the Partners' agreement on co-operation on non-military security factors.

Although this "civilian" common ground allows for a significant degree of co-operation and joint action in civilian matters, this is still not enough to constitute a solid common ground. This is confirmed by the fact that the EU's emerging structural conflict prevention policy – no doubt applicable in the EMP as well – is definitely a non-military and civilian endeavour. But it is equally rooted in the long-term promotion of democracy and human rights and, therefore, in that very security approach which continues to divide the Southern from the Northern Partners in the EMP. Despite this, the Group considered that the fundamental division which prevents full application of the comprehensive security concept can at least be attenuated by the application of the other two security concepts, human and global security.

Human security is a component of the comprehensive security concept. As such, it is no less linked to human rights and democracy than comprehensive security itself. If human security is regarded as the source of basic rights pertaining to citizens and communities, for the purpose of the search for Euro-Med common ground, it has the same significance as comprehensive security and the same limitations with respect to the EMP. If it is regarded as the source that legitimises joint policy responses to specific short-term situations of disruption and tension, it can result in common considerations and a degree of common ground.

For human security to be able to stake out a common ground by way of what has just been mentioned, the EMP must be able and willing to make common decisions and have a modicum of

instruments to implement those decisions. As a matter of fact, given its proactive attitude, the EU now definitely seems inclined to intervene with its own instruments and, if necessary, would look to the EMP as the framework for legitimation. But such unilateralism would never generate common ground. Common ground can only be generated by EMP capacity to make joint decisions to assure human security when needed and consequently to take joint action. In many cases, joint decisions and actions will prove impossible whilst in other cases they will contribute to gradually establishing a common ground. A more efficient political dialogue is thus the necessary condition for human security to make its way into the EMP and reinforce common ground.

While human security would work better as a policy than as a principle in the EMP, the global security concept could work essentially as a guiding principle. The application of global security means constant attention by all Partners to the others' reasons for searching for security. If strengthened political dialogue is a necessary condition for the concept of human security to work, this is even truer for global security. In a sense, political dialogue could be envisioned primarily as the instrument with which to secure global security in the Euro-Med framework.

Having reached these conclusions, the Group recommends the following:

- The EMP should recognise comprehensive security as the long-term common ground for its partnership; at the same time, it should point out that conditions are not ripe for full and joint implementation of this concept of security today. With a view to creating the right conditions, the EMP should note that Partners have already set out an important common ground by agreeing on the possibility for joint action in developing co-operation in non-military matters; this agreement is not equivalent to comprehensive security but allows for the achievement of an important part of it: thus, it is a good start towards agreeing on the entire concept and helping towards the conditions needed to make its development possible;

- The EMP should openly and formally adopt the principle of human security and define its short-term significance and relevance for the Process which is intended to establish an area of peace, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean in the long-term; it should establish procedures for decision-making and instruments to take joint actions when human security has to be enforced or restored;

- The EMP should adopt the principle of global security to provide the Partners with the instruments needed to guide the painful and difficult process of handling the concept of human security in a joint perspective and moving towards a fuller application of the principle of comprehensive security;

- The EMP should strengthen its political dialogue as it is the only factor that can make these elements of common ground work at present and should translate them as soon as possible into the basis for a Euro-Med common ground.

In considering the question of the common ground for EMP security, the Group has emphasised that, whatever concept the EMP is willing to adopt, it will only be workable if a fair political solution is found to the Arab-Israeli dispute, in particular to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in the framework of the relevant UN resolutions. In this sense, it recommends that, in seeking their common ground, the Partners should be more assertive and effective in contributing to the solution of the conflicts in question.

ANNEX 1

Meetings

1. Tunis 7 April 2001, the Istituto Affari Internazionali-IAI and the Association des Etudes Internationales-AEI meets to set out the terms of reference of the Working Group

2. Brussels 18-19 June 2001, some members of the Group meet on the occasion of the Steering Committee gathering

3. Tunis 5-6 October, seminar of the Group on "Searching for a New Consensus in the Euro-Med Partnership"

Papers

1. Roberto Aliboni, *Sharing New Concepts of Security in the EMP*

2. Amine Ait-Chaalal & Bichara Khader, *Le rôle de l'Europe dans la consolidation de la paix au Proche-Orient*

3. Khalifa Chater, *Visions sécuritaires*

4. Anssi Männistö, *The Shift of Focus of Security Concept in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*

5. Tuomo Melasuo, *Euro-Mediterranean Framework and the Concept of Comprehensive Security*

6. Ahmed Ounaïes, *Charte Euro-Méditerranéenne de Paix et de Stabilité: Quelle Charte? Quelle Paix? Quel Partenariat?*

ANNEX 2

MEMBERS OF THE GROUP

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EuroMeSCo Papers

1
Volker Perthes, *Germany and the EuroMediterranean Partnership: Gradually Becoming a Mediterranean State*, February 1998. (Available also in French)

2
May Chartouni-Dubarry, *Les processus de transition politique au Proche-Orient*, septembre 1998.

3
Alfred Tovias, *Israel and the Barcelona Process*, October 1998.

4
George Joffé, *Foreign Investment and the Rule of Law*, March 1999.

5
Azzem Mahjoub et Hafedh Zaafrane, *La zone de libre-échange euro-méditerranéenne*, mars 1999.

6
Gema Martin Muñoz, *Réforme politique et changements sociaux : l'exemple des pays du Maghreb*, avril 1999.

7
Roberto Aliboni, *Building Blocks for the Euro-Med Charter on Peace and Stability*, January 2000. (Available also in French)

8
M. Fatih Tayfur, *Turkish Perceptions of the Mediterranean*, March 2000.

9
George Joffé, *International Implications of Domestic Security*, April 2000.

10
Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, *La politique de visas dans l'espace euro-méditerranéen*, avril 2000.

11
Elvira Sánchez Mateos, *The Antipersonnel Landmines Issue in the Mediterranean*, April 2000.

12
May Chartouni-Dubarry, *Complementarity between the European Union and the United States in the Middle East Peace Process: Implications for the EMP*, avril 2000. (Available also in French)

13
Álvaro de Vasconcelos, *Intégration et coopération sous-régionale en Méditerranée*, avril 2000.

14
Ayman Abdel Nour, *Syrian Views of an Association Agreement with the European Union*, December 2001.

15
Ulrike Julia Reinhardt, *Civil Society Co-operation in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: From Declarations to Practice*, May 2002.

16
IEEI/CIDOB/GERM, *European Defence – Perceptions and Realities, Working Group III First Year Report*, June 2002.

17
IAI/AEI, *Security and Common Ground in the Euro-Med Partnership, Working Group I First Year Report*, June 2002.